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FIRST NOTES ON A THEME FROM SAENZ
BernardE. Jacob*
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FOUNDER-STATE TRUSTS

New York has imposed a tax on the net income of resident and
nonresident individuals, trusts and estates for more than eighty years. 2
During all of that time, the scheme for the taxation of trusts has centered
on a distinction between resident trusts and nonresident trusts. The same
distinction is important for all taxpayers, not just trusts. A resident
individual, for example, is taxed on his or her global income, that is,
income from any and all sources whatever, just as in the case of a
resident trust, while a nonresident pays taxes only on income that has its
source in New York.
Most states impose taxes on income of both residents and
nonresidents, so that where an out-of-state taxpayer receives income
from a source within a state there is a potential for double taxation.! To
take the example of someone who is a resident of New York, but owns a
goldmine in California, that taxpayer would report and pay a tax on all
her income to New York, including the net income from the California
goldmine. She would, as a nonresident under California law, report and
pay a tax to California, but California would tax only her goldmine
income.
The taxation of the goldmine income by both California and New
York is surely double taxation of that income;5 but this double taxation
2.

See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION

20.01 (3d ed.

2002).
3. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 605 (McKinney 2002).
4. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supranote 2, 20.04[2].
5. For a discussion of double (or multiple) taxation, see infra notes 379-83 and
accompanying text.
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has always been seen as comporting with the United States
6
Constitution. As a result, the imposition of these two state income taxes
on the same income by New York and California depends solely on the
tax laws of the two states. The good news is that New York, as almost
any American State that has a general state income tax, will permit a
resident taxpayer to credit the tax paid elsewhere as a nonresident
taxpayer against the tax due the state of residence.7
In New York, however, I also find another aspect of the income tax
law applicable to trusts that is even stranger than the potential for double
taxation that New York's tax credit has, generally, transformed into the
stately dance of cooperation described above. I mean, here, New York's
definition of a New York resident trust. A New York resident trust is one
whose settlor or settlors were New York residents at the time the trust
became effective and irrevocable. s Every testamentary trust whose
settlor died a resident of New York is a resident trust; and every inter
vivos trust is a resident trust if the settlor was a resident of New York at
the time the trust became irrevocable.9 All such trusts are New York
resident trusts without any regard to the current residence of living
settlors or the current or past residence of trustees or beneficiaries of the
trust, the place of "administration" of the trust in the sense of the
carrying on of its regular operations,"0 whether or not any of the income

6. The principle has always been clear. See Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n of Miss., 286
U.S. 276, 280-81 (1932) (stating resident taxable on out-of-state income); Shaffer v. Carter, 252
U.S. 37, 52 (1920) (explaining nonresident taxable on income from in-state property). Actually, the
passive receipt of income from realty, as from a goldmine, presented some special problem. In
Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422, 433 (1935), the Court struck down a state property tax imposed on
a beneficiary's income interest in an out-of-state trust whose assets were out-of-state realty, and
many felt that the Court was insisting on looking through the trust to the underlying realty; but New
York ex rel. Cohn v Graves, 300 U.S. 308, 311 (1937), put to rest the issue of barring a tax on a
resident's income from out-of-state realty. At issue was a New York tax on a New Yorker's income
from rents from a New Jersey property. Upholding the New York tax, then-Justice Stone said: "It
would be pressing the protection which the due process clause throws around the taxpayer too far to
say that because a state is prohibited from taxing land which it neither protects nor controls, it is
likewise prohibited from taxing the receipt and command of income from the land ....
Id at 314.
7. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 2,
20.04, 20.10; Warren Freedman,
PracticalAspects of Multiple State Taxation of Intangibles of Nonresident Decedents Since the
Aldrich Case, 24 NOTRE DAME LAw. 41, 1 (1948-1949).
8. See N.Y. TAX LAw § 605 (McKinney 2002).
9. See id.
10. In most states, the court which had jurisdiction over the administration of the estate will
"retain" jurisdiction over any trust created by the will. In some states, trustees will have to account
periodically before that court. In others, the court will continue to represent a possible forum for
litigation affecting the trust or the trustees. This has been identified as an appropriate nexus for
imposing a tax. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, 733 A.2d 782, 790 (Conn.), cert. denied,528
U.S. 965 (1999); District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d 539, 543 (D.C. 1997);
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of the trust has its source in New York or how long a time has elapsed
without any contact with New York by any of the beneficiaries, trustees,
or settlors." I call a trust that fits this definition of residence, a FounderState Trust.
The language of the New York tax law imposes state income
taxation on the entire or global net income of any trust if it is a FounderState Trust. That law makes residence of a Founder-State Trust turn
solely on the residence of the settlor of the trust as of a particular
moment in time. n A number of other states have similar Founder-State
Trust provisions,' 3 but others fix upon the current residence of the
beneficiaries or of the trustees of the trust. 4 This interplay, taken
together with the interplay between source based and global taxation,
means that the possibilities for double taxation are increased with respect
to trust income.' 5
Under the statute, the settlor's residence may have been momentary
and may have occurred long in the past, have long since been terminated
and need not be currently accompanied by any other contact with the
state. 6 Thus, we can take the following plausible case of an inter vivos
New York trust. Let us suppose the trust was created in 1931 by a
divorcing husband, who had moved to New York after he left his former
wife and children in Chicago where the marital home was. The trust
itself was designed to provide for his former wife and the children he
had with her, and the trust was irrevocable when created. The husband,
let us say, would be found to be a New York resident at the moment he
created the trust although he was never a resident before and soon after
ceased to be a resident; he died many years later as an Illinois resident.
The trust has, from its inception, been administered by a corporate
trustee who is both incorporated in and has its principal place of
business in California. The settlor's former wife, children, and
grandchildren, the only beneficiaries of the will, might have never had a
domicile in New York. Under the statute, New York still claims-in

First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Harvey, 16 A.2d 184, 189 (Vt. 1940). No such jurisdictional nexus is
created in the case of an inter vivos trust.
11. See N.Y. TAX LAw § 605 (McKinney 2002).
12. See id.
13. See infra Appendix.
14. See id.
15. State taxation of trusts is almost universally a "conduit" approach, where the trust gets a
deduction for income distributed and taxable to the beneficiaries, but pays a tax on income that is
accumulated. Subsequent distribution to beneficiaries is without further tax. See HELLERSTEIN &
HELLERSTEIN, supra note 2, 20.09.
16. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 605 (McKinney 2002).
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tax all intangibles in the state of the taxpayer's residence and prohibited
any other state from imposing any tax, either on such intangibles or their

transmission at death.23 The basis for this approach in the Cases
Allocating Intangibles,as I later will call them, was that the Due Process
Clause protected taxpayers against "double taxation" by states, which,
absent the constraint imposed on the states by that clause, could and
would seize upon various aspects of an intangible's connection to
different states.2 4 The attempt to create such a rigid scheme of protection
was always a controversial one. Each decision in the line evoked
dissents and called forth an outpouring of partisan commentary, pro and
con.2 Numerous earlier cases on the taxation of intangibles had to be
overruled to effectuate the desired allocation of the tax situs of
intangibles. 6 Ultimately, this initiative with respect to the taxation of
intangibles was overturned in a series of cases decided by a court with a
different make-up.27
To return to New York Founder-State Trusts, however, the New
York court in Murphy found that the Safe Deposit and Trust Co. was
recognized as still standing in the 1938 case of Guaranty Trust v.
Virginia,2 even after this turn-around.2 As the New York Court saw it,
neither that case nor Graves v. Elliott30 undercut the earlier Maryland
trust case. The intermediate court in Murphy had found "no merit" in
the argument that the continuing jurisdiction of New York Surrogate

23. See Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 209-10 (1930); Baldwin v.
Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 591 (1930); Beidler v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 282 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1930).
24. For example, in addition to the state of the creditor's residence, to which the Court wished
to award the allocation, states had sought to tax intangible property on the grounds that they were
the state of the debtor's residence, the state of the corporation's charter (for purposes of taxing
corporate shares), the state where the evidences of the intangibles were kept (especially where these
were treated as embodying the debt) and, in certain cases, the state where intangibles, even if not
evidenced by any document, could be treated as part of an ongoing business located in such state,
even when conducted on behalf of the nonresident. Where a trust was involved, the possible
"properties" and the possible "connections" were multiplied. See Roger John Traynor, State
Taxation of Trust Income, 22 IOVA L. REv. 268, 284 (1937).
25. See, e.g., the articles cited in notes 270-71 infra.
26. See FirstNat'lBank of Boston, 284 U.S. at 318.
27. See infra notes 272-78, 311-34 and accompanying text.
28. 305 U.S. 19 (1938).
29. See Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Murphy, 15 N.Y.S. 2d 579,581 (1964).
30. 307 U.S. 383 (1939). In this case, Utah was permitted to exact an inheritance tax on bonds
issued by a corporation incorporated in Utah.
31. See infra notes 38-59 and accompanying text; HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note
2 20.09[2] (questioning the continuing validity of Safe Deposit & Trust Co v. Virginia as based on
aversion to double taxation "long ... repudiated by the [Supreme] Court" and thus having
"weakened authority").
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principle-a tax on all the net income of the trust (reduced by
recognized distributions), which for all we know might have been
principally invested in businesses scattered throughout the western
United States, each of them also without any contact whatsoever with
the State of New York.
I say that New York demands such a tax payment "in principle,"
because in fact it has been seen as uncollectible at least since 1964 and
perhaps in fact from the time the statute was first passed or shortly
thereafter. The formal occasion for suspension of the tax provision was
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Mercantile-Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. v. Murphy.17 There a New York resident had settled
a trust in Maryland in 1953 as a revocable inter vivos trust; on his death
in 1956, an additional $1 MM was poured over into the trust. Because
the trust was originally settled on and has remained with non-New York
institutions as trustee, the Court held that the trust was not subject to
New York income tax for lack of a nexus. In fact, the beneficiary was a
New York resident but the trustee has power to accumulate, and the tax
is on accumulated income.'8
The New York Court put the case on an old U.S. Supreme Court
decision, Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia,'9 which set
aside Virginia's attempt to impose an ad valorem property tax on
intangibles that stood in the name of a Maryland corporate trustee, but
which had been transferred to that trustee by a settlor resident in
Virginia, for accumulation for the benefit of Virginia beneficiaries.2 The
Court, back then, had viewed the Virginia tax as an attempt to tax a
valuable intangible property right that was not "in" Virginia, but was
treated by the Court as having a constitutionally compelled situs in
Maryland, the principal place of business of the trustee.2 ' This
invalidation of this intangibles property tax can be seen as one of a string
of decisions leading up to First National Bank of Boston v. Maine,2 2 in
an effort to impose a national taxing regime that localized the power to

17. 15 N.Y.2d 579 (1964).
18. In a number of states, the local residence of a noncontingent trust beneficiary would
trigger resident taxation of the trust. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, 733 A.2d 782, 802
(Conn. 1999) (imposing a tax on undistributed income of an inter vivos trust settled by a
Connecticut resident with a New York trustee based on the Connecticut residence of the sole
beneficiary). Other states make a similar move, for example, see CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE,
§§ 17442, 17744 (2002).
19. 280 U.S. 83 (1929).
20. See id. at 89-90.
21. See id. at 93.
22. 284 U.S. 312 (1932).
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Court over the pour-over trust was a sufficient nexus, so as to permit
taxing of income accumulated in the Maryland trust.32
The Murphy case still stands as governing New York law.33 The
legislature, however, has never reacted to the loss of revenue stemming
from the holding in the Murphy case. Despite many other changes in the
state income tax law, the old statutory definition remains unchanged.3
Finally, in 1992, the New York State Department of Finance adopted a
regulation setting out at least a minimal reading of the Murphy case, and
a paraphrase of the regulation is now found in the Instructions relating to
the resident tax return. 35 That regulation provides that Founder-State
Trusts are not liable as residents for New York State income tax in any
year where all trustees and beneficiaries are nonresidents of New York
and the trust does not have any New York source income or assets.36 The
section makes no reference to the Murphy case, and it does not state
whether the regulation is intended to create a safe harbor or whether it
means that the trust does become liable if any one of the three contacts is
established.37
32. See Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Murphy, 19 A.D.2d 765, 766 (App. Div.
1963). In this, New York stands with the majority of other states that adopt the Founder-State
definition of a resident trust. See Traynor, supra note 24, at 275; HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN,
supranote 2, 20.09; S.R. Shapiro, Annotation, State Tax on Trust Income as Affected by Foreign
Elements, 5 A.L.R. 3d 606, § 3[b] (1966), superseding71 A.L.R. 685.
33. See In re Taylor, 445 N.Y.S.2d 648, 649 (3d Dep't 1981).
34. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 605 (McKinney 2002).
35. See N.Y. COMP. CODES & REGS. tit. 20, § 105.23 (2001).
36. See id.
37. The relevant part of the regulation, reads as follows:
(c) The determination of whether a trust is a resident trust is not dependent on the
location of the trustee or the corpus of the trust or the source of income; provided,
however, no New York State personal income tax may be imposed on such trust if all of
the following conditions are met:
(1) all the trustees are domiciled in a state other than New York State;
(2) the entire corpus of the trust, including real and tangible property is located
outside of New York State; and
(3) all income and gains of the trust are derived or connected from sources outside
of New York State, determined as if the trust were a nonresident.
(d) Examples. The following examples illustrate the provisions of this section.
Example 1: Taxpayer A who is domiciled in New York State and taxpayer B
who is domiciled in New Jersey together create an irrevocable trust. The
portion of such trust attributable to property transferred by A is a New York
State resident trust and the portion of such trust attributable to property
transferred by B is a New York State nonresident trust.
Example 2: Taxpayer C creates an irrevocable trust while such taxpayer is a
domiciliary of New York State. Subsequent to the creation of such trust, C
moves and becomes a domiciliary of California and transfers additional
property to such irrevocable trust. The portion of such trust attributable to
property transferred while C was a domiciliary of New York State is a New
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I have already indicated above that the Murphy court may be
exaggerating in their claim that Safe Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore
v. Virginia" remains sound law. The decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States have repudiated the attempt that was made in Cases
Allocating Intangibles during the late 1920s and early 1930s-of which
Safe Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia is an exemplar-to
fix a single constitutionally compelled situs for state ad valorem and
inheritance taxation of intangibles.
This turn from a Due Process Clause based rule against double
taxation is part of the discernible trend on the part of the Supreme Court,
over the past five decades, to protect the tax sources available to the state
in almost every field, even at the risk of double taxation. The Court has
moved slowly, but surely in the direction of removing all formal bars to
state taxation that were laid "on" interstate commerce, in the case of
reasonably apportioned income taxes, that do not discriminate in favor
of in-state businesses.3 ' These were bars that it previously had erected
under the Interstate Commerce Clause as well as the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The last formal bar was removed
as long ago as 1977 in Complete Auto Transit,Inc. v. Brady.41 The Court
has also, in effect, coordinated under the Interstate Commerce Clause
and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a whole
complex of sales and use taxes on the sale of goods and services. The
Court has generally relaxed the standards for the elements of nexus that
will sustain a Due Process or Interstate Commerce Clause attack on the
effort to get out-of-state merchants to collect such a tax.
At the same time, the Court has continued to reserve the powers it
first asserted early in the nineteenth century to review state tax laws in
the light of these and other provisions of the constitution.

York State resident trust and the portion of such trust attributable to property
transferred while C was a domiciliary of California is a New York State
nonresident trust.
Example 3: D, who is domiciled in Canada, creates an irrevocable trust with
the X Trust Company in New York City as trustee. The entire corpus of the
trust consists of securities of American corporations, which are actively
traded by the trustee on the New York Stock Exchange. The beneficiaries of
the trust are all New York State residents. Regardless of whether the trust is
held to be a resident of the United States for Federal income tax purposes, it
is, for New York State income tax purposes, a nonresident trust.
Id.
38.
39.
40.
41.

280 U.S. 83 (1929).
See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274,289 (1977).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
Brady, 430 U.S. at289.
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Either this relaxation of Due Process nexus requirements has
encouraged efforts by tax collectors in other states with Founder-State
Trust provisions to apply the provisions of the statute literally, or the
grudging admission of limits on Founder-State Trust taxation evidenced,
for example, in the New York State 1992 regulation has prodded trustees
to contest tax claims. Chase Manhattan Bank as trustee has been
involved in such litigation in Connecticut and Washington, D.C. in the
last few years, and it has lost in each case." In District of Columbia v.
Chase Manhattan Bank,43 the testamentary trust was established in the
D.C. decedent's probate proceedings in 1935, but the trust never had any
connection with the District of Columbia other than the jurisdiction of
the probate court. 44 In Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin,45 there are four
testamentary trusts that became effective, respectively, in 1975, 1974,
1968, and 1936 and so are, respectively, 24, 25, 31 and 63 years
removed from the proceedings in the probate court. 4 6 None of these trusts
have current contacts with Connecticut, save that each was established
under the will of a Connecticut resident probated in Connecticut and
under Connecticut law. Under Connecticut law, the probate court has
continuing jurisdiction over testamentary trusts in certain matters.
The two courts emphasized the relaxation of the standards under the
United States Constitution for the nexus required for state taxation and
enlarged upon the consequences of the continuing jurisdiction of the
probate court

9

over a testamentary trust.50 In both cases, the court relies

42. Much earlier a Vermont court had upheld Founder-State Trust taxation of testamentary
trusts without any other state nexus. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Harvey, 16 A.2d 184, 190
(Vt. 1940) (relying on Hutchins v. Comm'r, 172 N.E. 605, 607, 610 (Mass. 1930), which refused to
tax Massachusetts trustees of a trust established under the will of a New York resident and taxed in
New York under the Founder-State Trust approach).
43. 689 A.2d 539 (D.C. 1997).
44. See id. at 540-41.
45. 733 A.2d 782, 787 (Conn. 1999).
46. See id. at 787.
47. See id.
48. Two of the testamentary trusts require accountings to be made in Connecticut, but
Connecticut law permits waiver of annual accountings, and such accountings have been waived
under the other two trusts; all will be wound up and discharged under Connecticut law by a
Connecticut court. See id. at 799.
49. As used in this Article, a probate court is a court of limited jurisdiction with power over
matters relating to the probate, administration, and distribution of the assets of local decedents. In
some states, the probate court may have another name, such as the Surrogate's Court in New York,
or Orphans' Court in Pennsylvania and elsewhere; but the functions and histories of the probate
court in each state conforms, to a substantial degree, to a single, national template.
50. Jurisdiction of the probate court over inter vivos trusts has itself varied over time. The
Gavin court recognizes that inter vivos trusts stand on a different footing than do testamentary
trusts. See Gavin, 733 A.2d at 790.
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on the relaxation of nexus demanded under the Due Process Clause,
citing Quill Corp. v. North Dakota,5' and then proceeds to find the
continuing jurisdiction of the probate court to constitute a sufficient
nexus for the tax. 2
Both these cases are, decided on a winner-take-all basis; if the
minimal nexus is established, the full reach of the state statute is
justified. In each case the court notes that the parties did not litigate the
possibility that imposition of a tax in the circumstances would not
satisfy, without some form of apportionment, the Constitutional test
under the Due Process Clause. 3 That clause, in addition to the
requirement of a minimum nexus, requires that "there be a rational
relationship between the' 54income attributed to the state and the intrastate
values of the enterprise.
One of the trusts involved in the Gavin case was an inter vivos
irrevocable trust." Like the other trusts, the trust was administered by
Chase Bank as trustee; the founder, however, had been a Connecticut
resident. 6 He had since died, but the sole beneficiary of the trust is
currently a Connecticut resident."7 The court, in determining the
taxability of trust income, finds that the probate court does not provide
the same nexus as in the case of the testamentary trust, but that the
Connecticut residence of the beneficiary is a sufficient jurisdictional
nexus, to permit Connecticut to tax the trust income under a FounderState Trust provision.
51. 504 U.S. 298 (1992). This case involved challenges to North Dakota's ability to compel
the plaintiff to collect and pay over use tax for out-of-state sales to Dakota residents where the
plaintiff had no physical facilities in North Dakota. See id. at 301. First, the Court held that the want
of physical facilities did not necessarily offend the nexus requirements under the Due Process
Clause, but that, distinguishing the requirement of nexus under the Interstate Commerce Clause, it
would not reverse its earlier decisions limiting the liability of out-of-state sellers for use tax on
goods sold to North Dakota residents. See id. at 305, 317. Laurence Tribe lends voice to a fierce
attack on the inadequacies of the Court in respect of the broader reaches of the "nexus" doctrines
under the Due Process Clause. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 639, at 1282, 1286 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter TRIBE Third].
52. See Gavin, 733 A.2d at 792; District of Columbia v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d
539, 542 (D.C. 1997). The New York court rejected the Surrogate Court's, that is New York's
probate court's, continuing jurisdiction as a relevant contact in the Murphy case. See supra note 17.
53. See Gavin, 733 A.2d at 791; Chase Manhattan Bank, 689 A.2d at 542 n.6.
54. The paraphrased language comes from Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. Bair, 437 US.
267, 273 (1978), and it is set forth in the Gavin opinion. See Gavin, 733 A.2d at 791.
55. See id. at 787.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 788.
58. See id. at 790. Note that this analysis no longer justifies Founder-State Trust taxation as
such. Taxability of this trust pieces together (1) the Founder-State language of the Connecticut tax
law with (2) the fortuitous fact that the beneficiary is a Connecticut resident.
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Finally, in the Gavin case, the court does not find Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia a barrier; it considers that case has
been overruled. 9
The purposes of this Article will be to consider the history of
Founder-State Trusts as part of the state income tax law, to elucidate
their purpose and effect, and to consider the present day status of claims
of a constitutional protection that can be erected against state taxing
power in this context. This Article will also consider specifically those
claims of constitutional protection that ought to be erected against the
literal application of the Founder-State Trust concept and other variant
concepts of state residence, or at least against some applications of those
concepts, to consider what constitutional provisions might be applicable
to such taxation in light of historical constitutional jurisprudence, and
finally, 60 to argue that the privileges or immunities of national citizenship
may be the guerdon that will right these wrongs, now that the clause
61
seems to have been revived in Justice Stevens' opinion in Saenz v. Roe.
II. AT THE INCEPTION
The New York personal income tax was initiated in 1919.62 The
Founder-State Trust approach to distinguishing between resident and

59. See id. at 802; McCulloch v. Franchise Tax Bd., 390 P.2d 412, 418 (Cal. 1964)
(concluding that Safe Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia is no longer good law; most
specifically that conclusion rests on a per curiam affirmance, Stewart v. Pennsylvania,312 U.S. 649
(1941), of a state court decision, Commonwealth v. Stewart, 12 A.2d 444 (Pa. 1940) which held
Pennsylvania properly levied a personal property tax on the equitable interest, a life estate, of a
Pennsylvania beneficiary of a New York Founder-State Trust administered by New York trustees)
and on Commonwealth v. Sutcliffe, 140 S.W.2d 1028 (Ky. 1940). Both the latter cases distinguish,
rather than treat as overruled Safe Deposit and Trust v. Virginia. It is also worth noting that the
California statute is one that specifically purported to tax the income of trusts, wherever located, to
the extent of the interest of beneficiaries resident in California. See McCulloch, 61 P.2d at 416-17.
60. See Part IV, infra for a statement about the failure, in this Article, to consider notable
cases of tax-competition and tax-harmonization among the states in light of that constitutional
protection, as part of identifying some factors of state action in view of tax fairness.
61. 526 U.S. 489,501 (1999).
62. See generally 1919 N.Y. Laws ch. 627. It was preceded by a corporate franchise tax in
1917, a tax "measured" by net income. See 1917 N.Y. Laws ch. 726. New York State has
continuously imposed a personal income tax from 1919. In 1960 the New York legislature enacted
an income tax which was calculated by using the taxable income reported on the taxpayer's Federal
return, with New York adjustments as Article 22 of the N.Y. TAX LAW, §§ 601-99. See 1960 N.Y.
Laws 1960 ch. 563. The new law had been authorized by an amendment to the NYS Constitution of
1938 adding an additional paragraph in Article 3, § 22, adopted at the General Election of
November 3,1959 and effective as of the first of January, 1960. The old tax law, NYS TAX LAW
Article 16, §§ 350-73, was retained for years prior to 1960. See § 350a. Article 16 was finally
repealed by 1987 N.Y. Law ch. 19, effective July 20, 1987. Notwithstanding the new approach to
calculating New York state income tax under the 1960 Act, the tax, differently imposed on "resident
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nonresident trusts essentially arrived at the same time, 6 in the form of a
limitation on the taxation of nonresident trusts to income from sources
within the state, a limitation that can be found in a provision in § 365-3
of the Act, which states that
an estate or trust created by a person not a resident ...shall be subject
to tax only to the extent to which individuals other than residents are
liable under section 359, subdivision 3...64

Before approaching the problem of Founder-State Trust taxation,
we need to provide some context for the provisions of 1919's section
365-3.
A.

Income Taxation in the United States

Introduction of personal income taxes, the main-stay of Federal
taxation for nearly a century and, at the beginning of the twenty-first
century, an important element in the revenues of most states, did not
come without political and constitutional struggle at both the state and
the federal level. 65 From any perspective, imposition of such taxes would

estates and trusts" and on "every nonresident and part-year resident.., trust and nonresident estate,"
N.Y.S. Tax Law, §§ 601(c), (e)(1), continued to employ the Founder-State Trust basis for the
distinction. See 1960 N.Y. Laws §§ 618, 631,638; N.Y. TAx LAW § 601(e)(1) (McKinney 2002). A
"resident ...trust" is there defined as one settled by a person who was a New York domiciliary at
the time the trust was irrevocably settled. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b)(3)(c)(i) (McKinney 2002). In
section 618, the income of a resident trust is defined as "its federal taxable income as defined in the
laws of the United States," that is, the global income of the trust from whatever source. N.Y. TAX
LAW § 618.
63. In the event, the negative implication of the proviso was reflected when contemporaneous
regulations were made available. See N.Y.S. Comptroller, Income Tax Regulations, Art. 243
(1919). See generally HENRY M. POWELL, THE TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND PERSONAL
INCOME IN NEW YORK (rev. ed. 1919). See Brief for Appellant at 8-11, Mercantile-Safe Deposit &
Trust Co. v. Murphy, 15 N.Y.2d 579 (1964) (No. 94) [hereinafter Murphy Brief]. The negative
implication was finally made explicit in 1935 N.Y. Laws ch. 286. The Murphy Brief makes it clear
that this legislation "merely incorporates into the law the departmental interpretation arrived at
when the statute was silent." Murphy Brief, supra at 9.
64. 1919 N.Y. Laws ch. 627, § 365-3 (emphasis added). The provisions of § 359-3 limits
taxable income to "gross income from sources within the state, but shall not include annuities,
interest
... bearing obligations or dividends from corporations except to the extent ... a part of
income from any business, trade, profession or occupation carried on in this state .... The
language of the statute points to one of the major issues of Founder-State income taxation, a
nonresident trust is not taxed on income from intangibles, which are conventionally located in the
state of the owner's domicile, when held by the trust as assets except where those intangibles had
been "located" as part of an in-state business.
65. See CAROLYN WEBBER & AARON WILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND
EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 416-27 (1986); DAVID N. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A
CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THEORY TO POLICY 448-49 (4th ed. 1983); EDWIN R.A.
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be a novelty. It was argued that income taxes were difficult to
administer, insofar as the entire tax structure depended on the taxpayer's
declaration of income or, in the alternative, required the creation of an
expensive group of administrators and investigators who would oversee
an unpopular inquisition into the affairs of individuals.
Although there were instances of taxation of incomes at the state
level-where incomes were treated as property and often assessed by
arbitrary rules-of-thumb-in the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries, these gradually sank into desuetude. The most famous and
important examples of the imposition of income taxes in the nineteenth
century came during the Civil War of 1861 to 1865 when taxes were
imposed on incomes, in both the North and the South, 6 to meet the
emergency demands of financing the Civil War. Although the
Confederate taxes fell with the Confederacy and the federal income tax 7
expired without renewal some years after the end of the Civil War, at the
same time the federal experience with an income tax (and its subsequent
lapse) became the focus of a call for relief from high tariffs and for taxes
to be collected on incomes rather than property and to be coupled with
the greater "vertical equity" of a progressive tax rate. At both the
national and state levels, there was also widespread agitation over the
escape of non-real estate assets from taxation. s
A new national personal income tax, so structured that it exempted
all but a relatively small class of the wealthy, was enacted in the 1890s,
as part of a revision of federal taxation and revenues. Support by
representatives
from largely agricultural states was key to passage of the
69
tax.
SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACTICE OF INCOME

TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 388-419 (2d ed. 1921). See generally POWELL, supra note 63.

66. Income taxes were imposed by the federal government of the Confederate states only in
1863. When introduced, the success of any Confederate financing efforts were already
compromised due to earlier unwise Confederate fiscal policies that had resulted in a runaway
depreciation of the Confederate paper currency. Increasingly desperate, the Confederate government
had raised the rate of income tax to high levels by the end of war. See SIDNEY RATNER, TAXATION
AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERIcA 100 (1980 reprt.).

67. The Federal income tax in the Civil War was first proposed as an alternative to a national
real estate tax. In 1862, Congress enacted both taxes, but the income tax proved more productive.
68. "With industrialization... real-property taxes failed to capture revenue from the growing
wealth in intangible property .... Because property taxes failed to tap existing sources of wealth,
they did not keep pace with spending in local governments." ,VEBBER & WILDAVSKY, supra note
65, at 417.
69. Reliance on an advalorem tax on real property while allowing intangible property and
income to go tax free weighs heavier on farmers than persons in professional or industrial pursuits.
See SELIGMAN, supranote 65, ch. 4; W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, JR., PROGRESSMISM AND ECONOMIC
GRowTH: THE WISCONSIN INCOME TAX 1911-1929, at 58-64 (1974).
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As a novel form of taxation, the income tax called for the
articulation of a justification. As noted, the imposition of an effective tax
on income could be justified as a solution to what was widely perceived
as almost total dependence on an existing local property tax program
that-largely as a result of lax enforcement and dependence on an

uneven local administration-undertaxed non-real estate assets, and
especially financial assets such as stocks and bonds and did not tax

income at all.
But the national income tax was, also a progressive tax. Perhaps the
strongest justification for progressive taxation, for larger and smaller
incomes, depends on the argument that a progressive rate imposes a
different tax, but an "equal burden" on rich and poor, an argument
already stated by J.S. Mill. 70 The progressive income tax also comports
with the requirement that taxation should always seek the maximum

relative ability to pay. The latter point had been emphasized in the "four
... maxims in regard to taxes in general" premised by Adam Smith.7'
But the political furor that surrounded passage of the tax raised a debate
that often wandered from the argument that a progressive tax rate
reflected the realities of an "equal pain" as well as satisfying the
requirement of ability to pay. Instead, the class bias of the tax was
almost the only theme considered.
It was against this background that the Supreme Court of the7
72
United States intervened. In Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.,
Federal imposition of a tax on income "from capital" was declared
'
unconstitutional as a "direct tax."74
Since the federal enactment was not,
as the Constitution required any "direct tax" to be, apportioned among
the states,75 the entire 1894 income tax was struck down76 although the
70.

See generallyJ.S. MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Ashley ed. 1921); see also

HYMAN, supra note 65, at 355-59.
71. See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 777 (Edwin Cannan ed., Univ. of Chicago

Press 1976) (1776). The first maxim was that "The subjects of every state ought to contribute.., as
nearly as possible, in proportion to their respective abilities;" the third, that levies should be timed
"in the manner, in which it is most likely to be convenient for the contributor to pay it." These two
maxims, along with avoiding arbitrariness or over-high deadweight costs of enforcement were the
standards by which Smith reviewed taxes known to him. See id. at 777-78.
72. "The present assault upon capital is but the beginning. [Ultimately,] our political contests
will become a war of the poor against the rich; a war constantly growing in intensity and bitterness."
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 607 (1895) (Field, J., concurring). See the
discussion in RATNER, supra note 66, at 194-215.
73. 157 U.S. 429 (1895), and on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
74. See Pollock, 158 U.S. at 637.
75. "No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or
Enumeration herein before directed to be taken." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9. A direct tax, the majority
held, was, in effect, any tax on wealth as such, such as land or personalty, and so any tax on income
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case left open the question of taxation of earned income was a direct
tax.7 7 The political result of the Pollock case was that progressive-rate
income taxation, federal and state, became a fixed and important part of
the progressive agenda, Democratic and Republican. After nearly two
decades of agitation, Congress in 1909 passed a corporate franchise tax
and sent to the states a proposal for amending the Constitution to
overcome the Pollock case. The corporate franchise tax was upheld by
the Court as an excise that was merely measuredby net income." In due
course, the proposed amendment was adopted in 1913 as the Sixteenth

from that wealth was equally a direct tax. The dissenters argued that the exercise required more than
seeking the meaning of the eighteenth century distinction between direct and indirect taxes. See
Pollock, 158 U.S. at 641-42. They insisted that the constitutional provisions referring to direct taxes
evolved from the anxieties of the southern states about a discriminatory tax on land and slaves (as
realty) and so was tied, as seems to be the case, to the compromise by which slaves, as wealth, were
also partially counted for purposes of representation. See id. at 644-45. As a result, the clause should
not be applied broadly, that it meant no more than a tax on real estate or slaves (as realty). The
prohibition should not be extended to a tax on the income of lands, noting that such a restrictive
construal was almost contemporaneous, upholding the imposition of a tax on the "use" of wealth
was in any case as not a direct tax in the constitutional sense. See id. at 645; Hylton v. United
States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 172-73 (1796) (discussing sumptuary tax on carriages). Although
Federal taxes on land-levied in times of emergency (1798, 1813, 1815, 1861)-were uniformly
apportioned as direct taxes, Civil War taxes were imposed on income without apportionment (1861,
1862, 1863. 1864, 1865, 1866, 1867, 1870). In fact, in 1861, the Act of August 6, 1861, imposed an
apportioned tax on lands, but also levied, without apportionment, a tax on incomes. The issue had
been squarely presented, and answered unanimously in the negative, with respect to the Civil War
income tax. See Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. (12 Otto) 586, 602 (1880). Similarly, a Federal
succession tax had been squarely treated as an excise, and not a direct tax, in Scholey v. Rev, 90
U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 347-48 (1874). The distinction became unimportant with passage of the
Sixteenth Amendment, but between the Pollock decision and then, there were many detailed
arguments addressed to the topic. See, e.g., SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 531-89.
76. See Pollock, 158 U.S. at 436. Howell Jackson, appointed to the Court in 1893, fell very ill
with active tuberculosis and was not sitting when the case was fist argued and decided, although he
had not retired. He returned to the Court, so that the case could be reargued and the questions on
which the Court had been evenly split, could be decided. Jackson died less than three months after
the opinions on rehearing were handed down. Ironically, he ended up among the dissenters, but an
unidentified other had decided to vote with Chief Justice Fuller in holding that the entire income tax
act fell. The identity of the switched vote remains uncertain. Sidney Ratner argues, on the authority
of Edward S. Corwin, that the switch vote came from Justice Horace Gray. See RATNER, supra note
76, at 210. On the other hand, JOHN SPENCER BASSEtT, EXPANSION AND REFORM 1889-1926, at 43
(1971), states as a fact, that it was Mr. Justice Shims who shifted his vote.
77. See Pollock, 158 U.S. at 635. Chief Justice Fuller's majority opinion left open the
possibility that a tax on earned incomes alone could be a valid "excise" tax, but it went on to
suggest grave difficulties with the pattern of exemptions provided in the 1894 Act and, by
extension, with progressive rates as such. These suggestions never eventuated in a serious attack on
the progressive nature of the tax. See id. at 635-36.
78. See Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 109 (1911).
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Amendment, 79 and the general national income tax on individuals and
corporations it authorized was enacted. °
Later during the Great Depression, national income taxation
permanently captured the imagination of most liberals as an
irreplaceable instrument of government finance and policy.8 Wagewithholding was introduced during the Second World War; it greatly
simplified tax collection and made it highly efficient, as employer and
s2
employee were, made cosureties for the payment of the employee's tax.
At the state level, the debate about imposing a personal income tax
focused on a pair of other problems. Both state and local governments
were in need of additional revenues to meet increased demands on them,
and an increase in the traditional property tax rates or assessments was
seen as excessive as applied to real property, while the property tax so
far as it attempted to reach personal property was seen as almost wholly
ineffective.83 As the Mills Committee Report, prepared by a New York
State joint legislative investigative committee created in 1915 stated,
79. See U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The Amendment was certified as ratified on February 3,
1913. It read: "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census
or enumeration." Id.
80. See Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913). In the Revenue Act of 1913, 1I-D,
fiduciaries were only liable as agents to report and to withhold at the lowest (normal) rate tax on
money distributed by them. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES 19091950 v.144 (Bernard D. Reams, Jr. ed., 1979); KIXIVIILLER & BAHR, CONSOLIDATED UNITED
STATES INCOME TAX LAWS SINCE 1909 WITH REGULATIONS AND DIGEST OF COURT DECISIONS

AND UNOFFICIAL RULINGS 506 (1923). Trusts and estates were not taxable entities until the

enactment of the Revenue Act of 1916, ch.463, § 2(b), 39 Stat. 756,757-58 and the residence of the
fiduciary became and has remained the key to resident or nonresident status of Federal income
taxation of trusts.
81. "It took the depression of the late twenties and the thirties to create an American 'left' that
viewed bigger government as both a counter to big business and a force for good .... spreading a
more uniform national policy throughout the land. The nation ... was tumed Democratic by the
depression. That is how the party of Jefferson became identified with uniform national domestic
welfare policies, and the party of Hamilton with state diversity and a smaller federal government."
WEBBER & WILDAVSKY, supra note 65, at 427.
82. In 1998 the individual income tax was the source of forty-six percent of national
collections, while the corporate income tax made up twelve percent. I.R.S. Statistics, available at
http:llflattax.house.gov/taxfacts/irsfacts.asp (last visited Sept. 20, 2002). Since the fastest growing
part of Federal tax collections consist of the Social Security and Medicare taxes (34.7 percent in
1998 up from 31 percent in 1997), income tax collections are dominant so far as general revenues
are concerned.
83. The main tax structure in New York continued to be what it had been throughout the
nineteenth century and still was in much of the rest of the nation. Local assessors, at the county
level, sought to identify and value all "property," real and personal, including securities, credits and
other intangibles. On the tax base of such property, so assessed, both state and local governments
levied an annual tax, which was collected by local officials and turned over to the various taxing
authorities. Personal property, as the Mills Committee Report notes "under modem conditions
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All semblance of justice or equity has long since left the personal
property tax, which has been suffered to remain on our statute boos
because of the widespread apathy and ignorance of the public ... and
because ... it has not, generally speaking, been enforced ....One of
the main purposes for which this ...Committee was appointed was to
seek out that property which is now escaping and to recommend
changes that would equalize the tax burden by broadening the

base ....[T]his committee, in answer to the specific question
submitted to it, desires to state that ...the end sought for will be

accomplished best by: (1) the abolition of the present tax on personal
property ...; and (3) the imposition of an income tax on individuals
and general business corporations, including manufacturing

corporations. 4
The income tax was thus seen as responding to what was widely
perceived as under-taxation of intangible property, thus shifting almost
the entire state tax burden to the traditional tax on real estate.
Wisconsin had adopted the first "modem" personal income tax law
in 1911 "8 It did so, as commentators agree, propelled by the popularity
of a tax that would shift taxation away from over-taxed real and tangible
personal property, and especially agricultural land and farming
implements, and in the direction of under-taxed intangible wealth.
Politically, the tax belongs to a farmer coalition, and as such the new tax
has been viewed as shifting taxation too much in the other direction.
Almost unnoticed at the time, the Wisconsin tax made important
administrative reforms to accompany the new tax. 6 Mostly, these began
the replacement of the local assessment and collection machinery in
favor a state-wide body charged with collection and enforcement of
the tax.8
consists of securities, credits and other intangibles," which unlike real property, cannot be
discovered without effective self-assessment. See Report of the Joint Legislative Committee on
Taxation of the state of New York [hereinafter Mills Committee Report] (1916), at 43.
84. Mills Committee Report, supra note 83, at 43,47, 207.
85. See BROWNLEE, JR., supra note 69, at 58-64.
86. "Without exception ... the nineteenth century income taxes were administrative failures,
and their revenue yields trifling." HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supranote 2, [20.01 SELIGMAN,
supra note 65, at 367-429; BROWNLEE, JR., supra note 69, at 60; J.C. Bullock, Note, Wisconsin
Income TaxAct, 21 Wis. L. REv. 191 (1917).
87. "It was realized that the failure of all State income taxes in the past was directly
attributable to lax methods on the part of local officials, and this danger was sought to be avoided by
securing a higher degree of centralization." Mills Committee Report, supranote 83, at 192, as part
of its analysis of the Wisconsin income tax since 1911. EDwIN R.A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN
TAXATION 651 (9th ed. 1921) [hereinafter ESSAYS IN TAXATON], said that the administrative cost
effectiveness of the state income taxes was also greatly aided by the existence of a Federal tax and
the cooperation of federal and state officials.
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Thus the political energy behind state income taxes--granted the
growing need for public revenues-in this decade was that it served
fairness, in the sense of replacing an under-enforced tax on personal and
especially intangible property, with a more effectively-enforced tax on
incomes. But the income tax was also openly progressive, that is, it was
enacted with increasing marginal rates, so that as income increased the
tax applied more heavily on the last dollars earned. That, too, had great
political appeal. Cynics could and did articulate that appeal as stemming
from a desire to soak the rich, but the appeal also served fairness. An
economic justification for increasing marginal rates rests on the
probability that each successive dollar earned has a declining marginal
utility, so that the taxes imposed at different rates impact, nevertheless,
with "equality of pain." This argument is independently supported by
Adam Smith's maxim that demands that taxes be aware of "ability to
pay" the tax. And it is also supported by the political insight, going all
the way back to Aristotle, that republican forms of government should
avoid great disparities in wealth.88 It is fair to say that enactment of a
progressive-rate income tax was over-determined in the sense that the
political appeal of the progressive rate income tax lay both in the
argument of taxation from each according to ability to pay, and at the
same time it represented a reduction of tax on agriculture; it not only
imposed a greater tax burden on the rich, but it was designed to
overcome illegal tax evasion by those same rich.
In the decade that followed Wisconsin's enactment, a few states
reinstated income taxes on the nineteenth century model; and a few more
adopted features of the Wisconsin statute and, after 1913, copied the
federal tax law. Despite New York's adoption of a state income tax in
1919, there was no wide-based spread of income tax laws among the
states after 1919. A number of states even repealed their tax acts during
the 1920s.89
The next wave of state enactments occurred in the decade following
1929 when another thirteen states adopted the income tax. Income tax
laws were enacted in yet other states in the 1960s and after, driven by
the need of the states for more revenue and the political pressure to give
property tax relief. At the same time, the benefits of employing a tax
using the federal tax base made income taxation easier, both for
taxpayers and for administrators.

88. See generally ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, bk. 4, ch. 9 (H. Rackham trans. 1922).
89. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Morality of Money: American Attitudes Toward Wealth
and the Income Tax, 70 IND. L.J. 119, 144-55 (1994).
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During the 1970s and early 1980s, personal income taxes were the
most dynamic source of State revenue, rising from 19.2 percent in
1970 to 29.8 percent in 1985. In 1991, 41 States and the District of
Columbia levied broad-based personal income taxes. The total yield of
personal income taxes for the year ended March 1991 was $106.9
9
billion, which represented 35 percent of total State tax collections.
B. Legislative History
This is the general background against which we are to read the
meaning of the Founder-State Trust concepts we already find in the first
New York personal income tax. Where the concept came from presents a
serious mystery. The Mills Committee Report provided a draft of an
income tax in support of their recommendation that such a tax be
adopted. But it provides, section 363-2, that any trustee or personal
representative residing in or appointed by New York should report
income of the estate or trust, which "shall be taxed or not according as
the beneficiary resides within or without the state.""'
Moreover, although the New York statute, as adopted in 1919, was
clearly copied almost entirely from the federal income tax, the Federal
tax was imposed on resident trustees and made no mention of the
Founder-State concept.
We have not managed to find legislative or source materials
bearing directly on the introduction of the Founder-State model for
identifying resident trusts for income taxation purposes. We have looked
at the enactments of states that had an income tax before 1919, that is
Wisconsin (1911),92 Oklahoma (1915), 9' Massachusetts (1916), 9
Missouri (1917), 95 Delaware (1917),96 and Virginia (1918). 97
90. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 2, 1 20.01.
91. Mills Committee Report, supra note 83, at 232. The section goes on to provide that
"nothing herein shall be construed to exempt from taxation incomes derived from property located
or business transacted within the state."
92. Wisconsin, Session Laws, C. 658, adding 1087m-l-1087m-30 to Statutes, enacts an
income tax. The only reference found referring to trustees is section 1087m-10-5, which provides
that "Every guardian, trustee, executor, administrator, agent or receiver, and every other person or
corporation acting in a fiduciary capacity, shall make and render to the [county] assessor of incomes
of the district in which such representatives resides, a verified list or return as aforesaid of the
amount of income of any such person, ward or beneficiary ......
93. 1915 Okla. Sess. Laws § 1, merely imposes the tax on the net income of "[e]ach and every
person in this state," without further specification. Oklahoma is, today, a Founder-State Trust state.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 68, § 2353(6) (2002).
94. MAss. GEN. LAWS ch. 269, § 2 (1916) imposes taxes on certain interest and dividend
income; on annuities and income from professions, employment, trade or business and from
purchases and sales of intangible personal property "received by any inhabitant of this
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The New York statute does take a position, the Founder-State Trust
position, on the taxability of trusts as residents. The statutes of some
states with earlier enacted income acts98 apparently do not mention
trustees and those states whose income tax acts do mention trustees, with
the possible exception of Missouri, do not reflect the New York
approach before 1919 even though some of these same states can
currently be listed as using the Founder-State Trust approach in defining
resident trusts for income tax purposes. The intention of these early acts,
in some cases is too vague to be determined; in other cases it seems clear
that the tax is due from a local fiduciary, based either on the fiduciary's
residence or that of the beneficiaries.99 In no states' laws is there any
commonwealth." Id. § 5. Implicit in the statute is a different treatment of estates and testamentary
trusts, §§ 8 and 9, on the one hand, and other trusts, on the other hand. Fiduciaries of estates of
Massachusetts residents are to pay tax on income of the decedent and so much of the income of the
estate as is accumulated for resident beneficiaries, § 8, while taxable income from Massachusetts
testamentary trusts payable to Massachusetts residents are taxable to the trustee if a Massachusetts
resident or to the beneficiaries when received if the trust has no Massachusetts trustees, § 9. The
final sentence of section 9 provides that income accumulated for contingent beneficiaries "shall be
taxed as if accumulated for the benefit of inhabitants of this commonwealth." Id. § 9.
95. Section 2(b) of Missouri Act of April 12, 1917, an Act providing for the assessment,
levying, collecting and paying of income tax, states that "income of... any kind of property held in
trust, including such income accumulated in trust for the benefit of unborn or ascertained persons, or
persons with contingent interests and income held for future distribution under the terms of the ...
It
trust shall be likewise taxed, the tax in each instance ... to be assessed to ... the trustee ....
goes on to require the trustee to make returns and pay the tax. The tax is imposed (section l(a)),
generally, on the global income of residents and Missouri-source income of nonresidents. The
statutory language does not make it clear whether either the beneficiary or the fiduciary needs to be
a Missouri resident; if this is a Founder-State Trust, it is such in an inchoate form. Currently,
Missouri is listed as a Founder-State Trust State. Mo. REv. STAT. § 143.331 (2001). The 1919
North Dakota income tax, N.D. Stats. 1919, ch. 224, uses language similar to that of Section 2(b) of
the Missouri Act, above. Today the North Dakota income tax treats those trusts as resident trusts,
for filing purposes, which have "a relationship to the state sufficient to create nexus" broadly
defined. N.D. STATS. § 81-03-02.1-04 (2001).
96. See 29 Del. Laws ch. 26 (1917). This law enacted an income tax which was imposed on
every "natural person who is a citizen or resident of the State of Delaware." Id. at 281A § 245. The
act goes on to say that returns and payment of tax in respect of "income of infants, idiots and insane
persons" shall be made by "guardians, trustees, or other persons having charge of their estates." Id.
281E § 249. This does not answer the question of what is to happen to a trust that has "income"
which is not "income of infants, idiots or insane persons."
97. The Virginia tax (Virginia Acts of Assembly, 1918, ch. 219) imposed an income tax "on
each person and corporation residing or doing business in this State." The statutory definition of
person did not include a trust, but a later provision required trustees and other fiduciaries to return
income "of every person for whom they act, subject to this tax."
98. Hawaii, then a territory, adopted an income tax as early as 1905, but neither it nor
subsequent amendments prior to 1919 addressed the question of taxing trusts. See Hawaii Laws of
1905, Act 87.
99. That seems the intention of the relevant provision of the Wisconsin Act. See supra note
92; State ex reL Wis. Trust Co. v. Widule, 159 N.W. 630, 632 (Wis. 1916). There, the will of a
Wisconsin testator (Nathan Hamburger, apparently a principal in Gimbel's, itself a Pennsylvania
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language on which the language in the New York statute could be said to
be modeled. We are left to winkle out for ourselves the motives and
intentions that led to the introduction of the Founder-State Trust concept.
We have also gone through current state income tax laws and
attempted to see how those laws define resident and nonresident trusts.
As can be seen in Appendix, where the results of that research is
summarized, the Founder-State Trust concept has spread far and wide.'0°
In other states, the residence of the trustee, the residence of actual
beneficiaries or the "place of administration of the trust" is made
decisive. A substantial number of states follow New York in modifying
Founder-State Trust income taxation by taxing as residents only those
Founder-State Trusts where a trustee or beneficiary is resident.' °'
C. What Founder-State Trusts Mean
What justifies a state's approach to determining the state of
residence of a trust for income tax purposes? The arguments that one
seeks as justification must determine taxability in a way that is fair,
assists in the efficient administration of the tax, and comports with
sound policy. In the case of the Founder-State approach, there are at
least three plausible, but not conclusive, arguments, and behind each of
these arguments stand strong, but not unopposed constituencies. It is a
decided plus for the Founder-State Trust justification that it seems to fit
well within, or even to be strongly derived from, the operation of an
established legal category. Another justification is that it also assists
administrative ease and efficiency in the collection of the tax in several
important ways. Finally, since states have to be aware of consequences
that follow from the determination of taxability, including the extent to
which the rule adopted increases in-migration or out-migration of
citizens and wealth, the strongest prop of the Founder-State Trust
concept is that it locks the trust assets, and their income, into the state of
domicile of the settlor at death.

corporation) was probated in Wisconsin; the executors and trustees under a testamentary trust were
two individuals, a resident in Pennsylvania and Wisconsin Trust Co., a Wisconsin corporation. See
id. at 630. Under the Wisconsin income tax law, a tax is imposed on every "person or corporation
acting in a fiduciary capacity" as to the income of that trust. Id. at 63 1. "The fact that.., the person
entitled to enjoy [the income] resides without the state and is a cotrustee, and that two of the
cotrustees reside without the state of Wisconsin does not work a change in the character of the fund
itself in the hands of the Wisconsin trustee ....
Id. at 632.
100. See infra Appendix.
101. Seesupranote32.
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We will limit our consideration to the case of testamentary trusts,
for treatment of inter vivos trusts present additional issues as to which
there is little guidance because justifying the taxation on inter vivos
trusts on a Founder-State Trust basis has, generally, been unattended and
shunted to one side.'0 2 Justifying taxability of an inter vivos trust on
Founder-State Trust principles is so much more difficult if attempted on
the grounds that are advanced in the case of testamentary trusts, that the
whole question is put off or, as with the majority opinion in the Gavin
case, placed on an entirely different (and adventitious) ground.' 3 For that
reason, we analyze the testamentary trust, the core case of the FounderState Trust theory, and leave aside theory's applicability to inter vivos
trusts. '°4 Even so limiting our analysis, however, we soon realize that
support for the determination of the residence of a trust on Founder-State
Trust principles features the convergence of a number of justifying
arguments.
The Founder-State Trust theory begins by looking at the donor or
settlor of the trust, but it promptly moves from the settlor to the probate
court in which the settlor's will is probated. In the case of a testamentary
trust, the probate court records will make the existence of the trust and
the identity of the trustee a matter of public record and thus easily
available to the taxing authorities. This certainly assists in the
administration and enforcement of the income tax laws. However, the
administrative convenience of the aspects of publicity and easy
identification of trust and trustee is not the primary prize won by
connecting the Founder-State Trust to the probate court that is
administering the estate in which the trust is created. Basing taxability
on the continuing jurisdiction, and not merely on the jurisdiction, of the
probate court, seems to imply more than mere administrative
convenience, because the determination of trust residence and taxability

102. Perhaps inter vivos trusts, at least those whose income is not taxable directly to the settlor
or is not exempt from tax, are not yet a significant source of taxable income; but even if this
doubtful claim is true, such trusts seem on the way to coming into more general use. As they do so,
justifying treatment of inter vivos trusts will assume greater importance and demand more attention.
103. See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, 733 A.2d 782, 801-03 (Conn. 1999), where
permitting the Founder-State Trust pattern to be applied to a New York administered inter vivos
trust is justified because the non-contingent beneficiary of the accumulated income is a Connecticut
resident. The court admits, as suggested below, that the probate court reasoning has no application
to the inter vivos trust.
104. It is hard to see how the argument from the "continuing" jurisdiction of the probate court
has any relevance to inter vivos trusts, unless one ignores the facts that such trusts have neither the
publicity of testamentary trusts nor are historically tied into the legal infra-structure of the probate
court.
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as a resident seems to follow from the traditional nature and structure of
probate court proceedings and jurisdiction.
The Founder-State Trust theory's appeal to such broader norms of
probate court jurisdiction has to shift emphasis in a subtle way; the
emphasis moves from the residence of the decedent to the jurisdiction of
the court which, as a result of the decedent's residence at the time of
death, has jurisdiction over the administration of the decedent's estate.
Siting the trust where its trustor died is, in fact, to look away from the
testamentary trustor and toward the probate court and its continuing
jurisdiction over the trust.
This is of substantial significance because the shift of emphasis
from settlor to probate court tends to mask the great weakness of the
Founder-State Trust theory. It is the probate court's claim over the trust,
and not the relation between settlor and the trust he or she settled, that
represents the continuing and current presence in the state that is
attributed to the trust; and it is that current presence that forms an
appropriate basis for state taxation under the "state benefit" theory, one
which is capable of sustaining the Founder-State Trust approach to
current taxation of the trust as a resident. The continuing availability of
the probate court as a forum, which is so emphasized by the Gavin
majority, ignores the reality that the settlor, in general, establishes a trust
at a single moment of time by the single operative act of donation or
settlement. In the case of the testamentary trust, it is the will as a
disposition of property that takes effect on the death of the testator that is
the instrument of trust creation.
Because courts that have upheld the Founder-State Trust theory are
impressed by the "continuing jurisdiction" of the probate court, they
more easily overlook the fact that a settlor is always totally separated
from the trust he or she once established. The decedent, after all, must
leave the trust behind, and it is the words of the trust created by the
settlor that continue to govern the trustee and the beneficiaries in
important ways, and neither the settlor nor the probate court. It is clear
that to support taxability based on a probate court's continuing
jurisdiction over a testamentary trust created under the terms of a will
probated in such court, one must rhetorically magnify the importance of
the continuing jurisdiction of the probate courts and, just as rhetorically,
de-emphasize or even suppress the disconnect that exists from the
moment of the trust's creation between the settlor or the probate court,
on the one hand, and the trust, on the other. The courts that have
remained unimpressed by the probate court argument, on the other hand,
are very conscious of the essential irrelevance of the settlor after the trust
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is set up, and they do not find any very large benefit in the "continuing
jurisdiction" of the probate court.
To buttress a Founder-State approach, therefore, it would be helpful
if the Founder-State Trust doctrine has important practical consequences
in avoiding an otherwise serious administrative and policy problem for
the state that adopts it. The pure0'° Founder-State Trust concept, it
happens, does provide such a practical benefit, for the doctrine
minimizes the opportunity for forum-shopping for a low tax state, in
which to settle the trust. Where the residence of the trustee is relevant to
determining the residence of a trust, choice of a foreign trustee may
obtain the resident settlor the benefit of foreign tax laws which impose
little or no tax on the trustee as trustee.
For the same reason, a Founder-State Trust approach, as in
Connecticut, from one point of view at least, helps to protect local
trustees. For the competitive position of persons within the taxing state
who are available to serve as trustees for citizens within that state
achieve a level playing field as to trustees offering such services in other
states, and even in states where trusts are exempted from tax or are
subject only to a very low tax-rate. Moreover, since the chief alternative
test of income taxability to the Founder-State Trust doctrine is that trust
income is taxable in the state in which the trustee is resident, a citizen of
a Founder-State Trust state must avoid appointing a trustee resident in
such a state, for it exposes trust income to double taxation. Both that the
Founder-State Trust doctrine tends to remove the question of taxability
from choice of a trustee (and trust situs) and that it minimizes forum
shopping look away from juridical to practical categories.
I have now identified a theme of legalistic justification for the
Founder-State approach in determining resident trust income taxation
and suggested two closely related themes that are at least compatible
with the Founder-State Trust concept and provide pragmatic support for
its adoption. There is, however, in any assessment of the Founder-State
Trust concept another and separate theme, which must be considered
along with the above. This last theme is one that argues for or against
Founder-State Trust theory because it prolongs the claims of the trust
settlor's state of original residence over the trust assets and continuing
history of the trust assets. Beyond the technical argument of continuing
probate court jurisdiction, this theme calls attention to making taxability
105. By a "pure" trust I mean one where ever. testamentary trust created by a domiciliary of
the state is fully taxable as a resident of that state. The implications of a modified Founder-State
Trust approach, as in New York law under the 1992 regulations, are different and will be separately
addressed later. See infra Part I.C.4, New York Brew.
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of trust income dependent in an open-ended manner on the settlor's
immediate and possibly adventitious and short-term relation to the trust
and to the probate court in which the settlor's estate was probated.
Looked at in this way, the settling of a trust irreversibly ties the settlor's
money in trust to that particular state; its sits is forever beyond the
settlor's power to move those assets freely without terminating the trust.
And it is similarly beyond the power of trustees or beneficiaries, short of
terminating the trust altogether.
The first theme, based on traditional legal arguments of jurisdiction
and governing law, I call the Theme of Legality. This is the explicit
justification for Founder-State Trust taxation. The interrelated themes of
pragmatic justification, I call the Theme of Evading Evasion. What we
focus on at this point, is whether the settlor has the power to choose a
trustee and the trustee's (and trust's) sits and to shop among competing
states capable of assuring the limitation or absence of taxes. Trustees
might like to offer prospective settlors a tax haven, but if they cannot do
that in a Founder-State Trust state, at least they are able to say that
neither they nor any Trustee in another state can either trigger or prevent
taxation in the state of the settlor's domicile. The Theme of Evading
Evasion avoids complaints from banks and others offering professional
trustee services that the practical consequence of a state's using the
residence of the trustee as the criterion of residence of the trust for tax
purposes, places them at a disadvantage vis-a-vis trustees in other states.
But that criterion in turn leads us to the last theme because that last
theme dwells precisely on the irreversible consequences of the settlor's
domicile under the Founder-State Trust approach and can be called the
Theme of the Founder'sForfeit.
1. The Theme of Legality
The traditional conflicts maxim mobilia sequuntur personam
(personal property accompanies its owner) is still accepted as the
background governing rule for identifying the tax situs of securities,
intellectual property, and other intangibles; translated, it rests on the
perceived fairness of treating such property as located wherever the
owner is located, for unlike tangible property, it is not experienced as
being in any particular place. It is this conventional, but still-controlling
doctrine of conflicts of law that is a significant support to the effective
operation of both the Founder-State Trust doctrine and to the choice
(made by many other states) to insist that income from intangibles is
located wherever the trustee is resident based on the premise that the
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trustee holds title to the trust properties.' 6 This has the fortuitous, but
useful result that intangibles are all located wherever the owner is
located, and it is then a shorter step to a state's concluding that a
Founder-State Trust's global income or a resident trustee's global
income is properly attributable to that state. In the case of states where
global taxation turns on residence of the trustee, this is obvious As
already noted, in the process of localizing Founder-State Trusts, the
settlor's domicile (at the moment of trust creation and the decedent's
own demise) is thereafter only indirectly relevant; it is relevant only
because that domiciliary moment is the ground for jurisdiction.'0 7
Relying on the trustee's residence seems much more direct than relying
on the residence of the settlor, as a key to localizing intangibles. It is the
trustee who becomes, under trust law, the center of powers and
obligations, and it is the trustee who has legal title to the assets of the
trust, including intangibles.
The Founder-State Trust analysis, on the contrary, relates entirely
to the operations of the probate court that had jurisdiction over the
administration of the decedent-settlor's estate. The settlor's domicile at
the critical moment when probate court jurisdiction attached to the trust,
is, it is true, the basis for probate court jurisdiction. The continuing
relevance of the historical fact of the settlor's domicile at that moment
(without regard to any other fact about the settlor or the trust) is only
indirectly relevant to the Theme of Legality by reason of its being,
ultimately, the original source of probate court jurisdiction. Instead, all
turns on the continuing relevance of the probate court.
Historically, primary jurisdiction over the administration of trusts
developed in the Chancery Court, devolved on the appropriate successor
courts of equity in England and the United States, and, from them, to the
present identity and status as the body of equitable principles
administered by courts of general jurisdiction under modern procedural
law.

106. Other states look, not to the trustee's domicile, but to the place where the trustee's
practical administration of the trust is carried out; this is an alternate identification of the trustee's
"residence" that makes a legal move analogous to determining the "principal place of business" of a
corporation that has little or no actual presence in the state of incorporation. Both are versions of
looking to the trustee's residence and, just as the Founder-State theory is attached to probate court
jurisdiction, is linked to a broader legal principle for the trustee has legal tite to the assets.
107. That Founder-State Trust reasoning shifts from situs of the decedent to situs of the probate
court, does not imply that such reasoning was seen as unusual. Indeed, for some courts, it has
seemed just what was to be expected. See Harrison v. Comm'r, 172 N.E. 605 (Mass. 1930) (refusing
to tax the trust where there was a Massachusetts trustee because the trust was within the jurisdiction
of the New York Surrogate's Court).
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The probate court has a much more modest lineage than the courts
of equity. In England, until the middle of the nineteenth century, the
work of dealing with the personal estate of the decedent was a matter for
ecclesiastical courts, a task that was confirmed to them by the Statute of
Distribution in 1670. The American states needed a secular court that
would carry out the same, largely ministerial but important, functions of
probating wills, appointing and supervising personal representatives,
inventorying and gathering the decedent's assets, and approving the
distribution of the decedent's property. The probate court was created
for that purpose.
It is likely that arguments for the extension of the probate court's
exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation of testamentary trusts
stemmed from assimilating the trustees to the fiduciaries of the estate,
administrators and executors, who are in theory much more subject to
direct probate court jurisdiction; in fact, control over these fiduciaries lie
at the heart of that jurisdiction. There was a body of law that held that
the situs of the probate court was the official residence of estate
fiduciaries, without regard to the actual personal residence of those
quasi-officers of the probate court. Thus, the Founder-State Trust
concept is bottomed on an extension of the official residence theory
about estate fiduciaries to the trustees of testamentary trusts.0 8
In New York, for example, the Surrogate's Court in each county
was originally introduced by the Surrogates' Courts Code of 1880,
although the Surrogate, originally a minor clerk in the courts, had earlier
been selected to carry out the administration of decedents' estates in the
Revised Statutes of New York of 1830. Special courts or even particular
administrative officers were given the same functions previous to that
time.'t The jurisdictional grants to the probate court were often

108. Some authors, even while reporting the line of argument, have found the extension
dubious. See Robert C. Brown, The Taxation of Trust Property, 23 KY. LJ. 403, 412-16 (1935).
The Founder-State Trust provisions in New York must not only stretch the concept of situs where
the probate court is located from estate fiduciaries to testamentary trustees, but also further from
testamentary trustees to trustees of inter vivos trusts.
109.

See ROBERT LUDLOW FOWLER, DECEDENT ESTATES LAW OF NEw YORK (1911). The

New York State Constitution of 1938, as amended, now describes the constitution of the Surrogate's
Court in each county in Article VI, § 12. Section 12-d reads:
The surrogate's court shall have jurisdiction over all actions and proceedings relating to
the affairs of decedents, probate of wills, administration of estates and actions and
proceedings arising thereunder or pertaining thereto, guardianship of the property of
minors, and such other actions and proceedings, not within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court as may be provided by law.
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extremely limited.1 ° The law reports of most states are full of decisions
that dwell on the limited and subordinate position of the probate court
(often treated as a quasi-administrative arm of the state's courts of
general and equity jurisdiction, to which appeal from decisions
sometimes lay) and that insist on the "purely statutory" nature of the
probate court jurisdiction."'
But the probate court was, also, as Willie Sutton would have said,
where the money was.11 2 It became the contested site for jurisdiction over
matters relating to the wills of decedents and the testamentary trusts
established by those wills. Among its more important functions was to
provide a place-often, a hospitable place-for submitting trustees'
accounts for review and approval. The availability of the probate court
for other matters relating to the administration of trusts varied with the
time and the place. In Connecticut, for example, the courts for some time
concluded that the probate court lacked jurisdiction to give damages
even if a hearing on the trust accounting showed that such damages were
due.'13 In New York, it was only with "adoption of article six of the state
constitution effective September 1, 1962, [that] the last vestige of a
constitutional barrier to the conferring
of equity jurisdiction upon the
' 4
Surrogate's Court was removed." 1
But for those courts which have accepted the reasoning of the
Founder-State Trust approach, the jurisdiction of the probate court over
testamentary trusts (often a non-exclusive jurisdiction) must seem to
confer special benefits on the trustee and the beneficiaries of the trust,

110. N.Y. CONST. art. XII, § 12-e indicates the limited nature of the court when it adds that the
Surrogate's Court will have only "such equity jurisdiction as may be provided by law."
11. See, e.g., Dettenbom v. Hartford Nat'l Bank & Trt. Co., 185 A. 84 (Conn. 1936) and
Philips v. Moeller, 163 A.2d 95 (Conn. 1960).
112. In the effectiveness of the demand for administration of the property of decedents, and in
the compelled disclosure and publicity about the decedent's financial affairs, which accompany that
administration, may be seen, perhaps, one of the administrative roots of the Founder-State Trust
concept. The Mills Committee Report, supra note 95, notes that, under the then existing realities of
personal property taxation, "widows and orphans" were almost alone in paying, full freight, the
property tax due on intangibles.
When the chief bread-winner dies, a record of his property must be filed in the, where it
is easily accessible to the tax assessors. Here it is caught and taxed, while similar
property held by others is untaxed. [And] it is taxed at a rate which makes the personal
property tax in this case one of the most barbarous to be found in any country. Cases are
frequent where as high as 25 to 50 per cent of the total income set aside for the support
of widows and orphans is taken by this tax.
Id. at45.
113. Dettenborn 185 A. at84.
114. David D. Siegel & Patrick M. Connors, Practice Commentaries, in N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC.
Acr § 201, at 50 (McKinney, 1994).
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for it is these benefits which must justify the state's assertion of the
power to tax. Even for such courts, however, the nexus between the
trusts and the probate court is admittedly attenuated; the probate court is
no more than the court, in whose public records are found the documents
that define the trust and which often does no more than offer an
appropriate forum for accounting and otherwise administering the trust
without need of independently grounding jurisdiction over parties. This
is the language of Justice Borden, speaking for the majority in the Gavin
case:
For purposes of due process of law, we see nothing less compelling
about the benefits and opportunities provided by Connecticut to these
trusts by its legal and judicial systems than those benefits provided by
states in which either the trustee or the administration of a trust might
Just as the vitality of the trust as an economic entity is
be located ....
inextricably intertwined with the administration of the trust assets by a
trustee located in New York, the viability of the trust as a legal entity is
inextricably intertwined with the benefits and opportunities provided
by the legal and judicial systems of Connecticut, and the legal viability
is inextricably intertwined with its economic viability. Neither its
economic vitality nor its legal viability trumps the other for purposes
of due process and taxation. These contacts with Connecticut are
sufficiently 'fiscal' in nature to satisfy the due process clause, and gave
the testamentary trusts fair warning that they were subject to its tax
jurisdiction." 5
To this argument, Justice McDonald, dissenting in Gavin, responds:
The majority, in sum, justifies a tax on the entire income of the trusts
based on the fact that the Connecticut probate courts are open for
The fact that the courts are
accounting and trust administration ....
open and available to nonresidents hardly would justify a Connecticut
income tax on all of the income of New Yorkers or Canadians, simply
because they may have 16a case within the subject matter jurisdiction of
the Connecticut courts.

2. The Theme of Evading Evasion
The Theme of Evading Evasion is not mentioned by the majority in
the Gavin case. The Theme of Legality alone, as the opinion is written,
is taken as enough to justify the taxation of the testamentary trusts in the
case. This opinion takes the Founder-State Trust statute in Connecticut
as fully justified by these formal relations, but the opinion is not without
115. Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, 733 A.2d 782,795,799-800 (Conn. 1999).
116. Id. at 807 (McDonald, J., dissenting).
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covert reference to the Theme of Evading Evasion. The majority
prominently state that the trusts in question have not paid any income
tax in the past, and certainly not in New York, the state of residence of
the corporate trustee. What Chase-Manhattan as trustee is seeking in
Gavin is not fairness in tax, but immunity from all tax, and to achieve
that result it will take advantage of the Founder-State Trust provisions of
the New York income tax law to excuse it from paying income tax on
accumulated trust income to New York and, then, turn around to seek to
bar application of the same Founder-State Trust concept to the trust in
Connecticut income tax law by dwelling on the inadequacies of the
Founder-State Trust approach to taxation.
Serving as trustee has long been a major business." 7 Although a
number of complicating factors make it difficult to say with confidence
the amount of assets under control of private testamentary trust trustees,
it is clear that the amount of such assets is very substantial and the
income generated by such trusts prior to deductions for distributions to
beneficiaries are also substantial. Taking all these factors into
consideration, it appears in 1997, nationally, more than the 1400 trustees
of private trusts earned in excess of $600,000 in fees, employed some
8000 employees and paid approximately $190,000 in payroll."" New
York is a leader in providing corporate trustee services." 9
117. See generally Lawrence M. Friedman, The Dynastic Trust, 73 YALE L.J. 547 (1964). As
early as 1836 Mr. Justice Joseph Story could say that in America businesses had developed which
actively sought to perform the services of trustees, with the result that charging and paying trustees'
fees was quite common in America, while the reverse is true in England, where such services were
characterized as typically performed by private persons as one of the more arduous burdens of
friendship. See generally JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 1.8 (1972
reprt.). Story identifies FarmersFire Insurance & Loan Co., chartered in New York in 1822 and
entering, under an amended charter, into the trust business by 1826 as the first corporation to offer
such services. JOHN G. SMITH, THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRUST COMPANIES IN THE UNITED STATES
(Holt & Co. 1928) pushes the beginning of the business further back, citing MassachusettsHospital
Life Insurance Company, incorporated in Massachusetts in 1822, as having begun to solicit trust
business immediately, obtaining an amendment empowering the company to invest monies "held by
them ... in trust for or during the lives of any person or persons ....
Such endowments in trust
thereafter became the main business of the company; Smith lists Farmers Fire Insurance & Loan
Co. as the first corporation to obtain explicit authority to accept property on trusts and to
carry them out.
118. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 1997 Economic Census: Bridge Between SIC and NAICS, at
http:llwww.census.gov/epcd/ec97brdg/E97B2_67.HTM (last visited, Dec. 29, 2002).
119. In 1998 a total of over 73,000 trusts and other fiduciaries (Form IT-205) reported over six
and a half billion dollars of income to the state of New York. See 1998 NEw YORK STATE
DEPARTMENT OF TAXATION AND FINANCE, OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, Individual Income Tax
Statistical
Reports
for
1998,
Table
57
at
http:llwww.tax.state.ny.us/stat-pitlpit981Pit98_Table_57.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2002). Available
statistics do not break this figure down into trusts, on the one hand, or estates, on the other hand. In
addition, the trusts that filed either merely had New York source income or were New York State
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Corporate trusteeship, like other service businesses, is a
competitive one. Trustees in various states are competitive with those in
other states, and one of the bases for such competition is the legal
environment in which such trustees operate. One need not believe in the
tort of negligent trust situs, 20 to recognize how competition among
corporate trustees for new and old trust business also involves a
competition among the states, to provide a hospitable environment with
respect to the powers and liabilities of the trust.'
But just as the trustee in Gavin sought to avoid both New York and
Connecticut taxes although it had to adopt inconsistent attitudes to
Founder-State Trusts to do so, so settlors and their advisers also aim to
avoid all taxes, not just unfair taxes. It would be foolish to overlook the
active participation, not only of taxpayers seeking to avoid all tax, but of
the service professions who affirmatively work to minimize taxes for
their clients and even to reach the nirvana of total tax immunity, such as
the lawyers and accountants, for whom tax minimization has been a
residents under the modified Founder-State Trust tax rules that are applicable in New York. For
these reasons and reasons discussed in the text, the income figure may both or either understate or
overstate and, thus, fail to accurately reflect the amount of private trust assets under management by
New York trust companies.
120. See Michael J. Myers & Rollyn H. Samp, South Dakota Trust Amendments and Economic
Development: The Tort of "Negligent Trust Situs" at its Incipient Stage?, 44 S.D. L. REV. 662
(1999). The law, generally, seems to be that a trustee is not even obliged to resign from the trust in
order to avoid taxes. However, it is clear that legislatures and courts often facilitate relocation of
trustees for tax-related reasons. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 10-6.6(b)(2) (McKinney
Supp. 2002); In re Dombush, 627 N.Y.S.2d 232 (Sur. Ct. 1995).
121. "As the financial capital of the world, New York has the individuals best qualified to
serve as trustees. New York has the most comprehensive and thorough development of caselaw of
trusts and a Surrogate Court system second to none." Charles F. Gibbs & Colleen F. Carew, Trusts
Leaving New York, Situs in Cyberspace: Time for Legislation, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 20, 2002, at 3,
(arguing for tax relief to stem the outflow of New York trusts); Matter of Margaret Hitchcock,
(Nassau Surr. 1999), N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1999, at 34 (Surrogate Radigan announces he will send a
copy of his opinion permitting the transfer of twelve New York trusts out-of-state for tax reasons to
the New York legislature for its consideration). Competition among states in terms of legal
environment is not limited to matters of state taxation policies. The current hot topics are the
dubious attempts to create "asset protection trusts," intended to compete with intemational tax
havens as well as with the other states of the union, and the repeal of the Rule Against Perpetuities
and enablement of the dynastic or perpetual trust. A fair sampling of the literature can be found in
the happy circumstance of serious articles about the two topics in a single issue of Real Property,
Probateand Trust Journal for No. 3 of Vol. 35, Fall 2000. Henry J. Lischer, Jr., Domestic Asset
Protection Trusts: Pallbearersto Liability? 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 479, 530-32 (2000),
considering the argument that enactment of "asset protection trust" enabling statutes "provides
stimulus to the Financial Services Sector of the APT State," and Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the
Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No Friends-An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J.
601, 605 (2000) ("[S]ome U.S. states and foreign jurisdictions, especially some island nations
hungry for out-of-jurisdiction trust business, have exhibited willingness to repeal the Rule Against
Perpetuities.").
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major business at least since the introduction of income and inheritance
taxes in the early part of the twentieth century. Such service professions
also include professional trustees. In the case of trustees, the issue
achieves a particular piquancy because such trustees must recognize
that-in any state where the residence of the trustee or the locale of
administration is a criterion-they themselves are very relevant to the
determination of the tax liabilities of settlors, beneficiaries and the
trust.'22
Trustees, then, are committed to keeping taxes on trusts at a
minimum. This is both in keeping with a professional desire, along with
lawyers and accountants, to provide tax minimization for their clients,
but for trustees it is also in their own interest, for if the trust is taxable
because of the trustee, or something connected with the trustee, the very
viability of the trust business is put at risk. Trustees are expected to be,
and mostly they are, vigilant to minimize taxes.
But the phrase Evading Evasion means not only the trustee's zeal to
achieve maximum tax avoidance, it also means that taxes on the trust
and on the beneficiaries can often be avoided by means of the choice of
the trustee, it is evasion through the trustee. There is a very strong
argument for the Founder-State Trust because in states where that rule
applies, the possibility of shopping for the state with the most
advantageous tax laws is limited to re-settling the settlor's domicile.
Such tax planning is surely possible, but it requires willingness on the
part of the settlor to make substantial changes in life style. On the other
hand, in states where trusts are taxable based on the residence of the
trustee, the settlor is in a position to shop around and to choose a tax
situs where the law exempts the trustee from tax without any change in
life-style. Taxpayers are vigilant to find such opportunities for forum
shopping. That vigilance triggers a violent response in tax administrators
and commentators. The Hellersteins criticize the Murphy's3 decision,
both as a matter of reading the law as it has developed in the United

122. See Gibbs & Carew, supra note 121; Philip J. Michaels & Laura M. Twomey, State
Income Tax: Not All Trusts Must Pay, N.Y. ST. B.A. J., October, 2001, at 52-54; Jonathan R. Bell &
Linda S. Lasher, Selecting a Trustee with the Right Address, N.Y. L.J., May 13, 1996, at 7; Kathryn
A. Johnson & Adam J. Wiensch, Trustee Selection for Successful Trust Administration, PROB. &
PROP., May/June, 1994, at 38, 41-42; ROBERT A. HENDRICKSON & NEAL R. SILVERIAN,
CHANGING THE SrrUS OF A TRUST (2d ed. 1982). Nevertheless, it seems to be settled law that a
trustee cannot be compelled to resign merely because his continuance makes the trust income
subject to the resident income taxes of a particular state. See Bradley E.S. Fogel, What Have You
Done for Me Lately? Constitutional Limitations on State Taxation of Trusts, 32 U. RICH. L. REV.
165, 221-22 (1998).
123. Mercantile-Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Murphy, 15 N.Y.2d 579 (1964).
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States Supreme Court and as a matter of policy."' On the latter point,
they feel it is enough to say that "tax avoidance may result [for] the
decisions of the Missouri'2s and New York courts tend to invite
manipulation of the income of trusts and estates in a manner that gives
the parties investment advantages and encourages tax avoidance. The
Vermont... and California'27 holdings eliminate the opportunities for such

manipulation."' '

3. The Theme of the Founder's Forfeit
Finally, we come to the Theme of Founder's Forfeit. This is my
poetic phrase to describe a bad tendency that lies at the heart of the
Founder-State Trust tax law. It is the state's insistence on a persistent

liability to taxation of a person who has otherwise severed some or all
ties with the state that is imposing the tax. The state, in so acting, is
seeking to immobilize the settlor's wealth in ways that it could never
immobilize the settlor. As such, it sounds a very faint echo of a wrong
about which America, a nation of emigrants from many other countries,

has always been sensitive.
The wrong in question is insistence that a citizen of a state cannot,
without the permission of the state, sever its connections with that
state. 29 Let me mention, first in the order of history, the wrong of

impressment. At the very beginning of our history as a nation, England
insisted that it could summarily seize American seamen of British birth,
for involuntary service in the Royal Navy; for England they were still

124. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 2, § 20.09[2].
125. See In re Swift, 727 S.W.2d 880 (Mo. 1987); Westfall v. Dir. of Revenue, 812 S.W.2d
513 (Mo. 1991).
126. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Harvey, 16 A.2d 184 (Vt. 1940).
127. The Hellersteins have in mind McCulloch v. Franchise Tax Board, 390 P.2d 412 (Cal.
1964) which imposes a tax on the trust on the basis of the ultimate beneficiary's residence in the
state. See HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 2, § 20.09[3]. Such taxation, under California
law, is in substitute for Founder-State Trust taxation, while the Vermont case does involve FounderState Trust taxation. Perhaps the way to put it is, the authors must have in mind a tax system that
involves insuring that at least one state taxes the trust accumulations. Unfortunately, their solution
does not prevent more than one state from doing so.
128. HELLERSTEIN & HELLERSTEIN, supra note 2, § 20.09[2] (internal citations added).
129. The United States, which recognizes the right of its citizens, to repudiate their citizenship,
still insists that a citizen who merely lives abroad, however long, continues to owe obligations of
citizenship to the United States, including liability to military service and to continuing tax liability.
But an American can repudiate U.S. citizenship by following required procedures, and the voluntary
repudiation puts an end to either liability.
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Englishmen, no matter what American law said.1 3' From there, the basic
position of perduring bonds with the country of nativity gave birth to the
long dispute that, in fact, attended emigration from Europe to America.
Many European countries insisted that, as a matter of domestic and
international law, its citizens could not voluntarily repudiate their
citizenship.'31 This insistence that a person cannot voluntarily sever
connections with their native country had a contemporary revival, in the
case of Russian Jews in the 1970s and 1980s, who had such trouble in
obtaining exit visas to leave the country because they were alleged to
owe the Soviet State indefinite service in return for the upbringing and
education they had received there.
Finally, a more moderate and, perhaps, defensible variation on the
Founder's Forfeit are the numerous past and present financial
regulations that are aimed at preventing local investments and savings
free flight from the country. Free financial transfers has been a goal of
treaty organizations since at least the Bretton Woods Agreement of
1946. Retention of the right to limit such transfers is still regarded as an
ordinary aspect of sovereignty, under the discipline of the international
markets.
The Theme of the Founder's Forfeit can be understood as yet
another version of this latter principle, and it gives rise to the case where
the right to leave is admitted, but the right is qualified by subjecting the
emigrating individual to unusual continuing tax liabilities taxation.
Founder-State Trust taxation amounts to a state's taking the position that
130. As my colleague, Peter Spiro, has written:
Refusing to accept the legal fact of naturalization as diminishing obligations to the
Crown-a November, 1807 proclamation warned that 'no such letters of naturalization,
or certificates of citizenship, or certificates of citizenship, do, or can, in any matter divest
our natural-born subjects of the allegiance, or in any degree alter the duty which they
owe to us, their lawful Sovereign'--the English navy would impress the naturalized
Americans at sea into its service on the grounds that they had never been released from
their obligations to their country of birth .... British impressment policy was an
important contributing factor in the outbreak of war in 1812.
In the wake of that conflict and the obvious costs of continued impressment, Britain
desisted from extraterritorial efforts to return would-be former subjects by force. But as
was true of the may other states that refused to recognize expatriation, they remained
subjects in the eyes of the birth country.
Peter J. Spiro, Dual Nationality and the Meaning of Citizenship, 46 EMORY L.J. 1411, 1422-23
(1997) [hereinafter Dual Nationality]. Spiro goes on to chart (somewhat more speculatively) the
development, through a stage still widely accepted today, where new citizenship bonds can be
undertaken, but at the cost of relinquishing the earlier allegiance, to what he argues for as the proper
rule today, that is acceptance of dual citizenship. See also Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemmna,
51 STAN. L. REV. 596 (1999); Peter J. Spiro, Questioning Barriers to Naturalization, 13 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 479 (1999).

131.

See Dual Nationality,supra note 130, at 1420.
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a settlor's action in founding a trust results in the 32perpetual liability of
the assets and income of that trust to local taxation.
Here there are two questions. Is there any evidence that such
motivations entered into the formulation of the Founder-State Trust
definition? And if there is some evidence of such motivation, of what
relevance is it.
Certainly it is not implausible that administrative ease was the
primary reason for adopting the rule. It would not be implausible to
believe that administrators, equally fearing they would have little way to
find many nonreporting trusts, especially those that were not
administered by professional companies and, also, thinking that putting
the public records of the Surrogate's Courts to work, was a brilliant
stroke. But avoidance of trustee shopping and the reduction, if not
elimination, of competitive disadvantage for an important trust company
services industry would be additional reasons for adopting the rule.
Indeed, it also seems plausible that the Founder-State Trust
provisions would seem to many simply a natural expansion of a desire to
hold onto existing wealth. After all, some believe that the Surrogate's
Court desires to keep exclusive jurisdiction of well-monied trusts
precisely because they would then be constrained to pay fat fees to local
lawyers. In the years that preceded enactment of the New York personal
income tax in 1919, many in New York, perhaps with more reason than
in most states,'33 were leery that introduction of an income tax might lead
to emigration of wealthy taxpayers to "commonwealths which seek to
attract to themselves much of the wealth."'
Nothing more can be said. We have little evidence of actual
intentions and policies relating to the 1919 income tax, as we have
132. So far as the Founder-State Trust liability raises memories of a more radical rule which
encouraged immigration, while denying or limiting the citizens' rights to take their wealth with
them or even expropriating that wealth, such as we would find in the extraordinarily miserable
status of Jews in Nazi Germany during the 1930s and at other times and places under orders of
expulsion. See generally SAUL FRJEDLAENDER, NAZi GERMANY AND THE JEWS: THE YEARS OF
PERSECUTION 1933-1939 (1997).
133. During the Civil War, four Northeastern states, New York among them, provided thirty
percent of revenue produced by the wartime income tax. The concentration of wealth in New York
had not declined over the following decades, and that accounted for the state's resistance to the
1894 Federal income tax. In connection with the passage of that Act, William Jennings Bryan
admitted that it would sit heavily (and, he would say, for the first time) on monied individuals in
states like New York. He read, "with relish," a list of more than 100 millionaires resident in New
York City. See RATNER, supra note 66, at 172, 175, 219-21; POWELL, supra note 63. For similar
accounts of the introduction of taxation at this time, see generally CLIFTON K. YEARLEY, THE
MONEY MACHINES: THE BREAKDOWN AND REFORM OF GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY FINANCE IN
THE NORTH 1860-1920 (1970); SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 420.
134. SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 420.
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shown, for we do not have an effective legislative history of the 1919 tax
act and have not been able to identify a model for the Founder-State
Trust concept. Intentions such as I have referred to under the name of the
Founder's Forfeit might indeed lie behind the statute that, without
explanation or prior model, introduced the Founder-State Trust theory of
trust residence into New York. Such intentions are largely unknowable
unless openly admitted and the possibility of their presence may not be
directly relevant, from a legal point of view, provided that the statute can
be adequately justified on other grounds.
But in arguing for the state in the Murphy case, counsel have this to
say about the policy of the Founder-State Trust provisions:
Here, the donor of this inter vivos trust was domiciled in New York at
the time of its creation and remained so until death, with his power of
revocation unexercised. This constitutes the requisite jurisdictional
nexus to impose ... subsequent [income] taxes upon the trustee
thereafterwards .... It is irrelevant for plaintiff to seek to equate the
taxability of trusts which, as this is, is fixed and immovable, with the
taxation of individuals and their mobility during a given taxable
period. Different taxing concepts pertain. As to the trusts, the statutes
do not nor have they ever contemplated 'floating' ones which would
deprive this State of its comprehensive and continuing taxing
jurisdiction solely by reason of the donor's death, which ... it
concededly had during his lifetime ....

This State had jurisdiction then by virtue of [the donor's] New
York domicile and it has not lost it now .... The only effect death had
on the taxability of such trust income was to foreclose the exercise of
the donor's power of revocation over the trust .... His death as a New
York domiciliary permanently continued this trust as a New York
resident trust .... 135
As this language suggests, one could, with little difficulty, as I hope
I have shown, assign a desire for the Founder's Forfeit as one of the
motivations for the otherwise unexplained insertion of the Founder-State
Trust provisions in the 1919 Act. After all, in the end, the state could not
trust trust companies: if the new income tax cut too deeply into their
business, they could and would move out of state and perhaps take the
earnings of their trust assets with them. Second, it is clear that concern
for wealth leaving the state was near the surface in debates that led up to

135.

Murphy Brief, supra note 63, at 13-14 (emphasis added).
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enactment of the individual income tax. The Founder-State Trust
provision certainly does try to make sure that some of that wealth,
especially, in the case of the New York income tax, the whole existing
portfolio of New York trusts would not be able to move in a way that
would be likely to defeat the state's income tax; in the end this aspect of
the Founder-State Trust provision as having extracted the Founder's
Forfeit cannot be wholly denied.
4. A New York Brew
All that has been said relates to the "pure" Founder-State Trust
doctrine, that is, to income taxation of trusts that imposes global tax
liability on any testamentary trust that was founded by a decedent who
died resident in New York. Since at least 1964, New York, of course, the
pure Founder-State Trust doctrine has been invalidated. We do not know
how the New York income tax was administered until the adoption of
the present regulations'36 in 1992, but since then New York trusts are
those (and only those) Founder-State Trusts where there are other
specified New York contacts.'37
Thus the present New York law brews together two types of
liability. No trust with a New York trustee is taxable as a resident unless
it is also a New York Founder-State Trust; and no New York FounderState Trust is taxable as a resident unless it has one of the specified local
connections. As a result the New York modified version of the FounderState Trust doctrine, the New York brew, as it were, has lost a chief
benefit of the pure version of the Founder-State Trust doctrine. New
York law no longer bars New York settlors' attempts to evade New
York tax. Unless more strenuous devices are necessary because the
136. See supranote 37 and accompanying text.
137. First, the regulation makes no provision for apportionment, and by that failure alone might
be constitutionally challenged. Second, even if the Department is authorized to rewrite New York
law in this fashion, does the regulation they have adopted validly specify the circumstances in
which a New York Founder-State Trust should be taxable as a resident? As it stands, the regulation
makes no provision for apportionment of trust income as to trusts with several trustees resident in
several states or with assets located or income sourced both inside and outside New York; but as
noted above, see supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text, such apportionment may be
constitutionally required. Moreover, I do not see how the existence of trust income sourced in New
York, which on the face of it merely makes the trust subject to tax on that income as a nonresident
trust, can be made the predicate for the additional liability for tax as a resident trust. The reference
to local assets may echo the holding in Westfall v. Dir. of Revenue, 812 S.W.2d 513 (Mo. 1991)
(Founder-State Trusts are not taxable without a further nexus to the taxing state, but it is sufficient
that the trust, founded by a Missouri decedent but otherwise unrelated to the state, owned a small
parcel of real estate in Missouri and under certain contingencies, Missouri charities would receive
distributions). I raise, without pursuing, whether the adventitious presence of a minor trust asset or
some remote beneficiary is an appropriate basis for finding tax liability under the Constitution.
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proposed trust has New York beneficiaries or New York assets, a New
York resident can look about for a trustee and a trust situs in a state that
has more hospitable income tax laws than those of New York.
At the same time, another effect of the New York income tax law,
as it currently exists, is that it permits out-of-state settlors to establish
trusts with New York trustees without worrying about incurring New
York State income tax. It does not greatly matter whether this was or
was not the legislative intent of the adoption of the Founder-State Trust
provisions, it seems likely that this consequence has to be considered an
element in keeping the Founder-State Trust provisions on the books. 38 It
is, therefore, not surprising to find trust professionals demanding that
New York meet competition from other states by changing its tax and
other laws.'39
This would not be the first instance New York has responded to the
needs of the substantial New York trust industry. Long since, New York
adopted a Constitutional provision limiting taxation of "moneys, credits,
securities and other intangible personal property within the state not
employed in carrying on any business therein by the owner" when in the
hands of a nonresident of the state.' 40 It is a constitutional assurance that
the state will not levy a property tax or estate taxes based on the
"presence" of a securities and other intangibles;' 4' that, except for so138. "Consistent with long-standing policy of encouraging the import into New York of
nonresident financial business, the Tax Law does not impose income tax on trusts created by nondomiciliaries with New York banks and individuals as trustees, other than New York source
income, thereby disregarding the location, or situs, of such trusts." Gibbs & Carew, supra note 121.
Consideration of the important New York trust services industry must play a role in answering the
question why, despite the Murphy and Taylor cases, the Founder-State Trust provisions of New
York law have not been modified. A switch to income taxation on the basis of trustee domicile
would not only reduce the competitiveness of New York trust companies for future trust businesses,
it would affect hundreds of millions of dollars in trust assets already in the hands of New York
trustees.
139. See Gibbs & Carew, supra note 121: "It is illogical public policy to encourage
nonresidents to bring their assets to New York banks and trust companies while, at the same time,
driving resident trusts out of the state."
140. N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 3 (1939). Previously, New York had experimented with
conditioning non-taxation on reciprocal exemptions being available in the other state, and sometime
after simply ended death tax on nonresident individuals. See 1930 N.Y. LAWS ch. 710, § 249-p
(1930). See Leo Brady, Death Taxes & Recent Statutory and Judicial Solutions of Multiple
Taxation, 16 A.B.A. J. 532, 533 (1930).
141. The provision reads:
Moneys, credits, securities and other intangible personal property within the state not
employed in carrying on any business therein by the owner shall be deemed to be located
at the domicile of the owner for purposes of taxation, and, if held in trust, shall not be
deemed to be located in this state for purposes of taxation because of the trustee being
domiciled in this state, provided that if no other state has jurisdiction to subject such
property held in trust to death taxation, it may be deemed property having a taxable situs
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called business situs intangibles, New York will honor the principle that
intangible value should be taxable for all purposes (including death
taxation) in the state of the domicile of the owner. Concern for the trust
business is then made express, because the constitutional provision goes
on to state that such property "if held in trust, shall not be deemed to be
located in this State for purposes of taxation because of the trustee being
domiciled in this State."
It is the more likely that concern for impact on a trust industry has
something to do with New York's acquiescing in a modified form of the
Founder-State Trust definition of trust residence because, otherwise,
New York has a justified reputation for paying aggressive attention to
possible revenue sources, as the next section of this article shows.
D. Residence and Domicile: Double Taxation
The passions that are expressed in seeking the Founder's Forfeit
can be found in other provisions of state tax laws, as the desire to require
fair participation in the burdens of government shades into a desire to
hold departing citizens and commuting workers to ransom.14 2 I want to
take a look at two examples of penalizing particular taxpayers for
leaving the state.
We introduced at an early point in this Article the complementary
concepts of an income tax based on source of income and that based on
some variation of domicile, residence or presence in the state, and the
danger that the two modes of taxation will result in double taxation. 43 In
most cases, the danger of double taxation is averted by provisions in
many state laws for a credit against taxes paid on some or all income to

within this state for purposes of death taxation. Intangible personal property shall not be
taxed ad valorem nor shall any excise tax be levied solely because of the ownership or
possession thereof, except that the income therefrom may be taken into consideration in
computing any excise tax measured by income generally. Undistributed profits shall not
be taxed.
N.Y. CONST. art. XVI, § 3 (1939).
142. See Lunding v. N.Y. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287 (1998) (Privileges and
Immunities Clause (Article IV, Section 2) denies states the power to refuse all nonresidents a
deduction for alimony payments in circumstances where resident taxpayers get such a deduction);
City of New York v. New York State, 94 N.Y.2d 577 (2000) (City could not impose a local income
tax on City source income only of those nonresidents who were also non-domiciliaries of New
York; such a tax impermissibly burdened interstate commerce).
143. As George Altman and Frank Keesling expressed it many years ago, there is taxation of
income "Without Reference to the Person" (taxation based on source of income) and "With
Reference to the Person" (taxation of an individual on his or her global income). See GEORGE T.
ALTMAN & FRANK M. KEESLING, ALLOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION 29, 30 (1946).
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another state or states.'" These provisions, dependent on the actions of
each of the states involved, do not always achieve their goals of avoiding
double taxation. Moreover, in some cases, the results of the tax
provisions in one or more interacting states make it highly likely that the
tax-credit "safety-net" will not work. One such tax provision was
highlighted by a Report of the Committee of Personal Income Taxation
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York in 1993 .' We
will use the work of the authors of this Report since none of the involved
46
states has provided any effective relief in the intervening decade.'
The problem can be explained by reference to New York's double
definition of individual resident taxpayers as those persons who are
domiciled in the state and those, not domiciled in the state, who are
nevertheless counted as New York resident taxpayers.147 As long ago as
1946, the authors of a classic work on allocation of taxes among the
states noted that "the terms 'domicile' and 'residence' have often been
used interchangeably in cases involving jurisdiction to tax" and, again,
in counter-distinction from each other. 48 The fact is that many states
impose global taxation on the income of individuals who are "resident"
taxpayers in the state in not one, but in two quite different senses.
Individuals are globally taxed if they are domiciliaries; they are also
globally taxed, if, though not domiciliaries, they are resident.' 49 The term
"resident" in this context is statutorily defined (typically in the manner
of the New York definition).
This statutory definition substitutes for, or adds to, the usual
definition of domicile a more mechanical test, which turns on a set of
limited, but significant contacts with the state. The usual factors are the
number of days or months present within the state during a year, and the
existence within the state of some place of abode. Both items are
relevant to the test of "residence" in New York under the New York

144. See, e.g., N.Y. TAX LAW § 620-A(a) (McKinney 2002) and authorities cited supra note 7.
145. See generally Committee on Personal Income Tax, Individual Double Taxation in the TriState Region, 48 REc. Ass'N. B. CITY N.Y. 710 (1993) [hereinafter Individual Double Taxation].
146. An inquiry to the two major authors of the Report resulted in an email as follows:
Thanks for your note. We received one letter from NY which suggested that we had been
unduly harsh in asserting that there was double taxation without relief of certain types of
income. The writer, the then chair of the State Tax Commission suggested that an
adversely affected taxpayer could specially petition for relief. There was no suggestion
of any broader change that was appropriate. The other jurisdictions did not comment.
147. See Individual Double Taxation, supra note 145, at 721; N.Y. TAx LAW § 605(b)
(McKinney 2002).
148. ALTMAN & KEESLING, supra note 143, at 31-32.
149. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 605 (McKinney 2002).
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personal income tax. ' The New York State Tax Law defines a "resident
individual" as an individual:
(A) who is domiciled in this state... or
(3) who is not domiciled in this state but maintains a permanent place
of abode in this state and spends in the aggregate more than one
151
hundred eighty-three days of the taxable year in this state ....
Item (B) at the same time it defines this new sense of residence,
excludes any individual who is domiciled in New York. There is a great
difference between these two bases, each of which makes an individual
taxpayer subject to the New York tax on his or her global income. The
difference stems from the fact that domicile implies, in the strongest
way, a unique tie to the domiciliary state. There can be only one
domicile.5 2 A "resident" individual, on the other hand, implies
absolutely nothing about picking out a preferred unique situs. On the
contrary, a section 605(b)(1)(B) resident is defined in a way that, by the
very form of the definition, assures that he or she, not being a
domiciliary of New York, is domiciliary of another state.' 53 At the same
time, the provision defines a person whose connection to the state is
sufficient to justify global taxation, that is, tax on income from all
sources, without regard to the fact that the individual is also a resident,
and even a domiciliary, of another state.
Taxation of the nondomiciliary resident on his or her global income
has long been part of New York law and the law of other states imposing
a general income tax. Although it carries, as is suggested below, a
potential for double taxation, the courts have, until the present time,
rejected any claim that states imposing such a tax are breaching
constitutional limits as a result of the possibility or even the fact of
double taxation that results. In People ex rel. Ryan v. Lynch5M the
taxpayer was a domiciliary of Minnesota, but admitted he had a
permanent place of abode within New York and had spent more than
150. See id. § 605(b)(1).
151. See id. Certain exceptions, not here relevant, are also listed in subparts (A) and (B). For
adoption of a similar definition for local government income taxes, see N.Y. TAX LAW
§ 1305(a)(1)(2) and N.Y. GEN. CrrY LAW § 25-a (McKinney 1999).
152. It is fair to say that when conflicting claims of domicile have arisen, they have created a
near crisis. See infra notes 298-310 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Due Process
Clause objections to double domicile. See also infra notes 233-73 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the earlier Cases Allocating Intangibles. Both sets of cases assume that, in principle,
there is only one domicile. See also ALTMAN & KEESLING, supranote 143, at 31-32.
153. See N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b)(a).
154. 262 N.Y. 1 (1933).
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seven months of the relevant taxable year here, as the statute required.
The taxpayer resisted paying the tax because he claimed that the
constitution, and specifically the Due Process Clause, requires that only
a resident and domiciliary in a state is subject to tax in this way. Judge
Pound, for the court, disagrees. He sets aside the cases the plaintiff had
cited as dealing estate taxes and says:
The definition of "resident" ... has no legitimate bearing upon any
question raised under the Federal constitution. The decision depends
upon the general operation and effect of the statute ....
The statute in itself is quite valid under the Federal Constitution, as
giving a legitimate definition to the word "resident."' 55
To establish the legitimacy of the statutory definition, Judge Pound
cites a then recent federal tax case, Bowring v. Bowers,5 6 which held that
a long-term British resident of the United States was subject to federal
tax as a "resident alien" even though he intended ultimately to return to
Britain and was not, therefore, a domiciliary. With that, Judge Pound
dismissed the case as not presenting a question of constitutionality.'57
Where the taxpayer in Ryan fruitlessly relied on the Due Process
Clause, in the recent New York case of Tamagni v. Tax Appeals
Tribunal,5 ' the taxpayer also attempted to rely on the Interstate
Commerce Clause and the protection of a nonresident's privileges and
immunities found in Article IV, section 2 of the Constitution.
There the state of New York imposed a tax because the taxpayer, an
investment banker in a New York City firm, had long maintained his
main family residence in New Jersey. He and his wife were, as a result,
admittedly domiciled in New Jersey, but he and his wife maintained a
small apartment in the City; and he could not prove that he was not
physically present in the City for at least a few minutes on a
preponderance of the days (184 days) of the year. At that point, Tamagni
became liable for a tax on his income froin all sources, including income
from personally owned securities, income that was also taxed by New
Jersey because he was domiciled there.
155. Id. at 3-4.
156. 24 F.2d 918-19 (2d Cir. 1928).
157. See People ex rel. Ryan v. Lynch, 262 N.Y. 1, 4 (1933). Judges Lehman and O'Brien
dissented without opinion. The case is dismissed jurisdictionally, rather than on the merits, since the
plaintiff was seeking review of a confirmation of the administrative decision in the Appellate
Division below on the ground that the confirmation involved a constitutional question. Although the
constitutional claim was raised below, there is no evidence that it was the ground of decision.
158. 91 N.Y.2d 530 (1998).
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In a way, although, Tamagni's case does present the issue implicit
in the nonunique status of global "resident" taxation, it does not present
it in its harshest form. The Tamagni's may not have suffered the
maximum pain that doubly taxing such securities income potentially
implied.' Although such securities income does not have a source in
any particular state, New Jersey, the other (and domiciliary) state in a
position to tax that income, is alone in the nation in giving a credit for
other state income taxes whenever another state tax is paid and-what
New York refuses to do-without regard to whether the income so taxed
had a source within the state against whose tax the credit is claimed.
Therefore Tamagni may pay the New York taxes due and then claim the
amount of the New York taxes paid as a credit against his New Jersey
income tax (up to the amount of such New Jersey income tax paid). Of
course, if such a credit is not constitutionally required, New Jersey's
generous tax credit policy could be changed at any time that such a
change seems desirable to the New Jersey legislature.'o
In fact, were Tamagni's situation reversed, that is, if New Jersey
were imposing the tax on Tamagni because he satisfied the minimal
contacts of being a nondomiciliary resident there, while New York
rightly regarded him as a domiciliary, New York would not provide
Tamagni with any credit against his New York tax bill for taxes paid in
this way to New Jersey. The New York credit is limited to the amount of
income taxes paid to another state as a nonresidentstate tax imposed on
income from what New York considers to be 6' sources within the other

159. Now that Connecticut has an income tax, there must be some Connecticut commuters into
New York who are paying tax on global incomes to both states. Neither Connecticut nor New York
will give a credit for taxes paid to the other in these circumstances.
160. Some insight into the motivation from New Jersey's more generous tax credit policy was
recently given by Robert K. Thompson, director of the Division of Taxation, who says that New
Jersey;
prevents our taxpayers from getting whipsawed. Mr. Thompson said New Jersey
provides an automatic credit so that a taxpayer with a dilemma like Professor Zelinsky's
would not be doubly taxed ....
In essence, it is a situation where the New Jersey resident never gets hurt, but the
New Jersey treasury gets hurt.
Mr. Thompson, the interviewer further reported;
said he understands and appreciates New York's position; the state is not eager to allow
taxpayers to pick and choose their taxing jurisdiction since New York's taxes are higher
than those of surrounding states. At the same time, however, he said, "it is the kind of
thing, especially in today's economy, where states have to work together and reach
understandings that take into consideration the various states' tax policies and take into
consideration their taxpayers as well."
John Caher, State Tax Ruling Roils Controversy With Neighbors,N.Y. L.J., Dec. 5, 2001, at 1.
161. See infra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
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state. 62 The New York limitation on the availability of a credit against
income tax paid
• • to
163 another state is much more common than is the New
Jersey provision. In fact, when New York asserts a resident income
liability against a domiciliary of Connecticut, the tax paid in neither
New York nor in Connecticut, will qualify as a tax credit against the tax
paid in the other state. The result will be that the hypothetical
Connecticut domiciliary would have to pay two taxes on his or her
global income, without any offsetting credit. This is, classically, double
taxation.
Tamagni attempted to object to this potential double taxation
(which, under the facts of a case, will not occur unless New Jersey
modifies its interstate income tax credit rules). '6 From a constitutional
point of view, he argues, to permit both New Jersey and New York to
tax the same income results in a discrimination against and a burden on
interstate commerce. In the course of responding to this argument, Judge
Wesley, speaking for the Court, says:
The current statute can be traced back to chapter 425 of the Laws of
1922, which first defined residence for tax purposes in terms of
maintenance of a permanent place of abode in New York and presence
in this State for seven months .... At the time the statute was enacted
the Income Tax Bureau noted in its memorandum in support of the
legislation that, "[w]e have several cases of multimillionaires who
actually maintain homes in New York and spend ten months of every
year in those homes ... but they ... claim to be
nonresidents".... The statutory residence provision serves the
important function of taxing those "who, while really and [for] all
intents and purposes [are] residents of the state, have maintained a
voting residence elsewhere and insist on paying taxes to us as
nonresidents".... In short, the statute is intended to discourage tax
evasion by New York residents.
Judge Wesley then rejects the argument that this variety of
commuter tax requires apportionment.'6 The New York and New Jersey
162. See Individual Double Taxation, supra note 145, at 713.
163. See id. at 715, 717. The Report goes on to recommend that a system of credits is more
appropriate than the allocation of income, because a system of credits assures that no person subject
to this form of potential double taxation will escape paying taxes to either state, but will be required
to pay taxes that are deemed appropriate by the policy of each state. The tax credit achieves this
result by requiring that every taxpayer claiming a credit will pay the income taxes levied by the state
that imposes the higher tax, but will pay no more than that, in total, to both states. See id.
164. See Tamagni v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 91 N.Y.2d 530, 536 (Ct. App. 1998).
165. Id. at 535 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
166. Seeid. at538,544.
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taxes, he says, are different taxes because New York is taxing the
taxpayer as a resident while New Jersey is taxing him as a domiciliary. It
is a strange argument, indeed! It is like saying the self-same stick is
really two sticks because it is too long for some purposes and too short
for others. The problem with Judge Wesley's argument is that the claims
of domicile and "residence" are both rooted in the quantity of the
taxpayer's enjoyment of civil society in the respective states.
Admittedly, both the nondomiciliary resident and the domiciliary receive
substantial benefits from the existence of civil government in New York
and New Jersey, respectively.
But receipt of such benefits cannot be the answer to all the
questions that could be raised on these facts. Whether such benefits are
received is not the only question that could be posed here. It is easier to
point to the benefits received from each of the states, as justifying that
state in asserting some tax liability, than it is to conclude that those
benefits justify double taxation, potential or actual, due to the facts of
persistent presence in both states in the form of a spread-out or extended
presence that stretches across several states.
Recently a second case arising in New York has brought forward,
on quite different facts, issues parallel to those raised by the nondomiciliary resident in Tamagni. The case is one that a Cardozo School
of Law Professor, Edward Zelinsky, is currently litigating through the
New York courts. Professor Zelinsky is a regular faculty member at
Cardozo, a New York City institution, but he commutes from New
Haven, Connecticut, where he is domiciled. He insists that his income
from Cardozo is not entirely income that is sourced in New York, but
should be treated, in part, as income from sources outside of New York.
The issue here is whether income from the Law School should be treated
as Connecticut-sourced income to the extent that his work for the school
is in fact performed in Connecticut at Professor Zelinsky's home office;
he insists he carries out many of his job-related functions there. New
York does not deem the salary allocable between the two states and
insists Zelinsky owes it tax on the whole amount of the Cardozo salary.
At the same time, under its own allocation rules, Connecticut does deem
the salary allocable, in part, to the extent of work done in New Haven.
Moreover, Connecticut, since it treats the Cardozo income partly as
Connecticut income, will not give Professor Zelinsky a credit for all of
the tax paid to New York as a nonresident taxpayer since (Connecticut
says) a portion of the salary in question is Connecticut income, and not
New York income. Professor Zelinsky insists he is thus caught in a
"whipsaw" between the two states.
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Professor Zelinsky is litigating the issue in New York. He has lost
at the administrative level and more recently before the New York
Appellate Division. 67 But his law suit has attracted considerable
attention, not least because Professor Zelinsky has effectively posed his
issue as one arising from the new technology that allows more flexibility
for work, through the Internet, while at home; he correctly points out
that his is an issue that will increasingly arise with the spread of
telecommuting. 6 1 Moreover, the contest is drawing strange comment
from New York and Connecticut taxing officials. In a December 5, 2001
article John Caher quotes from officials of the two states, each openly
suggesting that the other state ought to provide accommodation.' 69
Should the double taxation in either case be permissible,
constitutionally permissible? If it is, we would have, as the statements
quoted by Judge Wesley show, to accept that the Founder's Forfeit, the
insistence that a taxpayer cannot escape New York's taxation even if, in
reliance on the promise of our Federal Union, he or she extends
expansively into another state or other states, each of whom may seek to
tax. I am writing to test if such double taxation -- either so motivated or
having such an effect-should not, consistent with existing
constitutional language and strong constitutional policy, be permissible
without requiring, as a matter of constitutional mandate, some provision
for a credit against taxes paid in one state or the other.'7 '
167. See Zelinsky v. Tax Appeals Tribunal, 2002 WL 31720595 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d. Dept.,
Dec. 5, 2002). The court finds that New York's attribution rules are admittedly unusual and subject
to criticism, but also finds no constitutional defect in them under either the Due Process Clause or
the Commerce Clause and turns the matter over to "Congress or the Legislature." Id. Professor
Zelinsky intends to seek review by the Court of Appeals. See Letter from Edward Zelinsky to
Author, dated Dec. 9, 2002, on file with author.
168. See, e.g., John Caher, Panel ConsidersProfessor'sAttempt to Topple Tax Law, N.Y. L.J.,
Oct. 10, 2002, at 1; John Caher, Telecommuting Is Getting Expensive, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 27, 2000, at
B4.
169. John Caher, State Tax Ruling Roils Controversy with Neighbors, N.Y. L.J., Dec. 5, 2001,
at 1.
170. Of course, the Founder-State Trust concept does not bring us immediately to double
taxation; in itself, it is only a bizarre extension of a tenuous claim to taxability, one that only makes
political sense, perhaps, in light of the Founder's Forfeit. But the Founder-State Trust concept does,
in fact, raise exactly the same risk of double taxation in the absence of an adequate tax credit safetynet as does the global taxation of both domiciliaries and nondomiciliary residents. Other states may
or will impose global taxes on the basis of the local domicile of the trustee or beneficiaries; if they
do, the scene is set for double taxation.
171. The question is a pragmatic one. If the states have moderated the impact of the double tax
then its mere possibility should not be enough to demand constitutional discipline. The states
deserve that much leeway. Supreme Court opinions have insisted, several times, that the mere
existence of double taxation is not, per se, a violation of the Due Process Clause, but the occurrence
of such double taxation is objectionable where the Court can see a viable way of avoiding such a
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Before we directly address that question in this Article, we must
turn to a long and checkered history of the effect of American federalism
and the federal Constitution on "double taxation," a very ambiguous, but
persistent term in American constitutional law, first under general
considerations of fairness and later, by incorporating those fairness
considerations as an aspect of the Due Process Clause.
III. DUE PROCESS AND THE SITUS OF TAX
The constitution has offered grounds for taxpayer hopes from early
on.12 In McCulloch v. Maryland"' the Court opened a long and not yet
finished history of tax immunities by declaring the immunity to state tax
of the Bank of the United States as a Federal instrumentality. 74
Moreover, the Court's protection of interstate commerce from state
regulation and taxation, which was at first near absolute and
subsequently more nuanced, has been and continues to be a major
resource for taxpayers complaining of state taxes. But the Constitution
has offered other resources, for far beyond the language of the
Constitution there has been a persistent objection to some state taxes

which is not grounded in specific constitutional language. The objection
is that the taxes in question were beyond the jurisdictionof the state."

result, by allocation, apportionment or tax-sharing. The other two reported cases I have found on
this issue of non-domiciliary resident income tax involved cases where the "other" (domiciliary)
states do not impose any income taxes; the taxpayer in one case had Nevada as a domicile and in the
other, Florida (although Florida's intangibles tax is sufficiently significant that it itself poses a
double taxation question). The older, partially-left-behind states, Minnesota and Michigan, at least
can iake the argument that they should be able to tax former domiciliaries until the new
domiciliary states also impose an income tax since the taxpayers are snow-birds who do not sever
all connections with their old states. See Stelzner v. Comm'r 621 N.W.2d 736, 737 (Minn. 2001);
Luther v. Comm'r, 588 N.W.2d 502, 504 (Minn. 1999).
172. In Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 172-73 (1796), it was argued that
Congress' Act June 5, 1794, 1 Stat. 373, imposing an excise on carriages throughout the country,
violated the Federal constitution because it was a direct tax within the meaning of Article I, § 9. The
tax was upheld.
173. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819).
174. See id. at317.
175. In McCulloch v. Maryland, as an incident to denying the State of Maryland the right to tax
the Maryland branch of the Bank of the United States, Chief Justice Marshall soothingly assured
that the state still retained the power to tax, so far as exercise of that power did not threaten the
United States or its instrumentalities, and that that power "is an incident of sovereignty, and is coextensive with that to which it is an incident. All subjects over which the sovereign power of a State
17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819). But the Chief Justice then
extends, are objects of taxation ....
concludes: "but those over which it does not extend, are, upon the soundest principles, exempt from
taxation." Id. at 429 (emphasis added).
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The rhetorical example, never found in practice, 76 is a state's purporting
to lay an ad valorem tax on land located outside the state. This sounds
like a matter of state constitutional law, appropriately addressed to the
courts of the state, but the argument has found a place in the Supreme
Court reports also. 17 Perhaps the entire concept mirrored rules of
international law and comity and was linked to the same considerations
that led to the refusal of sister states to open their courts to the
enforcement of tax laws of another state. More recently, Justice Powell
has suggested a framework rationale for such action, which, still without
being attached to specific constitutional language, fits more
neatly
178
within the language of contemporary constitutional argument.
A.

Situs and Domicile

In the immediate aftermath of the Civil War the concept of
attempting to tax property with a situs beyond the state's jurisdiction

176. See, e.g., Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 204 (1905). The
point is that imposing an ad valorem tax on extra-territorial land was so universally condemned that
an actual attempt to do so would never arise. But see Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422, 423(1935)
(illustrating a state's attempt to tax shares in a trust that held only extra-territorial real property).
177. Justice Reed speaking for the Court in Braniff Ainvays v. Nebraska State Board,347 U.S.
590, 599 n.18 (1954), stated: "[Tihe common-law concept of situs was recognized by this [the U.S.
Supreme] Court as a limitation on state power to tax ... prior to invocation of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a defense to such taxation [but] ... no consistent constitutional principle was
applied." See also for the same point, Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954); Central
R.R. Co. of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 620 (1962) (Black, J., concurring in the result). See
F.J. Goodnow, CongressionalRegulation of State Taxation, 28 POL. SCl. Q. 405, 417-18 (1913),
often cited as the first work to note the existence of constitutional objections not tied to the Due
Process Clause.
178. Speaking of the threatened findings of conflicting domicile for the late Howard Hughes by
both California and Texas in Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 100-01 (1982), Justice Powell dissented
from the invocation of sovereign immunity to prevent the estate's bringing a suit in the nature of
interpleader, on the grounds that it was the necessary basis for protection of a constitutional right,
for:
multiple taxation based solely on conflicting determinations of domicile not only is
unfair, but ... taxation on this basis by at least one of the States must lack the only
predicate asserted to justify its levy under the Due Process Clause .... The threat of
multiple taxation based solely on domicile simply is incompatible with the structural
principles of a federal system recognizing as "fundamental" a constitutional right to
travel.
Id. at 100-01. Justice Powell was joined on this point by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens,
and the Court as a whole did give California leave to file an original action against Texas alleging
potential harm from the latter's insistence that Hughes was domiciled there. See California v. Texas,
457 U.S. 174 (1982). We will have reason to return to Justice Powell's language that links the
structure of the Union to the concededly fundamental right to travel freely.
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was used by Supreme Court majorities in two long-forgotten cases. 79
These were successive cases dealing with Pennsylvania's attempt to
withhold part of the interest being paid nonresident holders of bonds
issued by in-state railways. The first case, North CentralRailroadCo. v.
Jackson,5 0 was an action to recover interest due on a bond coupon
brought by a nonresident bond owner against the debtor railroad, which
refused to remit the full amount of the dividend, withholding 15 percent
under the claimed tax mandates of the United States and Pennsylvania.
The tax mandates were parallel, for under the federal provision the
railroad was to withhold 5 percent of the dividend, and under the state,
10 percent.
The Pennsylvania tax was on "money owing" at three mills to the
dollar of the principal amount of bonded indebtedness, to be withheld
from interest payments. The railroad's tracks lay 67 percent to 75
percent within Pennsylvania, and the rest in Maryland. A mortgage on
the line as a whole secured the bonds. The Pennsylvania courts had held
the tax was not a tax on nonresident aliens; accepting that, Mr. Justice
Nelson reasoned the tax must then be a tax levied "on the security [for]
the bond, which is in the hands of the nonresident holder."'' With that
characterization in hand, the Court focused on the effect of a tax on the
unapportioned and integral security of a railroad line located in two
states, though part of single road. For Justice Nelson, the tax was laid on
a security interest in real property located in two separate states. That
was a fatal flaw in the tax: "to permit the deduction of the tax from the
coupons in question, would be giving effect to the acts of the legislature
of Pennsylvania upon property and interests lying beyond her
jurisdiction," that is, upon the portion of the mortgaged property that
was located in Maryland. The tax is overturned, and the nonresident
alien obtains the full dividend.8 2 The reliance on the general principle
179. See generally ,orth Central R.R. Co. v. Jackson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262 (1868); Cleveland,
P. & A. R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 NVall.) 300 (1872).
180. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262 (1868).
181. Id. at 267.
182. Id. Under the Act of June 20, 1864, Congress, by one section imposed an income tax on
residents and nonresident citizens, and by another required railroad companies to deduct five
percent from bonded indebtedness, without mentioning any limitation of the character of the
recipients. See id.at 269. The Court rules that the withholding was not intended to apply
nonresident alien owners. It notes, however, that Congress explicitly authorized withholding against
nonresident aliens in later acts. The Court expressly reserved judgment on whether "it is competent
for Congress to impose [the tax]." l- In the event, the Court never reached that issue. In a series of
cases coming before the Court, in which the main issue was usually the termination date of the tax,
the Court chose to avoid the issue of such competence. See generally Barnes v. The Railroads 84
U.S. (17 Wall.) 294 (1872); United States v. B.&O. R.R. Co., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322 (1872);
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that a tax that attempts to reach beyond the jurisdiction is void, seems
8 3 Although the language of "giving effect to the acts of the
complete."
legislature of Pennsylvania" vaguely points to some hypothetical refusal
to give faith and credit to the Pennsylvania law, the holding has no
anchor in the language of the U.S. Constitution.
In the once-celebrated State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds Case
(Cleveland, P. & A. R.R. v. Pennsylvania),' 4 a different version of the
same Pennsylvania tax came before the Court. Once again, it was struck
down. But this time, the Court was closely divided; and the dissenting
four' 85 were not afraid to insist that Pennsylvania had not violated any
provision of the Federal constitution. For the dissenters, absent expressly
applicable constitutional constraints, the state can tax "the property of
persons which it can reach and lay its hands on, whether these persons
reside within or without the State."
Mr. Justice Fields, a fierce proponent of property rights, wrote for
the Court in that case. Once again, the defect in the state tax is that it
reaches beyond the jurisdiction. But this time, what is remote are the
bonds, those invisible commercial obligations, which are to be safely
identified with their nonresident owners. That principle is central to the
disposition of the case. Because the bonds in the hands of the
nonresident holders are "beyond the jurisdiction of the taxing power of
Stockdale v. Ins. Cos., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 323 (1873); Railroad Co. v. Rose, 95 U.S. (5 Otto) 78
(1877); Railroad Co. v. Collector, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 595 (1879); United States v. Erie Ry. Co., 106
U.S. (16 Otto) 327 (1882). When the issue of Congress' competence to tax nonresident bondholders
was finally presented in the Erie Railway case in 1882, the majority disposed of the case as
involving a tax on the corporation, not on the bondholders. See Erie Ry. Co., 106 U.S. at 330-31.
Only Justice Field dissented from the result in Erie Railway. See id. at 330. But Justice Bradley
concurred in the result only; for him Congress clearly imposed the tax on the bondholders.
Although, as he sardonically remarked, "it might create complications with foreign governments, it
is true, and involve the country in war," Congress' competence to impose the tax on nonresident
bondholders was beyond question. In DeGanay v. Lederer, 250 U.S. 376, 382-83 (1919), a
unanimous court upheld a United States income tax on a citizen and resident of France in respect of
income from securities of American companies and mortgages of American land on the ground that
the evidences of these holdings were held for the taxpayer by an American agent under a power that
permitted sale and reinvestment. The Court self-consciously manipulates the "fiction" of situs,
saying the securities are integrated both with their certificates and into a course of United States
business. "It is difficult to conceive how property could be more completely localized in the United
States." Id. The Court does not cite or distinguish State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds. The laws
goveming national power to tax aliens differs from the power of the states to do so.
183. See North Central R.R. Co. v. Jackson, 74 U.S. at 268. But almost immediately, a special
niche was carved out that permitted states to localize all shares of stock of a national bank, whether
held by residents or not, in the state where the bank was operating. See Nat'l Bank v.
Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353, 326 (1869); Tappan v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 86 U.S. (19
Wall.) 490, 491 (1873).
184. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300 (1872).
185. Justice Davis' opinion was joined by Justices Clifford, Miller and Hunt. See id. at 326.
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the state," the tax cannot be sustained simply as a tax on nonresidents
with respect to present property, e.g., like land owned by a nonresident,
but located in Pennsylvania, and since the tax must therefore be a kind of
license tax on the borrowing and was not a condition of the issuance of
the bonds (in which case the creditors could have negotiated to have the
debtor bear the tax), the order to the debtor corporation to withhold a
portion of the dividend impairs the obligation of the contract under
which the bonds were issued, in violation of Article 1, § 10. But the
impairment argument assumes that a straight-forward tax on dividends
payable to nonresidents is not possible. 6 The case was understood to
deny the states the right to tax intangible obligations owing to
nonresidents.
In time the Due Process clause was called on to constitutionalize
Justice Field's intuition of limits on state taxing powers "beyond its
jurisdiction,"'' 7 and in aid of the invocation of the (unexercised)
Congressional power over interstate commerce. It happened that the
tendencies of arguments made under both clauses resulted in the issue's
being stated, more and more often, in terms of the situs of the "object" of

a tax law,' for instance, it was taken as a given that a state could not tax
real property that was not within the state.

9

For a very large part of

constitutional history, again, no state could lay a tax "on" interstate
commerce, but could require participants in that commerce to pay nondiscriminatory taxes on property and operations "within the State."'90

186. As Justice Davis said in dissent, state courts had determined, long before these bonds
were issued, that a tax of just this sort was validly imposed on the nonresident creditors, on the
ground that they were receiving benefits from the state that would allow enforcement of their rights
as creditors. See id. at 327.
187. Although Justice Black correctly claims, in his concurrence in Central Railroad Co. of
Pa. v Pennsylvania,370 U.S. 607, 620 (1962), that the first case relying on the Due Process Clause
when striking down a tax as "beyond the jurisdiction" was Louisville & Jeffersonville Ferry
Railway v. Kentucky, 188 U.S. 385 (1903), the clause was sooner cited. See, e.g., Savings & Loan
Soc'y v. Multnomah County, 169 U.S. 421 (1898).
188. The word "situs" seems to have been introduced into the law in JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICTs OF LAW 309, 463 (1972 reprt.); see also "situs" in the
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY.

189. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194,204-05 (1905).
190. The centerpiece of pedagogy in state taxes and constitutional law is the rejection of
interstate commerce immunity and the emergence of the obligation of that commerce to pay its way
under a "practical" set of four limitations in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274
(1977). The four limitations are that tax must not discriminate against interstate commerce and,
moreover, must be based on a transaction or asset that has a substantial nexus with the taxing state,
must be fairly apportioned to intra-state property or operations, and is fairly related to the services
provided by the state.
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But the term "situs," a term that had been introduced as part of the
law of the conflict of laws as to personal property generally and,
especially, as to jurisdiction over the disposition of such property after
the owner's death,' 9' appeared in cases where its limitations as a criterion
for the taxability of property other than land were soon pointed out by
critics. Traditionally, personal property was subject to an old maxim,
mobilia sequuntur personam. The latin, which literally speaks of
movables as trailing along behind the person, pointed to a legal
conclusion, that, e.g., for purposes of distribution or administration after
death, all personal property was treated as if it were located wherever the
owner was.'92 It was a fiction. And, as a fiction, it was already
recognized as inappropriate in many cases by Joseph Story in the early
part of the nineteenth century. 93 Mr. Justice Gray dismissed the concept
as out-of-date by saying that it "grew up in the Middle Ages, when
movable property consisted chiefly of gold and jewels, which could be
easily carried by the owner from place to place, or secreted in spots
known only to himself."' 94 Treating all property as in the presence of its
owner was a fiction that "yields whenever it is necessary for the purpose
of justice that the actual situs of the thing should be examined."' 95
B.

Tangible Personalty

In the case of tangible personal property, its situs, its physical
location, seems to offer an easy alternative to the fiction that attributes
tangible personal property to wherever the owner happened to be; there
are greater difficulties with intangible assets. 9 6 However, even tangible
property can be moved about in various ways and for various purposes.
The Court did work out a more or less stable pattern for the ad
valorem taxation of tangible personal property, but even so, given the
tenacity of American lawyers, it did so only slowly. Why was this
important? Not only because it validated a tax on personal effects and art
objects, on herds and flocks. But because it validated a tax that was
relatively easy to administer (the property lay open to view for the most

191. See STORY, supra note 188, Chs. IX and XIV.
192. See id. at311-12.
193. See id. at 462.
194. See Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 22 (1891).
195. STORY, supra note 188, at 462, quoted in PullmanPalace Car Co., 141 U.S. at 22.
196. There remains an ambiguity about the situs of even realty and tangible personalty.
Property remains a legal convention; it is the apparatus of law that confirms ownership, and our
rights to exclude, use and transfer that are most valued. These too are "intangible" and
"incorporeal."
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part) and was to be imposed on a mass of new wealth, that is, the wealth
that is a by-play of the logistics, the planning, preparation and operation
at the level of great industrial operations that emerged with the
remarkable growth of the country as an industrial nation before and,
especially, in the half-century after the Civil War. The wealth that the
states sought to tax was, among other things, inventory of all sorts, raw
materials and farm products that were waiting for processing or
distribution, and it was the supplies, equipment, and facilities of the new
age: ships, wagons, machinery, even telegraph poles and wires, and
above all, throughout this period, the rolling stock of the railroads,
engines, boxcars, tank cars, refrigerator cars, coaches, and Pullman
cars.'9 7 In the twentieth century airplanes offered a new field in which the
rules must be worked out. 98
The first cases involved the right to tax ships, and these were
allocated to the home port, and the home-port state, a species of mobilia
sequuntur personam, that barred taxation by all other states, in part on
the ground that federal law required them to be registered at a home
port.' " Then, leaving ships aside, new rules were worked out for railroad
rolling stock, whether or not used in interstate commerce. Such cars
were limited to specific tracks and yards, were used for the most part in
scheduled runs, and in principle could be located and tracked.2 The first
rule that departed from taxation of all such rolling stock at the home
state of the owner, was the rule that, if the rolling stock was permanently
in one state, it was taxable there in full, without regard to the domicile of
the owner.Y If the stock was regularly used on runs in several states, it
was taxable in each state where it was in regular use on some pro rata
basis, usually in proportion to in-state track mileage. 2 2 The taxing power
of the taxpayer's home state, i.e., the state of incorporation or domicile,
however, correspondingly shrunk. If tangible personal property had a
"permanent" status elsewhere, that permanent status was exclusive of
any home state right to tax. 2 3 Thus, the Court has, in principle, allocated
197. See Thomas Reed Powell, Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota: State Taxation ofAirplanesHereinAlso of Ships and Sealing Wax and RailroadCars,57 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1097-99 (1944).
198. See id. at 1097.
199. See id.; Pullman Palace CarCo., 141 U.S. at 23.
200. See Pullman PalaceCar Co., 141 U.S. at 26.
201. See id. at 22.
202. See id. at 26.
203. See Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 211 (1905) (Justice
Holmes concurring in the result, but "hardly understand[ing] how it can be deduced from the
Fourteenth Amendment"); Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U.S. 473, 500 (1925) (same exclusion of
domiciliary state taxation of tangible personalty in another state extended to inheritance tax
measured by the value of such personalty); Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251, 257 (1949).
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tax jurisdiction over a broad spectrum of taxes that are levied on or
measured by the value of tangible property.
Where tangible personalty has not acquired a permanent situs in
some other state, however, because, like ships, some rolling stock and
aircraft, for example, it is almost always in transit and not permanently
located anywhere, the home state can tax the whole fleet; and it certainly
can do so if no one else is doing sO.2 Northwest Airlines v. Minnesota03
held that the home state could do so as to aircraft. The plurality opinion
in that case admitted that other states might be taxing some portion of
the fleet's value, on an apportionment theory, but denied there was
2
anything in the record that showed that was the caseY.
In later cases, nondomiciliary states were permitted to establish a
statistical basis for an apportioned taxation of a transportation
equipment, e.g., train-day "equivalents," without showing that such
equipment was present in-state with the duration and regularity that was
arguably implicit in earlier talk about a fixed situs. 2 7 It is likely that the
law of taxation of such equipment requires, both under the Commerce
Clause and under the Due Process Clause, that a state resort to
reasonable apportionment formulas whenever the taxpayer can show
that, otherwise, it would be subject to taxation, double taxation or,
even, state taxation of values not present therein, that is, taxation beyond
the state's jurisdiction. 2°9 It certainly continues to be the law that

204. See Union RefrigeratorTransit, 199 U.S. at 196.

205. 322 U.S. 292 (1944).
206. See id. at 294-95.
207. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Mo. State Tax Comm'n, 390 U.S. 317, 324 (1968); Central
R.R. Co. of Pa. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607, 622-625 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Braniff
Airways v. Neb. State Bd. of Equalization and Assessment, 347 U.S. 590, 591,593, 597 (1954); Ott
v. Miss. Valley Barge Line Co., 336 U.S. 169, 171, 174 (1949).
208. In CentralRailroad Co. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962) six Justices (Frankfurter
and White did not participate in the case) split over whether Pennsylvania could tax the plaintiff's
rolling stock even though, statistically, it was outside Pennsylvania for almost ninety percent of the
time. The burden was on the plaintiff, Justice Harlan argued, to show other states than Pennsylvania
constitutionally could tax the pool of out-of-state cars, and mere statistical evidence of being out-ofstate and nothing else, was not an adequate showing. See id. at 613. Justice Douglas, on the other
hand, thought that after Braniff, the statistics were all that was needed to show potential double
taxation. Thus, six Justices agreed that double taxation was constitutionally prohibited under both
the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause. There was also a consensus that the
constitutional problem could be avoided if each state appropriately apportioned its tax claim
according to a reasonable formula. The actual disposition of the CentralRailroadcase was decided
by Black's joining the trio for whom Harlan wrote, but on Commerce Clause grounds only. See id.
at 619. Black continued to believe that the Due Process Clause cannot bar state tax laws.
209. Seeid. at619-21.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss4/2

54

Jacob: An Extended Presence, Interstate Style: First Notes on a Theme fr

20021

A THEME FROM SAENZ

domiciliary state taxation of tangible property permanently located
outside that state is barred. °
C. Double Taxation Affirmed
If the post-Civil War economic growth had led to an explosive
increase of valuable property and equipment, the overall values
represented by investment multiplied by many orders of magnitude
more. It is a commonplace that most value today is represented by
financial rights and claims. And these rights and claims are of the most
diverse sorts: bank accounts and loans of all sorts, from ritualized public
issuance of bonds and notes to loans to a brother-in-law, securities and
mutual funds, mortgages and mortgage pools, markers and lottery
tickets, notes, bonds, debentures, partnership interests, pieces of the
action, contract rights and "mere" contract rights, trust funds, accrued
commissions and credits, retirement rights and insurance policies, to say
nothing of intellectual property and the value of credit and credit lines.
All of this diversity, however, is, to a greater or less degree, alike in
consisting of rights or claims against another rather than relating to
concrete assets. Even our money, which certainly seems tangible and "in
hand," is in reality a circulating medium, our paper currency no longer
even bothers to make the circular promise that it may be redeemed in
legal tender, for where currency is concerned, authenticity, that is, credit,
is important, not content. All these are intangibles.
Here the maxim mobilia sequuntur personam seems less gothic
than when applied to, say, property regularly left in a vacation home
when the owner is not there. Where else is an intangible, save as an
aspect of the owner? That notion certainly dominated Justice Field when
he was striking down the Pennsylvania state tax on foreign bonds. 2 ' But
the Pennsylvania court whose validating opinion Justice Field rejected,
had seen it differently. In Maltby v. Reading & Columbia Railroad
Co.,212 the Pennsylvania court had upheld the withholding tax on railroad
bond dividends, even as to nonresident holders
because civil government is essential to give value to any form of
property, without regard to the ownership, and taxation is

210. See Treichler v. Wisconsin, 338 U.S. 251,256 (1949).
211. See State Tax on Foreign Bonds Case, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300 (1872). See, for example,
Field's insistence that the bond cannot be deemed the property of the debtor, so as to have a situs
where the debtor is located. When it has suited the Court, this case has been made to turn on the
assimilation of the bonds to the paper by which they were evidenced.
212. 52 Pa. (2 Smith) 140 (1866).
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indispensable to civil government .... Is it not apparent that the

intrinsic and ultimate value of the loan as an investment rests on state
authority-that it is the state which made it property and preserves it as
property? Then it would seem that this kind of property, more than any
other, ought to contribute to the support of the state government. 23
The argument that the state need only show some benefit or
opportunity extended to the individual will ultimately come to be folded
into the modem theory of the Due Process Clause as applicable to state
taxation."'
The pressure from debtor states seeking to tax intangible property
of various sorts when held by out-of-staters continued after Justice
Field's striking down the Pennsylvania withholding tax on interest
payments made on railroad bonds. By the 1890s, Oregon successfully
assessed the "interest" of a mortgagee as part of the value of real
property. 2"5 So much of the property, to the extent of the unpaid amount
of the debt not in excess of the value of the land, was then assessed to
the out-of-state lender. The tax on the value of the mortgage security
was upheld notwithstanding that even the actual mortgage documents
were in California.2 1 6 The latter is relevant because, during this same
time, two more generalized forms of localization came to be applied to
debts and similar intangibles. On the one hand, various kinds of
intangibles-notes, bonds, and other securities-were treated as if the
property right were integrated into the paper (the note, the bond, the
certificate), and the state could tax when the paper was kept locally. 27"
By extension, bank accounts were treated as located at the actual
banking offices. 28 Later, where it could be shown that the credits were
part of a revolving fund employed by a nonresident within a state,
through an agent or otherwise, the credits were said to have a business
situs within the state and were taxable by the state where the business
was being carried on.21 9
213. Id. at 146.
214. See infra notes 311-31 and accompanying text for a discussion of the benefit theory.
215. See Sav.& Loan Soc'y v. Multnomah County, 169 U.S. 421,425 (1898).
216. See id. at 427 (quoting Dundee Mtg. Co. v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 19 F. 359, 367-68 (C.C.D. Or.
1884) ("[T]he mere fact that the instruments has been sent out of the state for the time being, for the
purpose of avoiding taxation thereon or otherwise, is immaterial.")).
217. New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U.S. 309 (1899), which, ironically, distinguished State Tax
on Foreign Bonds as proceeding on the basis that the paper representing the bonds in question was
located abroad. See id. at 319-21.
218. See id. at 322; Fid. & Columbia Trust Co. v. City of Louisville, 245 U.S. 54, 54-55
(1917).
219. See Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co v. Bd. of Assessors, 221 U.S. 346, 356-57
(1911). There was always some uncertainty whether intangibles were being "localized" as a part of
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Between the developing doctrine of business situs and through
assimilation to tangible objects, the property taxation of intangibles had
been opened up to the states. By the 1890s, however, attention was
shifting from annual property taxes to tax on the devolution of property
at death.' 0 It was a case involving such a succession or inheritance tax
that soon gave Mr. Justice Holmes the opportunity of giving the purest
expression to the withdrawal of judicial limits on a large repertory of
taxable objects available to the state.
The case was Blackstone v. Miller.2' With only one dissent, m
Holmes upheld New York's inheritance tax as imposed on the New
York assets of a decedent who died domiciled in Illinois. The New York
assets subjected to the tax are a debt due from a New York securities
firm and a deposit of $4.84 million held, waiting disposition, by New
York Trust as proceeds of a sale of bonds. The decedent's estate had
already paid inheritance tax in Illinois, where his estate, as the estate of a
domiciliary, had included the large deposit as subject to tax. Holmes
held that here, where the amount on deposit with New York Trust was
held for more than a year prior to the decedent's death, New York was
justified in imposing the tax because "the transfer of the deposit
necessarily depends upon and involves the law of New York for its
exercise [by reason of the state's] ... power over the person of the
debtor ... the place where the debtor is will make him pay." Thus,
New York has as much power over the account as it has over tangible
personalty located there,' ,' and
"the fiction [of mobilia sequuntur
4
personam] must give way. 2
Beyond upholding the New York nonresident inheritance tax with
respect to intangibles with a barely plausible connection to the state,
Holmes' relatively brief opinion stated two further principles. First, as so
often with Holmes, the appeal, in rhetoric at least, was to the brute force
business operations in state (the business situs doctrine) or as part of some passive local object, the
paper evidencing debt, or the bank buildings of the bank in which the account was held. See, for
example, the contrasting analyses of Justices Holmes and McKenna in Wheeler v. Sohmer, 233 U.S.
434 (1914). The business situs doctrine was never repudiated by the Court. See id.
220. See the discussions in Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898), and
Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
221. 188 U.S. 189 (1903).
222. Justice (not yet C.J.) White noted his dissent from the judgment without opinion. See id.
at 207.
223. Id. at 203, 205. Holmes indulges in a thought experiment that resonates with the law of
abatement and of the comity of conflict of laws, suppose New York laid down the law that a debt
disappeared when the creditor died, then "the right of the foreign creditor would be gone." Id.
at 206.
224. Id. at 206.
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of the state: it was New York that would have to provide the forum and
remedy if the estate were to have the large deposit repaid.72 But, of
course, that fact is not necessarily dispositive of the case; rather,
Holmes' opinion admitted, implicitly and explicitly, that the deposit, if
merely in a New York bank for a short period of time (and not for over a
year, a more than transitory period), would be beyond New York's
jurisdiction to tax.226 Holmes' claim that New York law made possible
the enforcement of the decedent's claim against the New York bank
holding the decedent's deposit, is only a qualified one. The argument
about the importance of New York law would be the same, no matter
how transitory the deposit; but Holmes admits that, despite his reference
to that argument, no New York estate tax would be payable if the claim
in question, though against a New York debtor, was only transitory.
Second, Holmes meets the fact of double taxation head-on. Such
double taxation is no violation of Full Faith and Credit Clause, the
privileges and immunities of a citizen of another state (Art. IV § 2), or
the Fourteenth Amendment. 22 "No doubt this power on the part of two
states to tax on different and more or less inconsistent principles, leads
to some hardship ...But these inconsistencies infringe no rule of
constitutional law. 22 9 Admission that judicial power is not capable of
harmonizing double taxation and its related conceptual inconsistenciesbeing in two places at one time, as it were-reflects, of course, a
statement of the limits of judicial competence. Accepting the possibility
of several states taxing the same or closely related property interests was
not novel with Holmes, 2'0 although it may have fit his fancy to
emphasize it more than most Justices. 3 '
After Blackstone v. Miller and Kidd v. Alabama, nondomiciliary
state property and inheritance taxes on intangible values were upheld a

225. See id. at 205.
226. See id. at 203.
227. See id.
228. See id. at 207.
229. Id. at 204-05.
230. Justice Harlan writing for the Court in New York Lake Erie & Western Railroad v.
Pennsylvania, 153 U.S. 628, 641 (1894), could put it even more harshly.
It is not enough to justify the overthrow, by judicial decision, of a state law imposing
taxation, simply to show that such law operates unjustly. So far as the courts of the
Union are concerned, they must recognize and, when necessary to do so ....enforce the
statutes of the several States, unless those statutes encroach upon legitimate national
authority, or violate some right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United
States.
231. Holmes makes the same point during the same year in Kidd v. Alabama, 188 U.S. 730
(1903). "The real grievance... is that, more than probably, they are taxed elsewhere." Id. at 732.

https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol30/iss4/2

58

Jacob: An Extended Presence, Interstate Style: First Notes on a Theme fr
2002]

A THEME FROM SAENZ

number of times, relying on varied state connections to the values in
question2" and often on the clear understanding that double taxation could
result 3
D.

The Cases Allocating Intangibles

Despite the fact that numerous Justices, before the Blackstone case
was decidede 3 and afterward,2m have accepted the fact of multiple
taxation based on conflicting state approaches as an ineradicable aspect
of federalism, it is also true that the Court has concerned itself and
continues to concern itself with avoiding multiple taxation more than
Holmes would admit. In Union RefrigeratorTransit v. Kentucky' 35 the
Court had prohibited the state of incorporation from taxing, on a
domiciliary theory, rolling stock that was permanently out-of-state and
taxable elsewhere.26 The inverse of the same principle was kept alive in
cases where intangibles had only a transitory presence elsewhere.3 7 In
1923, the old rule was given new force when it was applied in a striking
232. See Corry v. Mayor, 196 U.S. 466,479 (1905) (Baltimore imposes a tax on a nonresident
owner of shares in a local corporation, measured by the value of the stock, with the corporation
(B&O) to pay the tax); Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Bowland, 196 U.S. 611, 621 (1905) (U.S.
bonds deposited, as required, with the superintendent of insurance as a condition of doing business
in Ohio); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. New Orleans, 205 U.S. 395, 402 (1907) (business situs); Liverpool
& London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Bd. of Assessors, 221 U.S. 346, 351 (1911) (business situs); Wheeler
v. Sohmer, 233 U.S. 434 (1914) (nonresident inheritance tax assessed on notes held there, but made
and payable in a third state); Bullen v. Wisconsin, 240 U.S. 625 629, 631 (1916) (Illinois as well as
Wisconsin taxed lapse of a power to revoke an inter vivos trust); Fid. & Columbia Trust Co. v. City
of Louisville, 245 U.S. 54, 57 (1917) (tax on local bank accounts of a nonresident); Maguire v.
Trefry, 253 U.S. 12, 13 (1920) (income tax on money received by a beneficiary from a
Pennsylvania trust); Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Durr, 257 U.S. 99, 106 (1921) (Ohio can tax a seat on
the New York Stock Exchange as local property of a resident); Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1,
18-19 (1928) (New York and Connecticut both have imposed inheritance taxes on the same assets).
233. See supranotes 212-18 and accompanying text.
234. Notably in Cream of Wheat Co. v. County of Grand Forks, 253 U.S. 325, (1920), where
Justice Brandeis dismisses the inconsistency and the metaphor of being in two places at once, by
responding, "To this it is sufficient to say that the Fourteenth Amendment does not prohibit double
taxation." Id. at 330.
235. 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
236. See id. at 211. Holmes concurred while expressing a doubt that the Due Process Clause
could be extended to achieve this result. Id. See also Citizens National Bank, 257 U.S. at 110-11,
where Holmes writes on the assumption that a stock exchange seat cannot be taxed out of New York
if it is conceptualized as a right to operate on the floor of the Exchange. He also joined without
comment in Frick v. Pennsylvania,268 U.S. 473, 486 (1925), and Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27,
28 (1928).
237. In Buck v. Beach, 206 U.S. 392 (1907) (notes temporarily sent from an Ohio office to an
unrelated Indiana office in an effort to avoid taxation in the former state could not be taxed in the
latter) and in Holmes' opinion in Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. at 205, the same reservation was
made.
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case to prevent Pennsylvania, the steel magnate's domiciliary state, from
imposing an inheritance tax on the Frick art collection located then as
now in New York City; the state could not tax the item that was only
"transitorily" present.2 38 The works had no tax situs in Pennsylvania,
even though the tax, as an inheritance tax, was an excise tax on the
disposition rather than a property tax.
And in 1929, in Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v.
Virginia,239 the case we began with in this Article, the Court held that
Virginia could not reach the undistributed trust property of Virginia
beneficiaries when it was held by a Baltimore trust company as trustee.240
Justice McReynolds makes it very clear what is bothering him about the
application of the Virginia tax on intangibles:
"It would be unfortunate, perhaps amazing, if a legal fiction
originally invented to prevent personalty from escaping just taxation,
should compel us to accept the irrational view that the same securities
were within two states 24
...1 and because of this to uphold a double and
oppressive assessment.,
This declaration that the Court will not always acquiesce in double
taxation,242 was the beginning of an offensive designed to end the
inheritance taxation of nonresident decedents' intangibles. In the next
two years, a majority of the Court decided four cases on the explicit
basis of barring double taxation by adopting a course of allocating a
unique situs for tax purposes to intangible property, just as the Court had
done in the cases of tangible personalty from Union Refrigerator
Transit 43 to Frick v. Pennsylvania. That effort invoked the Due
Process Clause, and it appears at the politically-charged zenith of
political opposition to the Court's insistence on interfering with many
state policy initiatives by invoking that clause. Our background to the
problem of the Founder-State Trust, so far as judicial intervention is
concerned, will be completed when we have described this attempt to

238. See Frick, 268 U.S. at 494.
239. 280 U.S. 83 (1929).
240. See id. at 93.
241. Id. at 94.
242. Justice Stone, with Justice Brandeis, concurs in the result, but backs away from Justice
McReynolds' language, choosing to find a basis in the fact that assessment did not seek to tax an
apportioned beneficialinterest in the trust. See id. at 95. Justice Holmes dissented. See id. at 96.
243. 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
244. 268 U.S. 473 (1925).
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allocate tax situs and the retreat from the Court's free use of the Due
Process Clause in defense of property and enterprise in this instance.245
The four cases embodying this effort,246 the Cases Allocating
Intangibles, as we will call them, are quickly told. In Farmers Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota,247 the state of Minnesota attempted to collect an
inheritance tax on Minnesota municipal securities held in New York, in
the estate of a New York resident, whose estate was being probated
there. After hesitating, the Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that the
recent case of Blodgett v. Silberman24" justified the state's imposition of
the tax based on the location of the issuing municipalities.
Six Justices put Blodgett aside as dealing only with tax by the
domiciliary state 9 and explicitly overruled the double taxation aspect of
Blackstone v. Miller50 The Court declares that the sole situs of a bonds
for tax purposes is the state of the bondowner's residence; and, as in
Frick, the property tax rule is extended to cases of an inheritance tax] 5'
Justice Stone concurred in the result, but on the basis that, although
Minnesota's law supported the underlying debt contract, those laws had
no significant role in the transfer at death. So far as inheritance is
concerned, Minnesota cannot claim to provide any benefit. Justice
Holmes, joined by Justice Brandeis, dissented; he saw Minnesota as the
home state as possessing the requisite power to impose the
debtor's
2
tax.25

Although there had been in the legal literature a number of calls for
judicial action against double taxation during the years before Farmers

245. Of course, it was not the allocation of estate tax opportunities among the states that led to
FDR's proposal of the Court-packing plan, but the New Deal appointments to the Court-for
example, Justices Black, Reed, Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy and Jackson-originally, and in some
cases always, saw this small eddy of cases in the same light as Lochner v. New York 198 U.S. 45
(1905) and its progeny, the ChildLabor case and the frustration of New Deal initiatives, as beyond
Congress' power over interstate commerce, which the Court had effected in Schechterand in Carter
CoaL
246. See generally Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1930); Baldwin v.
Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930); Beidler v. S. C. Tax Comm'n, 282 U.S. 1 (1930); First Nat'l Bank
of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932).
247. 280 U.S. 204 (1930).
248. 277 U.S. 1 (1928).
249. In Blodgett, it was clear that the same assets had already been taxed by New York, the
nondoniciliary state. See id. at 4-5.
250. "The practical effect of [Blackstone's rule permitting several States to tax the same
intangible] has been bad; perhaps two-thirds of the States have endeavored to avoid the evil by
resort to reciprocal exemption laws." Farmers'Loan & Trust Co., 280 U.S. at 209.
251. Seeid.at206.
252. Seeid. at216-17.
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Loan & Trust, 5 especially in connection with the promotion of
reciprocal exemption statutes in the various states limiting nonresident
state inheritance taxes, "4 the Court does not review this literature. 5
Instead, it prominently quotes Justice Field writing in The State Tax on
ForeignBonds Case76
In Baldwin v. Missouri,2 7 during the same term, the newly
developed rule that only the domiciliary state could tax intangibles was
applied to bar Missouri's inheritance tax on a nonresident with respect to
bank accounts in Missouri banks and mortgage-notes owed by Missouri
debtors and secured by Missouri land.2 s The mortgage notes are
physically in Missouri, but they are merely evidence of the obligation.2 9
The accounts and the mortgage-notes, then, are mere intangibles, and
taxable only in the domiciliary state. Holmes, dissenting, treats the case
as just another case of the free use of the Due Process Clause "to
embody our economic and moral beliefs."2 6 Justice Stone argues the
traditional case for a power to tax nonresident obligors by the debtor
state, that is, the importance of the Missouri courts in enforcement of the
obligations. 261 Justice Stone also takes seriously,262 but the majority does
not, Missouri's argument that, without a power to tax nonresident estates
with respect to such property, the possibility of widespread tax evasion,
with assets being taxed by neither state, is opened up.263

253. See generally Charles L.B. Lowndes, Jurisdiction to Tax Debts, 19 GEO. L.J. 427 (1931)
[hereinafter Jurisdictionto Tax Debts].
254. See generally NATIONAL TAX ASS'N; REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF NATIONAL TAX
ASSOCIATION ON DOUBLE DOMICILE IN INHERITANCE TAXATION 201 (1935), [hereinafter TAX
COMMITTEE REPORT]; Brady, supra note 140, at 532; Jurisdictionto Tax Debts, supra note 253.
255. Justice McReynolds does, however, refer to this literature obliquely: The practical effect
of multiple taxation has been "stoutly assailed on principle." Farmers'Loan & Trust Co., 280 U.S.
at 209.
256. How this case was read has proven to be a measure of the Court's attitude, from time to
time, to limits on state taxation. "This case has been all things to all men," says Boris Bittker,
Taxation of Out-of-State Tangible Property,56 YALE L.J. 640, 648 n.26 (1946) and refers the reader
to a detailed history of its "variegated explanations" in ARTHUR L. HARDING, DOUBLE TAXATION
OF PROPERTY AND INCOME 29 (1933).
257. 281 U.S. 586 (1930).
258. See id.at593.
259. The Court concludes that Missouri is not claiming that the debts have a business situs in
Missouri. See id. at 592.
260. Id. at 595.
261. Seeid.at597.
262. "Taxation is a practical matter [and] becomes increasingly difficult if the securities of a
nonresident may not be taxed where located [and] where the courts are not open to the tax gatherers
of the domicil." Id. at 598.
263. See id. at 598.
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Early in the next term, the Court, this time with Justice Stone
acquiescing in the opinion, the new rule is applied to prevent South
Carolina as the debtor's state from imposing an inheritance tax where
the decedent is a nonresident." 4 The case actually involves loans to the
decedent's closely-held South Carolina corporation. 265 Here the
"business sits" question is once more left open. As a result, although
the new rule is extended to open credits, it is not clear that the Court is
prepared to bar taxation of a nonresident's claims on local residents,
when those claims have a local business sits, that is, are part of
permanent business operations by the taxpayer.
In the 1932 term, the new rule was extended one more time, when it
was applied to prevent inheritance taxation by the state of incorporation
as to shares owned by a nonresident decedent.266 Again, a number of
older cases had to fall.
A review of these decisions would serve no useful purpose... [Cases]
that give countenance to the general doctrine that intangible property
(unlike tangible property) might be subjected to a death transfer tax in
more than
one state ... has ceased to have other than historic
267
interest.

Despite this bold statement, Justice Sutherland's opinion for the
Court shows signs of an attempt to respond to the objections of amici
curiae in the case. The decision implicitly confirms that policy
considerations of fairness and simplicity drive the Court toward the rule
that the domiciliary state is the only state that ought to have power to
impose an inheritance tax; in each other state, he then ends by saying,
"there is wanting any real taxable relationship to the event which is the
subject of the tax."2 This simple conclusory statement hardly adds to
the policy argument that double taxation deprives taxpayers of due
process of law.
Once more in dissent, Justice Stone taxes the majority with the
inadequacy of their "logic," which amounts to no more than the Court's
"ascribing a situs to the shareholder's intangible interests which, because

264. See Beidlerv. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 282 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1928).
265. See id. at 6.
266. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932). At the same time, the
Court recognizes that Maine can impose a transfer tax when the shares of the Maine corporation are
actually reissued to those who take under the vilU the Massachusetts shareholder, but that does not
preclude the application of the new rule in the case of inheritance taxation. A stock transfer tax is
usually a relatively trivial tax.
267. Id. at 322.
268. Id. at 329.
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of the very want of physical characteristics, can have no situs.... Situs
of an intangible, for taxing purposes, as the decisions of this court,
including the present one, abundantly demonstrate, is not a dominating
reality, but a convenient fiction which may be judicially employed or
discarded, according to the result desired."269
The legal literature was suddenly full of critiques and defenses in
response to the Cases Allocating Intangibles, but it was also full of
speculation about the possible extensions of the rule allocating a unique
situs to intangibles for taxation. Legal writers were quick to see
questions left open by the Cases Allocating Intangibles,27 ' in particular,
with respect to the treatment of state income taxes, as more and more
states enacted such laws.
For us, of course, the suspense has long left this story. Before the
decade was out, a new majority, with the new appointees, Black,
Frankfurter, Reed and Douglas, joining Justice Stone, twice voted to
permit a state to levy nonresident inheritance taxes on property passing
through the decedent's exercise of powers over a trust.2 72 These decisions
did not, for the moment, displace the Cases Allocating Intangibles in
their specific holdings, but they did replace the rule that those cases had
been designed to stand for, the newly-minted rule that only the
domiciliary state had the power to tax the intangible wealth of the
decedent.273
274
The two cases came down on the same day. Curry v. McCanless
upheld an Alabama inheritance tax on the value of an Alabama inter
vivos trust, which is appointed by the will of the settlor, who was a
Tennessee resident both at the time she established the trust and at her

269. See id. at 332.
270. See generally ARTHUR L. HARDING, DOUBLE TAXATION OF PROPERTY AND INCOME
(1933), reviewed by Simeon E. Leland, Harding on Double Taxation, 24 CAL. L. REv. 379 (1936);
FREDERIC J. STIMSON, JURISDICTION AND POWER OF TAXATION (1933); Charles L.B. Lowndes,
Bases of Jurisdictionin State Taxation of Inheritances and Property, 29 MICH. L. REv. 850 (193 1);
Jurisdictionto Tax Debts, supra note 253; Charles L.B. Lowndes, The Passingof Situs-Jurisdiction
to Tax Shares of CorporateStock, 45 HARV. L. REV. 777 (1932); Charles L.B. Lowndes, Spurious
Conceptions of the Constitutional Law of Taxation, 47 HARV. L. REv. 628 (1934) [hereinafter
Spurious Conceptions]; Maurice H. Merrill, Jurisdiction to Tax-Another Word, 44 YALE L.J. 582
(1935).
271. See Charles L.B. Lowndes, State Jurisdictionto Tax Income, 6 TEMP. L.Q. 486, 493 n.27
(1932); Robert C. Brown, Multiple Taxation by the States-What is Left of It? 48 HARV. L. REV.
407, 409-10 (1935) (business situs rule, trust taxation, and apportionment of corporate "excess
value" among the States).
272. See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939); Graves v. Elliott, 307 U.S. 383 (1939).
273. See Curry, 307 U.S. at 373; Graves, 307 U.S. at 387.
274. 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
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death.2 " And Graves v. Elliott7 6 held, on the strength of Curry v.
McCanless , that New York could impose an estate tax on a New York
resident's relinquishment, at death, of power to revoke a trust of
intangibles held by a Colorado trustee. 7 Colorado has already imposed
an inheritance tax measured by the Colorado trust assets.27 '
Yet, before analyzing Justice Stone's opinion in McCanless, it is
important to step back to consider two lines of cases decided between
1932 (FirstNat'l Bank of Boston v. Maine) and 1939 (McCanless). They
suggest, I think, that the story is more complicated than might appear.
Justice Stone refers to one of those lines of cases when he says in
McCanless, that, after the Cases Allocating Intangibles were decided
"more recently this Court has declined to give the doctrine ... that the
Fourteenth Amendment precludes the taxation of any interest in the
same intangible in more than one state ... completely logical
application." 279
The point that Justice Stone is making is that the very Justices who
had decided the Cases Allocating Intangibles had been unwilling to
extend their rigid code. The decisive issue he had in mind was the reach
of state income taxes. In the early 1920s, it was established with respect
to the then novel state income taxes that there was no bar to collection of
income tax from nonresidents on income from in-state employment or
rents and profits from local lands."' But the decisions in the Cases
Allocating Intangibles established that an inheritance tax, although on
the transfer of property rather than on property itself, was in fact to be
determined by the situs of the property transferred2 1 By analogy, the
question was whether the legality of an income tax would be decided by
the nature and situs of each item of income. Such a decision would make
it possible to allocate the income taxable by the states among the states,
just as the disposition on death of property, tangible and intangible, was
allocated among the states.

275. See id. at 360, 372-73.
276. 307 U.S. 383, 383 (1939).
277. See id. at 386-87.
278. See id. at 385.
279. See McCanless, 307 U.S. at 363.
280. See Schaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37, 52 (1920); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252
U.S. 60, 75 (1920). In Schaffer, the Oklahoma tax on oil royalties from local wells was upheld not
only against the Due Process claim, but also against Interstate Commerce, Privileges and
Immunities and Equal Protection claims. See Schaffer, 252 U.S. at 55-57.
28 1. And by the same Cases Allocating Intangibles the situs of such intangibles was uniquely
allocated to the state of the owner's domicile.
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The issue came up very quickly. In Lawrence v. Mississippi State
Tax Commission, the Court upheld, in an opinion by Justice Stone and
with only Justice Vandevanter dissenting, Mississippi's tax on a
Mississippi resident income from construction contracts wholly carried
out in Tennessee. 82 Justice Stone emphasized the intangible nature of the
contract income right, although the taxpayer's operations clearly had a
business situs in Tennessee.28 ' The reasoning of the case is not elaborate,
but he says that denial of Mississippi's right to tax this income would be
"anomalous. 2M
The issue was presented again in Senior v. Braden.25 And now the
Court struck down a state property tax imposed on a resident
beneficiary's income interest in share certificates of an out-of-state land
trust, whose assets were out-of-state realty.286 The Court looked through
the trust and treated the beneficiaries as having a direct interest in out-ofstate trust assets.2 7 It was a decision, said Roger Traynor 5 in his classic
article, State Taxation of Trust Income, that would, absent Lawrence,
make "jurisdiction to tax income ... dependent upon jurisdiction to tax
the property from which derived ... " 9 But the threat passed when in
New York ex rel. Cohn v. Graves,2 9 the Court held that New York could
impose a tax on a resident's income, even though that income was
derived from the rent of real properties in New Jersey and mortgage
loans on New Jersey property.' Senior v. Braden was read as a property
tax case where income was treated the same as a tax on property by
"concession of counsel., 292 Only Justices Butler and McReynolds
dissented, arguing that a tax on rents was a tax on land.293

282. See Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n. of Miss., 286 U.S. 276,284-85 (1932).
283. See id. at 279-80.
284. Seeid. at281.
285. 295 U.S. 422,429 (1935).
286. See id. at 422, 429.
287. See id. at 432-33.
288. Later Justice (1940-1964) and Chief Justice (1964-1970) of the California Supreme Court.
289. See Traynor, supra note 24, at 274.
290. 300 U.S. 308 (1937).
291. See generally id. (holding that the state court was correct in holding that a state may tax a
resident upon income received from rents of land within the state, and from interest on bonds
physically within the state, and secured by mortgages upon lands similarly situated).
292. Seeid. at316.
293. See id. at 317-18. Calling on the case that had, in 1895, temporarily disabled the United
States from enacting an income tax, Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895),
the dissent insisted on the identity of property and its income. The authority, however, was both
compromised by this time and not directly in point, since that case decided only that taxes both on
property and its income were sufficiently similar so that the latter was also a "direct Tax" within the
meaning of the constitutional provision. See id. at 315.
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In Guaranty Trust Co v. Virginia, Justice McReynolds wrote for a
unanimous Court in upholding a Virginia income tax on a Virginia
beneficiary's receipt of income from a trust established with New York
trustees, even if "the identical income in the hands of her Trustees had
been assessed with income taxes by the state of New York .... ,294 He
went on to reject very explicitly the argument that "double taxation" of
income was always prohibited by the Constitution.295 Referring to the
Cases Allocating Intangibles as well as to cases establishing the state of
situs as the unique state with power to impose a property tax on real or
tangible personal property, McReynolds wrote:
Those cases go upon the theory that the taxing power of a state is
restricted to her confines and may not be exercised in respect of
subjects beyond them. Here, the thing taxed was receipt of income
within Virginia by a citizen residing there. The mere fact that another
state lawfully taxed funds from which the payments were made did not
necessarily destroy Virginia's right to tax something done within her
borders. After much discussion the applicable doctrine was expounded
and applied in Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n ...and New York ex
reL Cohn v. Graves.296
The very Justices who had decided the Cases Allocating Intangibles
were not prepared to extend the doctrine, developed to limit inheritance
tax, to analogous income tax situations; not even if the result was to
permit double taxation.297
E. The Double Domicile
The decade of the 1930s disclosed another problem with taking the
program suggested by the Cases Allocating Intangibles to its broadest
reach. The notion of siting all intangibles for tax purposes solely in the
state of the taxpayer's domicile obviously depends on the dogma that
there is a unique state of domicile. It also depends on a determination by
294. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 21-22 (1938). The real problem of the
taxpayer here is, precisely, a problem of the interstate nature of the income. Income taxed to the
trustee should in principle be without tax on distribution to the beneficiary, and distribution to a
New York beneficiary would be without tax. But here Virginia had never received a tax from the
trustee, New York had. See id.
295. See id. at 22-23.
296. Id. at 23. The case revives Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920).
297. In addition to the income tax cases, Justice Stone, in Curiy v. McCanless, noted that the
Court had upheld nondomiciliary state property taxation of intangibles, where the credits were
involved in a local business. See supra note 232 and text following note 265 supra,which indicates
that the majority in the Cases Allocating Intangibles declined to overrule these "business situs"
cases.
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the relevant courts fixing that state of domicile. These presuppositions
soon became apparent in a context that brought the Justices face to face
with a fatal flaw in their program.
Despite the implicit assumption that an individual necessarily
always possesses a unique domicile, there is no, or only a very limited,
remedy available to the estate of a decedent which finds itself faced with
conflicting determinations of domicile by two or more states, each of
which finds the estate's decedent was domiciled there.298 Such an estate
may find itself liable to double inheritance taxes on the entire estate
levied by each state which has found the decedent to have died
domiciled there.299
We begin with the fact that the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
U.S. Constitution does not require a state to accept the finding of
domicile of any other state.3 OMoreover, before the issue of conflicting
findings of domicile can be raised in the inheritance tax context, the
taxpayers face major procedural difficulties in effectively presenting the
question in federal court. First, the appropriate Federal question must be

298. See Francis C. Nash, AndAgain Multiple Taxation?, 26 GEo. L.J. 288, 341 (1938).
299. See id. In addition to Professor Nash's detailed article on the problems of conflicting state
determinations of domicile, we can also consult the contemporary Tax Committee Report, supra
note 254, at 201-12, and the relatively recent revisiting of the issues by Kathleen Leslie Roin. See
Kathleen Leslie Roin, Note, Due Process Limits on State Estate Taxation: An Analogy to the State
CorporateIncome Tax, 94 YALE L.J. 1229 (1985).
300. To begin with, the taxing authorities of State B were not parties to the litigation in which
the taxing authorities of State A had won a finding that the decedent died domiciled in State A. But
at a deeper level, domicile is in these proceedings a jurisdictional fact. That no state is bound by the
finding of domicile by another state has long been the Federal rule established in probate matters.
But for our generation, the same rule was laid down in Williams v. North Carolina (Williams II),
325 U.S. 226, 227 (1945), where North Carolina bigamy convictions were upheld against a couple
who, both married to others in North Carolina, had gone to Nevada to get divorces, married in
Nevada, and were arrested on their almost immediate return to North Carolina. A jury could
properly disregard the Nevada divorces if it found that, contrary to the finding of the Nevada
divorce proceedings, the pair were never domiciled in Nevada.
If this [the U.S. Supreme] Court finds that proper weight was accorded to the claims of
power by the court of one State in rendering a judgment the validity of which is pleaded
in defense in another State, that the burden of overcoming such respect by disproof of
the substratum of fact-here domicil--on which such power alone can rest was properly
charged against the party challenging the legitimacy of the judgment, that such issue of
fact was left for fair determination by appropriate procedure, and that a finding adverse
to the necessary foundation for any valid sister-State judgment was amply supported in
evidence, we cannot upset the judgment before us. And we cannot do so even if we also
found in the record of the court of original judgment warrant for its finding that it had
jurisdiction.
Id. at 234 (Frankfurter, J.); see also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 410 (1975) (upholding a
durational requirement of one year's residence before permitting a resident to bring an action for
divorce); Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 505 (1999) (reaffirming the holding of Sosna).
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framed and insisted upon below.0 1 Second, the affected individuals
cannot seek a Federal interpleader, without2 the consent of both states,
because each of them can claim immunity.3
Even if the states are willing to abide the decision of the United
States Supreme Court as to which state is the domiciliary state, they
have, on the face of it, no clear case or controversy as between them
since it is the taxpayer, and not the states, who suffer pecuniary loss
unless the assets of the estate are inadequate to satisfy all of the tax
claims.0 3 Thus by the time that the Supreme Court departed, in Graves v.
Elliott 4 and Curry v. McCanless from the initiative of the Cases
Allocating Intangibles, the unreliable nature of a finding of domicile has
already become painfully clear. 30' The effort of the Cases Allocating
Intangibles turned out to have the least stable foundation that could be
found. If domicile were to be the basis for avoidance of double taxation,
the Court itself must be prepared to take the extreme step of intervening
to resolve conflicting judgments by a de novo 37 and that binding
determination would now be based only on a claim that the Due Process
Clause itself does not permit conflicting findings of domicile. It is clear

301. John Dorrance, who lived both in New Jersey and in Pennsylvania, died possessing a
large fortune in 1930. Pennsylvania found he died domiciled in Pennsylvania, and New Jersey, that
he died domiciled in New Jersey. Each State proceeded to levy a full inheritance tax, without credit
or deduction. Throughout a decade-long litigation, the estate failed to get a hearing in lower federal
courts because of its failure to raise the federal question appropriately, and the Supreme Court
refused to hear the matter. See Nash, supra note 298, at 318-42; Tax Committee Report, supranote
254, at 201-12.
302. See Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 91 (1982) (the Eleventh Amendment bars the statutory
impleader sought in this particular case); Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley, 302 U.S. 292, 299300 (1937). In the rare case, where one state is willing to submit itself to the jurisdiction of the
courts of the other state, a determinative resolution of the conflicting claims is possible. See In re
Trowbridge, 266 N.Y. 283, 293 (1935) (holding that Connecticut obtains a finding by the New York
courts that it is the domiciliary state).
303. See Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15, 17, 20 (1939) (denying leave to file
original action to determine domicile); Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398, 398 (1939) (granting leave
where estate is not adequate to satisfy claims of four different states that the decedent was domiciled
there at the time of her death).
304. 307 U.S. 383 (1939).
305. 307 U.S. 357 (1939).
306. The concept of domicile, based as it is on intent, often calls for a difficult and
controversial resolution of questions of fact and law. There is no concept, as Justice Rutledge says
in dissent in Williams v. North Carolina(Williams II), 325 U.S. 226, 245-46 (1945), which is "as
variable and amorphous as 'domicil' ... [which must be] established only by proof from which, as
experience shows, contradictory inferences may be made as strikes the local trier's fancy." Id. at
245-46; see also Nash, supranote 298, at 290-91.
307. It must be a de novo finding because, as the Williams case decides, two states could,
drawing inferences within the realm of the reasonable, make conflicting findings about domicile on
the same facts. See Williams, 325 U.S. at 239.
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that in the 1930s the Court was not prepared to take this step.30 s It is
perhaps interesting that one aspect of the Court's disposition of the case
is that, in the interpleader below, the estate had argued that Hughes died
a resident of Nevada, when that state did not then impose any
inheritance tax. 3°9 That claim disappeared once the case was relegated to
litigation between Texas and California.310
F. Double Taxation Denied
Both the re-affirmation of the possibility of double taxation in the
case of individual income tax and the extremely unstable nature of a
finding of domicile, make it clear that the arbitrary and rigid approach of
the Cases Allocating Intangibles was unsustainable from the beginning.
It is no surprise that new appointees to the Supreme Court, already
deeply committed to the sharp reduction of the power of the Court,
under the rubric of Due Process, to set aside major legislative efforts,
should abandon the effort to allocate tax situs in the case of inheritance
taxes. Both Curry and Graves announced the end of that effort. State Tax
308. The death of the reclusive Howard Hughes under circumstances where he was arguably
domiciled in any of several states has since led to a slight amelioration of this result. In the Hughes
case, California sought to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court against Texas,
seeking to resolve conflicting claims of domicile. Leave to file was denied in a brief per curiam,
Californiav. Texas, 437 U.S. 601, 602 (1978), but with two separate concurring opinions in which
four Justices joined. The burden of the concurrences was that California lacked a justiciable claim,
but that the estate should be able to get a determination by initiating interpleader in the Federal
court. The estate followed the suggestion, but found itself barred by Eleventh Amendment
immunity. See Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 86, 91 (1982). At the same time, however, the Court
granted leave for California to file its petition in the nature of interpleader as an original action in
the Supreme Court. See Calfornia v. Texas, 457 U.S. 164, 164-65 (1982). Before any further
proceedings were taken, the states of California and Texas shared in agreed proportions, more or
less a single inheritance tax. Mr. Justice Powell, joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens, dissented
in Cory, 457 U.S. at 92. The ground of Justice Powell's dissent is that "the Due Process Clause
provides the right to be free of multiple taxation of intangibles based on domicile; accordingly, he
would allow the taxpayer to raise the question-now of constitutional dimensions in a Federal
interpleader action." Id. at 101 (Powell, J., dissenting). Concurring with the majority in Cory,
Justice Brennan agrees that Due Process protects against conflicting findings of domiciliary taxation
in several states, but believes that no remedy in interpleader need be available if, as is the case here,
the same issues would be litigated in an original proceeding between the conflicting state claimants.
Thus, on the one hand, these cases present a strong revival in striking circumstances of the same
principle that lay behind the Cases Allocating Intangibles, but, like the earlier initiative, this
tantalizing principle is obscured, this time by the Court's refusal to give the affected taxpayer a clear
and direct remedy. Although the Court granted California leave to appeal under the pressure of the
concurring and dissenting opinions in Cory, they did so without formally dispensing with the notion
that the dispute is one among the states and becomes justiciable when the estate may not be rich
enough to pay both taxes.
309. See California v. Texas, 457 U.S. 164 (1982).
310. See California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601, 601-02 (1978).
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Commission of Utah v. Aldrich' closed out the story of the Cases
Allocating Intangibles in 1942 by explicitly overruling First National
Bank of Boston v. Maine. It is now time to draw out the rationale of
Justice Stone's ruling in McCanless and the arguments of the majority
and minority in Aldrich, so as to draw the weak conclusions presented
by story of the waxing and waning of a concern with avoiding double
taxation.
Justice Stone begins his opinion, as we have seen, by insisting that
the Court had already backed off from the claim of Justice Sutherland
that older cases permitting double taxation of intangibles had only a
historical interest.313 We have just reviewed those instances of backing
off. The premise of the taxpayer in Curry, as in the Cases Allocating
Intangibles, was that there was some unique situs of intangibles, such
that two states could not simultaneously tax them. 4 But situs reasoning
will not always be appropriate:
when the taxpayer extends his activities with respect to his intangibles,
so as to avail himself of the protection and benefit of the laws of
another state, in such a way as to bring his person or property within
the reach of the tax gatherer there, the reason for a single place of
taxation no longer obtains, ... [and] there are many circumstances in
which more than one state may have jurisdiction to impose a tax ....
To try to limit these relations to a single state result in
"unwarranted curtailments of state power" where, as here, there is "no
more [plausible] ground" for giving tax rights to one state or the other. 6
Here each state is seen as providing "the benefit and protection of [its]
laws enabling the owner to enjoy the fruits of his ownership and
[simultaneously has] the power to reach effectively the interests
protected, for the purpose of subjecting them to payment of a tax. 317
Justice Stone states:
Even if we could rightly regard these various and distinct legal
interests, springing from distinct relationships, as a composite unitary
311. See State Tax Comm'n of Utah v. Aldrich, 316 U.S. 174, 176 (1942). See Robert C.
Brown, The Present Status of Multiple Taxation of IntangibleProperty,40 MICH. L. REv. 806, 806
(1942); Robert L. Howard, State Jurisdiction to Tax Intangibles:A Twelve Year Cycle, 8 Mo. L.
REV. 155 (1943).
312. 284 U.S. 312 (1932).
313. See supranote 297 and accompanying text.
314. Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357,367 (1939).
315. Id. at 367-68.
316. Id. at368,370.
317. Id. at364.
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interest and ascribe to it a single location in space, it is difficult to see
how it could be said to be more in one state than in the other and upon
what articulate principle the Fourteenth Amendment could be thought
to have withdrawn from either state the taxing jurisdiction which it
undoubtedly possessed before the adoption of the Amendment by
conferring on one state, at the expense of the other, exclusive
jurisdiction to tax.'18

This opinion certainly vindicates Stone's earlier insistence that situs
is a fiction and, in itself, does not compel any result, but simply
represents one possible way of stating a conclusion reached on other
grounds. The conclusion reached by the Cases Allocating Intangibles,
stripped of its fictions, was that the substantial autonomy and the
demands, even if reasonable demands, of several states to receive taxes
from a taxpayer must, in general, give way when it will result in unfair
double taxation.1 9 The issue is now reformulated to demand a
comparison of the claims of the several states with the harm to the
taxpayer, once unfair double taxation ceases to be determinative.
The conclusion reached by Justice Stone, however, also rests on
assumptions that are less than transparent. First of all, it carefully
continues the constitutionally mandated regime 3of
allocating tangible
2
property solely to the state in which it is "located. 1
Second, although Justice Stone properly elevates the claims of the
states to which the taxpayer has a substantial relation, even if those
claims result in the taxpayer's paying more taxes in the aggregate than
he would pay to either state alone, the reach of those state claims are not
well articulated. We are told only that the taxpayer himself chose to
"extend himself' into relations with both states, but the relations
themselves are described only as "the protection and benefit of the laws
of another state," to which is added the contingent fact that the relations
are such as "to bring
[the taxpayer's] person or property within the reach
3 22
of the tax gatherer.
Stone's argument suggests something more than the mere passive
availability to the taxpayer of civic life in the two states; it suggests a
quantifiable extension of local benefits. Moreover, it seeks to buttress

318. Id. at369.
319. See supraPart lII.D.
320. See Curry, 307 U.S. at 373.
321. Justice Stone is criticized for limiting taxation of tangible property to the state in which is
located in Boris Bittker, The Taxation of Out-Of-State Tangible Properny, 56 YALE L.J. 640, 648653 (1947).

322. Curry, 307 U.S. at 367.
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the vaguely quantified benefits by also alluding to the power of the state,
the physical power, to collect the taxes easily. It is hard to see how the
allusion to power (twice repeated) is directly relevant. 3 It is even harder
to see how the "protection and benefit" is to be quantified. The judgment
in McCanless may be correct, but it rests, as did the Cases Allocating
Intangibles, on an unarticulated comparison of state claims with taxpayer
harms.
Perhaps the point I am making about the ascendant "benefits" rule
will be clearer if we consider State Tax Commission of Utah v.
Aldrich,324 the case that consolidates the new rule. That case held that
Utah could impose an inheritance tax on the value of shares of a Utah
corporation, where the decedent and all other persons involved in the
estate have nothing to do with Utah, and where the Utah corporationUnion Pacific Railroad-has both its principal place of business and its
326
3
stock transfer functions elsewhere. 2 NationalBank of Boston v. Maine
has to be overruled, and it is. The Cases Allocating Intangibles
establishing a rule of immunity against taxation by more than one state,
is "of recent origin" and against the weight of a long line of contrary
precedents. "'A state is free ... [to tax anything] in relation to
opportunities which it has given, to protection which it has afforded, to
benefits which it has conferred by the fact of being an orderly, civilized
He
society.' 327 Justice Frankfurter concurs in the judgment.
emphasized the breadth of state taxing powers, but he also insisted there
is some limit on these powers imposed by the Due Process Clause.329
Tacitly admitting the unfairness of the doctrine that all states with
colorable claims to impose taxes, could do so, he suggests that
legislative action, state and Congressional action should resolve the
conflicts.3 °

323. This reference to state "power" is reminiscent of Justice Holmes, whose language often
suggested the claim to right of a robber baron collecting tolls from hapless transients. I put the
ultimate reach of such language to one side, for the main weight of the argument rests, here and in
other cases, on the state's creation of the conditions of civilization and (tacitly) on the extent to
which the taxpayer has relied upon those conditions.
324. 316 U.S. 174(1942).
325. See id. at 181-82. In this case, it is also true that imposing a tax on $1 MM in Union
Pacific bonds costs the estate nothing, since the full amount of the tax will be a credit against
domiciliary taxes in New York.
326. 284 U.S. 312 (1932).
327. Aldrich, 316 U.S. at 178-79 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444
(1940)).
328. See id at 182 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
329. See id. at 183 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
330. See id. at 184 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
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Justice Frankfurter's unease with the decision resonates with Justice
Jackson's dissent. With his usual wit, Jackson notes that Justice Douglas
could be read as saying that any tax that is collectible, is legitimate, but
he hopes the Due Process Clause requires more than such power.33 Each
of us is "a very real debtor 33 2 of every state, but he does not think that
we would not agree we should be taxed by each. In particular, he feels
the particular decision is wrong and amounts to trading one fiction, that
is, the unique situs of intangibles in the Cases Allocating Intangibles, for
another equally unreal claim.333 For the majority assumes that the state of
incorporation stands in substantial contact with every shareholder, when
in fact it is sometimes (and here) an irrelevant accident. Echoing the
language of the Cases Allocating Intangibles and arguing that National
Bank of Boston should not be overruled, he warns the decision will
"intensify the already unwholesome conflict and tension between the
334
states" in tax competition.
If Jackson's dissent in Aldrich echoes the Cases Allocating
Intangibles, it also resonates with the stubborn judicial resistance to
double taxation in the particular case of airplanes. As noted above, the
33
majority in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minnesota
refused to concern
itself with the possibility of double taxation when it permitted the home
state of Northwest Airlines to impose an ad valorem tax on the total
value of the air fleet, but, nevertheless, rules of apportionment have
taken over in taxation of this kind.336 In the same limited way, one can
say that the dilemma of conflicting double state determinations of
domicile has finally called forth a remedy, even if a limited and
uncertain one.337 If the Cases Allocating Intangibles failed of their
particular objective, it seems clear that, despite the broad language of
Justice Stone in McCanless and Justice Douglas in Aldrich, avoidance of
double taxation is still a viable argument in all taxation cases. Just how
strong that argument is in any particular case, is a nice matter of
judgment, but that judgment may be aided by further articulation of what
goes into the mix as "fairness." In the last part of this Article we will
turn to consider the relevance, in assessing that fairness, of the privileges
or immunities of our national citizenship. Those privileges or

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

See Aldrich, 316 U.S. at 199 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
See id. at 200 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
See id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
See id. at 191 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
322 U.S. 292 (1944); see supra notes 204-06.
See supranotes 207-08.
See supranote 308.
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immunities are inherent in the structure of the Constitution and gained,
against the states, additional strength and protection through the
Fourteenth Amendment's insistence that they should not be abridged. To
put our effort more concretely, we will try to show there are reasons,
rooted in avoiding the Founder's Forfeit, to revive Colgate v. Harvey38
as an extension of Saenz v. Roe's 339 concern for persons who are, as is
their right, moving about among the states.
IV. INTERLUDE: THE OTHER HALF NOT HERE CONSIDERED
I have now pursued the old cases for a considerable time; and I will
return to tax cases before the United States Supreme Court to round off
my discussion of the legality of the taxation of Founder-State Trusts. But
in the meantime, I must recognize-I cannot treat-an entire other
dimension that affects the understanding of this and related issues. Legal
controversy is always complicated by the fact that all parties involved
have to be understood as independent, mutually and reciprocally related
forces.4 We need to know, not only what the Court did, but what the
main parties, the states and the taxpayers did or will do. Although
neither a state nor its taxpayers have the same commitment to reasoned
principle as do the courts,3' we are not without some resources to
understand and map those reactions.
We have argued that, despite the Supreme Court's exhibiting a
strong theme of respect for total state autonomy in choosing what to tax,
the existence of the Union, and the constitution that binds it together,

338. 296 U.S. 404 (1935) overruled so far as concerns the validity of differential taxes on
income from loans made in-state and out-of- state by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940). As
said in that case, where the older privileges and immunities clause of Article IV, § 2 protected
immigrants newly arrived from another state, the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against
abridgment of national privileges or immunities protects the person who has, temporarily or
permanently, left his home state to operate in another state; it protects against vengeful and unjust
treatment of self-exiles by their original state. "A provision which thus extended and completed the
shield of national protection between the citizen and hostile and discriminating state legislation
cannot be lightly dismissed as a mere duplication, or of subordinate or no value, or as an almost
forgotten clause of the Constitution." Colgate, 296 U.S. at 431.
339. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
340. The work of Perry Dane on the nature of sovereignty is relevant to both the subjects here
considered and to the entire analysis provided in the next part. See Perry Dane, Vested Rights,
"Vestedness," and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191 (1987); Perry Dane, The Maps of
Sovereignty: A Meditation, 12 CARDozo L. REV. 959 (1991); Perry Dane. Whereof One Cannot
Speak: Legal Diversity and the Limits of a Restatement of Conflict of Laws, 75 IND. L.J. 511 (2000).

341. And of course, even in the Courts, the commitment to principle is such that a lawyer
knows better than to rely on "mechanical jurisprudence," however much it may benefit him to
invoke it.
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have resulted in significant restrictions on that autonomy. 42 These
restrictions have resulted in judicial invalidation of taxes. That
invalidation, in turn, has sometimes been more than a mere denial of tax
resources to a state. That denial has resulted from, or has been connected
with, the Court's deciding, on whatever basis, to award another state or
states a preferred access to particular taxables. 34' This award or allocation
has occurred in at least two forms:
Courts have sometimes allocated-winner take all-taxables to one
state rather than to another." In other cases, the courts have approved
and guided the states themselves engage in a voluntary and explicit form
of cooperative allocation of taxables.34'
Such an allocation of taxables may take the form of statutory
exemptions (or reciprocal statutory exemptions) or it may take the form
of awarding tax deductions or credits 34 6 for taxes paid in other states. It
may also take the form of an apportionment of taxables, where several
states, each with more or less plausible claims on a particular taxable
item, share in the possible tax resource by way of limiting their access to
no more than a portion of the particular taxables. The formidable task of
finding a mutually accepted basis for such apportionment has been taken
as incumbent on the states throughout our history. The motto for this
Article-an assurance to the Court by Daniel Webster that taxation by
the several states of the income and property of the Bank of the United
States would not result in double taxation-took the form of an
expectation of a state by state allocation of such property. 34' It is easy to
identify several modes, by way of which such apportionment was carried
out. For example, states imposing taxes on railroad business or capital
early made a voluntary apportionment of taxes by taxing that business or

342. See supra Part III.F.
343. This term, taxable, is the noun form of the adjective, that is, "one who or that which is
subject to taxation; esp. in pl. persons or things liable to a tax." Its use as a noun is, according the
Oxford English Dictionary, s.v, a U.S. innovation, dating from examples in the Law of the
Proprietorship of Maryland in the seventeenth century.
344. See FirstNat'l Bank, 284 U.S. at 326.
345. See, e.g., for the early apportionment of taxables, The Delaware R.R. Tax (Minot v.
Philadelphia, Wilminton & Baltimore R.R. Co.), 85 US (18 Wall.) 206 (1873); State R.R. Tax Cases
(Taylor v. Secor), 92 U.S. (2 Otto) 575 (1875).
346. This is really a form of ceding a taxable to a competing state, but only to the extent that
the other state actually imposes a relevant tax. If the competing state in fact imposes no tax, there is
no reason for the accommodating state not to collect its taxes in full. No double taxation will result
if it does so.
347. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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property in proportion to the track mileage in each state; and the
apportionment was early approved by the Court. 4s
These cases were also the beginning of a long list of cases, which
explored in detail the appropriate ways in which a state could capture the
"excess value" of a company's doing business within a particular state,
that is, its value as a going business in operation and in excess of the
tangible assets it owned. 49 These cases, in turn, stand as direct
progenitors to the development of the rules for allocating, calculating
and enforcing the apportionment of the full value of the income of a
"unitary" business among all the states in which the taxpayer's business
is carried on. These rules have been worked out by a combination of
mutual statutory accommodations (including a Uniform State Law),5
invocation of interstate agreements351' and reciprocal arrangements. These
efforts are sometimes aided by the discipline of the Supreme Court's
decisional law invoking both the Interstate Commerce Clause and the
Due Process Clause.
Another range of apportionment cases have developed to
accommodate multi-state taxation of mobile equipment, such as river
barges, airplanes, trucks and the rolling stock of railways.352 Where such
stock is not permanently located in any one place, statistical allocation
on some basis is widely looked to.3 53 Finally, a different kind of

allocation has been that of apportioning the income of trusts subject to
state income taxation has been approved by the Supreme Court, where
was the local residence of one of
the basis on which the tax was imposed
3 4
several trustees in the taxing state.
All of these arrangements have crucially involved decisions in
355
many state capitals, both with and without, and even against,
suggestions by the Supreme Court. In trying to winkle out what is really
going on in state tax cases, it is necessary to understand such state
348. See cases cited supra note 345.
349. See The DelawareR.R. Tax, 85 U.S. at 223.
350. See Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act, 1957 adopted as of July 1999 in
22 states and District of Columbia. See 7A U.L.A. 331 (1985).
351. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S. 452,454 (1978).
352. See supraPart III.B.
353. See Powell, supranote 197, at 1098.
354. See Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486, 498 (1947). A similar selfchosen apportionment occurs, for example, under California law when the trust is taxable on the
basis of being the local residence of less than all beneficiaries. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 17742 (Deering 2002).
355. One complaint against the Cases Allocating Intangibles is that they rendered pointless the
substantial progress of allocation by voluntarily adopted state rules of exemption or reciprocal
exemption of such intangibles. See supranotes 270-71 and accompanying text.
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actions and both their potential and their limits. Initially, I had hoped to
sketch the historical waxing and waning of state tax cooperation and
competition.356
Today the opportunities for doing that are much better than they
have been in the past, for legal scholars have provided new tools for
doing so, borrowed from historians, political scientists and philosophers,
and economists. Any such account today is obliged to seek access to
some of the economic and political approaches to evaluating and
predicting the patterns, which are complex and not always even
coherent, of such cooperation and competition. Economic analysis, and
the quasi-economic analysis of motivations provided by public choice
theory could and should be ransacked to see what insight they provide
into the historical sketch of these interactions.
Indeed, even the slightest reflection on the interaction of state and
Federal actions with respect to state taxes, even the reflection that our
case-oriented analysis affords, is adequate to demonstrate that the states
and the United States Supreme Court (but hardly Congress) are locked,
in the matter of state taxation and state taxables, in an extremely
complex and many-sided dialogue. That dialogue provides many
examples of fair offers and of provocations and responses to such fair
offers and to such provocations, by states and the Court to each other.3 57
It also provides a continuous set of interactions of both states and Court
to the taxpayers who in turn manage their affairs with respect to those
moves. Indeed, state action in the area of taxation gives a concrete
meaning for the sound of one hand clapping. State action in this area
will only be really discernible-audible in terms of our metaphor-when
the hands of the other actors join in, that is, the states and taxpayers in
the states. And yet one hand clapping has a role to play.
Indeed, one of the personal discoveries I made while reviewing
these old cases, and the rise and fall of the Cases Allocating Intangibles
is that both the rise and failure of the doctrine in those cases was, in
substantial part, attributable to the maturing of the long slow change in
tax policies brought on by the obvious failure of local ad valorem
taxation to capture the swiftly growing wealth represented by securities,
credits and other intangibles and the inadequacy of the existing property
tax structure to meet the growing demands of the states and localities for
356. See generally Leo Brady, Death Taxes-Recent Statutory and Judicial Solutions of
Multiple Taxation, 16 A.B.A.J. 532 (1930); Warren Freedman, PracticalAspects of Multiple State
Taxation of Intangibles of Nonresident Decedents Since the Aldrich Case, 24 NOTRE DAME LAW.
41 (1948-49); Roin, supranote 299.
357. See supra PartlII.
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adequate revenues. The very slowness with which new taxes-the
income, estate and gift and sales taxes-were devised and adopted
meant that intangible properties, and income from them, as well as large
earnings, had a long tax holiday.
During this long holiday, some Justices failed to notice that excise,
inheritance and income taxes had brought that tax holiday to an end, and
others, were too quick to jump to an attack on such relatively novel
taxes, and to the defense of previously sheltered income, under the
rallying cry of double taxation.358 The legal history of taxing intangibles
supports the argument that imposing judicial discipline on state taxes
cannot be understood without some sense of what state action with
respect to the question has been, or is likely to be.359
Any such stroke and counter-stroke of state governments and
national judiciary 36 is itself incomplete without reckoning with the

taxpayer as a participant, not a passive object, in this multi-voiced
process giving rise to the tax policies of the several states, and their
never-ending formulation and reformulation. The tax laws are, to put it
in yet one more metaphor, so many nets to catch the relevant taxpayers
and their wealth. Nets are often cast, but they do not always fill up.36'
The loose fish eludes. The taxpayer, and the taxpayer's wariness, is
always present as a conditioning function. The taxpayer seeks to escape
tax-after all, by definition, an involuntary transfer362 -and the states,
however else they formulate their tax policies, must take that
evasiveness into account. The analysis of the motives and opportunities
358. See Spurious Conceptions, supra note 270, at 631. See also infra notes 407-09 and
accompanying text.
359. See discussion supraPart 11.
360. Congress has a role to play in this process, but plays it with great reluctance. See
Goodnow, supra note 177, at 430-31; Kathryn L. Moore, State and Local Taxation: When Will
Congress Intervene?, 23 J. LEGIS. 171 (1997).
361. This is an old story. In the times of Athens' glory, rich men were expected, and in default,
compelled, to make monetary contributions to fund most public purposes. That obligation was a
leitourgia, a liturgy (the word we have developed from it), a public sacrifice. Even in those days,
rich men often feigned poverty, to escape the liturgy. In appropriate circumstances, a rich man who
has refused to make an expected liturgy, will be charged with avoiding the expense without
justification. One of the tax evader's resources was a procedure called the antidosis, literally, the
exchange. The person charged with liturgy evasion, we would say tax evasion, could respond to the
person denouncing him by offering to exchange his wealth for the denouncer's wealth. If the other
refused the exchange, then a court would decide who, as between the two, should perform the
liturgy in question. See N.G.L. Hammond & H.H. Scullard eds., THE OXFORD CLASSICAL
DICTIONARY 68, 613 (2d ed. 1970).
362. Few would say with Mr. Justice Holmes, "I like to pay taxes. With them I buy
civilization," quoted in RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION FOR PROSPERrrY 277 (1947). See also
Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87, 99, 100 (Holmes, J., dissenting). And even
if they do say something like that, they do not always say it with the same conviction.
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of the taxpayer must also be taken up, along with the analysis of public
finance and public choice. A justification for seeking the Founder's
Forfeit is that the taxpayer in question is attempting to evade, without
justification, taxes that are due.363
Taxpayer motivation, in its projected and actual response to state
action, is often now arranged about a thesis that takes into consideration
taxpayer mobility among the states, to liken the tax policies of the
several states to competing objects in a great market. Under the thesis
associated with the name of Charles M. Tiebout, an American regional
economist, the possibility of taxpayer migration forms a decisive part of
an analysis of state tax competition and cooperation.364
But-alas-it is clear to me that this necessary part of an overall
discussion of the limits of state taxation, and in our particular case, state
trust taxation, is an effort that is too expansive to be included as a brief
digression in the development of my attempt to apply the National
Privileges or Immunities Clause to Founder-State Trusts. It certainly
deserves its own, article-length development. States' competing or
cooperating tax policies, and the provocations and responses of
individual taxpayer to the various development stages of those everevolving policies, must, in this Article, remain in the deep background.
Since the doctrinal arguments, and the policies that animate them, are
intelligible without the development of this mass of-mostly political
and economic-arguments and analyses, the former are what I will
conclude with. The other-states and taxpayers and the springs of their
actions-will be left to a later effort.
V.

THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND AN INDIVIDUAL'S MOBILITY

A.

The Supreme Court and State Taxation

One of the persistent themes of American federalism has been the
Supreme Court's supervision of state taxation in the name of the Union
and the rights accorded to individuals as a result of that Union. That
supervision can properly be called fitful, as it has varied in rationale and
waxed and waned in intensity almost from its first exercise. The exercise
of that supervision has often been sought by taxpayers, invoking a
variety of grounds, not all of them successful. At the beginning of our
363. See supra Part II.C.2 and note 165 and accompanying text for the language used in Judge
Wesley's decision in the Tamagni case.
364. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,64 J. POL. EcON. 416,422
(1956).
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constitutional history, in McCulloch v. Maryland,36 5 the Court's
supervision was made part of an equal assurance, to each state and to the
federal government, that the Court recognized the power of each to tax;
it was an assurance that was-as to the states-without textual basis, but
was confidently seen as arising from the central importance of such a
power to sovereignty. The power to tax was recognized in each, but it
was a limited power; it was limited, in McCulloch itself, by the
immunity of the federal government and its instrumentalities from
taxation by the states.366
Our own study began with several cases, just after the Civil War,
arising out of Pennsylvania's requiring in-state issuing railroads to
withhold, as tax, a portion of bond interest payments.3 The withholding
applied to all interest paid, but it was contested as applied to interest
payable to nonresident bondholders."" In two cases,369 the Supreme Court
of the United States narrowly held for the taxpayers in confusing
opinions in which notions of the "'situs' of the bondholders' property as
located outside the state played a dominant role. Beginning with these
cases limiting states" power to tax, the Court then, over the course of
almost fifty years, nevertheless found a large number of ways of
expanding the list of state taxables, so as to permit the states to subject to
tax the claims held against residents by nonresidents.7
To the trend of these cases, the Cases Allocating Intangibles made a
notable, if brief and contested, exception. The Cases Allocating
Intangibles3 7' invoked the Due Process Clause, and they were swept
away in the general-if temporary-turm from substantive due process.
Ultimately, the Cases Allocating Intangibles were all overruled in State
Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich. 2 Justice Douglas' expansive
opinion in Aldrich, basing state power to tax on the existence of in-state
benefits, even if attenuated, has often been cited as expressing the
current state of the law regarding the capacity of states to tax.7
365. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
366. See id. at 436-37.
367. See State Tax on Foreign-Held Bonds (Cleveland, P. & A. R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania), 82
U.S. (6 Wall.) 300,300 (1872); North Central R.R. v. Jackson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262 (1868).
368. See State Tax on Foreign-HeldBonds, supranote 367, at 302-03.
369. See id. at 325; North Central R.R. Co. v. Jackson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 262,268 (1868).
370. Compare also here the discussion Part 1I.B supra, the parallel development of sharing in
the taxables represented by rolling stock and other mobile tangible personalty.
371. See First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312, 327 (1932); Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 210 (1930); Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586, 589 (1930);
Beidler v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 282 U.S. 1, 7 (1930).
372. 316 U.S. 174 (1942).
373. See id. at 181-82.
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In my own review of the historical sweep of these cases, I do not
believe I have turned up anything new, but I do believe that, stirring
around in the old mud, I have found a basis for a different conclusion
from that of many commentators on State Tax Commission of Utah v.
Aldrich. My conclusion is that there are limited and contested, but
important, restrictions on state power to tax, which were (and still are)
conceptually derived from a bare intuition about the scope of state power
to tax. 74 In the early cases mentioned above,3" it is perhaps equally
important that that intuition or presupposition is both expressed or
referred to by the majority and, in each case, contested by the dissent's
sturdy insistence on legislative control in the definition of taxables.3 76 I
can show, I believe, that the core intuition remains a thematic concern in
cases of state taxation although it can never be reduced to a rule, due to
the operation of other, conflicting considerations. Moreover, I believe
that it is the desire of preventing a particular form of double taxation that
underlies and is the vital nerve of this conceptual intuition. That concern
is very much present in those early cases.377
Double or multiple taxation is a slippery idea. The common theme
is that someone has to pay "the same tax twice (or more times). 3 78 What
0 does it mean to pay the same tax twice? Moreover, as Edwin Seligman
said in his still relevant essay on the subject, a double tax is often
justified or difficult to avoid from the increasing complexity of the
economic and political world in which we live.379 After all, double
taxation can be found within a single tax jurisdiction. A tax on mortgage

374. This intuition operates also in international law and is still sometimes referred to as the
"legislative jurisdiction" of states. See, e.g., Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction,78 COLUM.
L. REv. 1587 (1978); Robert L. Palmer, Toward UnilateralCoherence in Determining Jurisdiction
to Tax Income, 30 HARV. INT'LL.J. 1 (1989).
375. See State Tax on Foreign Held Bonds Case (Cleveland, P. & A. R.R. Co. v.
Pennsylvania), 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 300 (1872); North Central R.R. Co. v. Jackson, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
262 (1868).
376. Justice Davis dissenting in The State Tax on ForeignHeld Bonds Case, says that a state is
free to tax any "property of persons which it can reach and lay its hands on..." 82 U.S. at 328. The
affirmation and denial of that statement neatly sets the bounds of the debate that has formed the law
in this area.
377. Maltby v. Reading & Columbia R.R. Co., 52 Pa. 140 (1866), the Pennsylvania case that
the dissenters in The State Tax on ForeignHeld Bonds Case, supra note 375, relied on, is both more
circumspect about its powers to control legislative action and explicit in its treatment of legislative
authority and its limits. The tax on nonresident bondholders, it says, may be "extravagant, especially
in view of the taxation to which the owner is exposed in the place of his residence," but that
argument, that Court equally goes on to insist, is addressed to the legislature. Id. at 147 (emphasis
added).
378. See ESSAYS IN TAXATION, supranote 87, at 98.
379. See id.
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debts, when the property securing the debt pays taxes on full value was a
double tax that set off a storm of protest in Massachusetts a century
ago."' The question whether there is a double tax when a tax at different
rates is levied on the same "item," e.g., the varying marginal rates of all
current income taxes, has, perhaps, been answered more in practice than
in theory."' A similar question whether it is not a double tax to tax the
property and the income it produces similarly seems to be put at rest.
But if the tax is doubled because it is levied by two different tax
jurisdictions, the question becomes easier to answer. After all "double
taxation" as a hindrance to international trade has produced whole
volumes of international tax treaties and a fertile field of tax legislation
and tax practice.3"2 In general, the understanding is that, by way of
exemption or tax credit and by way of coordinating the definition of
taxables among nations, taxes on businesses that are transnational will
not have a heavier tax burden than they would under at least one of the
involved nations.3 3
A similar concern to avoid double taxation in this sense, if on a
more modest scale, is reflected among the states in the United States.3 '
And here the Supreme Court has also had a role to play. It has
encouraged individual and cooperative state action, as indicated above,
by the possibility of its intervening to strike down a double tax and it has
actually intervened to strike down the tax because it was a double tax.3 5
I can begin with what the Supreme Court has often meant, even in those
cases when it expressed or admitted its willingness to permit double
taxation without intervening. 386 For double taxation certainly exists
where there is the imposition of comparable taxes in different states on
the same individual, not only lifting the aggregate tax paid, but singling
out that individual for a treatment that is to be invidiously compared to
that of other individuals who differ only in lacking connections to
numerous states. Thus, in Blackstone v. Miller, both Illinois and New
380. See id. at 103.
381. See, for the continuing debate, RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND
THE POWER OF EMINENT DOmAIN 295-303 (1985); Steven A. Bank, The Originsof a Flat Tax, 73
DEN. U. L. REV. 329 (1995); Walter Blum & Harry Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive
Taxation, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952); Leo P. Martinez, "To Lay and Collect Taxes": The
ConstitutionalCasefor ProgressiveTaxation, 18 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 111 (1999).
382. See, e.g., Palmer, supranote 374, at 15.
383. Seeid. at7, 15-16.
384. See SELIGMAN, supranote 87, at 115.
385. For examples other than the Cases Allocating Intangibles, I offer the treatment of tangible
personalty in tax cases, supra Part ]fl.B, and the demand for "internal consistency" for taxes
imposed on interstate operations. See infra note 419 and accompanying text.
386. See Blackstone v. Miller, 188 U.S. 189,207 (1903).
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York collected an estate tax on the five million dollar deposit with a
New York bank by Timothy Blackstone, the Illinois decedent 3" Without
appropriate relief from the tax system of one state or the other, the tax
paid by Blackstone's estate will be larger than either that paid by another
Illinois decedent who kept her money in a local bank or that paid by a
New York decedent who kept his deposit in the same bank as Timothy
Blackstone.
Again, the estate of John C. Dorrance was doubly taxed when it
paid two taxes, each as a domiciliary, to Pennsylvania and to New
Jersey388 and so, absent resolution of the claims of Texas and California,
the estate of Howard Hughes would have paid a double estate tax." 9 In
these cases, double taxation is not just a way of comparing tax
experiences; the term in the context of the Supreme Court usage,
connotes a situation that ought not to exist in justice and fairness.
And yet it is precisely this scenario in Blackstone, and a large
number of similar scenarios, that provoked the vain effort undertaken in
the Cases Allocating Intangibles. And although the Court refused to
intervene in the Dorrancecase, the Hughes case saw a different result 3 O
Although in both cases, Blackstone and Dorrance,double taxation was,
in the circumstances, permitted without judicial intervention, when such
cases occur without some appropriate state response, we may see such
intervention. We are looking for cases of multi-state taxation where the
practical effect of not intervening results in the imposition of a
significant tax penalty on the person who does not arrange his affairs to
stay within the confines of a single state.
That is the scenario that obtains in the case of income taxes
imposed on "nondomiciliary residents 38 1 and in cases of sharply
differing applications by two states of a generally consistent and
harmonious taxing scheme, as in the Zelinsky case reported above,3
involving different sourcing rules in New York and Connecticut, without
available tax relief in either state. It is also the case, more directly, when
the tenuous connection of "continuing jurisdiction" in a state probate
court holds a trust in perpetual thrall, as in the case of Founder-State

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

See id. at 202-03.
See Nash, supra note 298, at 318.
See California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601, 601, 602 (1978) (per curiam).
See supra note 308.
See supra notes 142-66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
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Trusts. Here the penalty is not the tax resulting from moving away from
home, but is explicit in the structure of the taxing statute itself.393
B. At Home in the "States"
In our own review of state taxation cases we have seen taxpayers
assail overreaching state taxes, and, in some cases, succeed in striking
them down on various Constitutional grounds and on none.394 Clauses
invoked, in addition to the sovereign immunity arguments authorized in
McCulloch, have been the Duties and Imposts Clause of Article I,
Section 10,115 the Due Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and, most persistently, the Interstate Commerce
Clause.396
Almost all of these provisions have been relied on by the Court in a
number of state tax cases, but the National Privileges or Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment39 7 has been relied on by the Court
only once in a tax case, and for a result from which the Court quickly
backed away. In this section I will attempt to revive the underlying
rationale of that case, Colgate v. Harvey,39 and to lay out an argument
that the National Privileges or lInmunities Clause should play a role that
is both gap-filling and integrative in requiring states, at a minimum, to
provide taxpayer relief from double taxation (double taxation of global
income) of persons who have, in one way or another, established
themselves in more than one state. The aim should be that no person
shall pay substantially more in income taxes than the amount at most of
the highest levy at the highest rate that is imposed by any of the states
involved. The relief should also be crafted in such a way that it cannot
393. Moreover, the existence of other, and conflicting, modes of state income taxation of trusts,
such as taxes imposed by the state of residence of the trustee, or the place of administration of the
trusts, makes the possibility of double taxation directly possible.
394. See, e.g., Miller Bros. Co. v. State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, app. at 353-57 nn. 8-20
(1954). See also supranote 177.
395. "[N]o State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or
exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection laws." Brown v.
Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419,453 (1827); see also Mager v. Grima, 49 US (8 How.) 490,494
(1850).
396. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
397. Amendment XIV (1868), Section 1 reads: All persons born or naturalized in the
United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and
of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (emphasis added).
398. 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
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easily be employed to immunize the taxpayer from fair taxation in each
state.
At a remove, the same rationale has a role to play in compelling the
discarding of the Founder-State Trust concept of a trust's residence for
income tax purposes, with its wholly inappropriate attempt to
immobilize assets within a state that the trustee, donor, beneficiaries
have long since left.
I will use the argument first advanced in Colgate v. Harvey that one
function of that clause was to fill a "gap" left by the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2 by offering a federal guarantee that
each citizen would be free to absent herself from her home state without
incurring penalties imposed by the home state's resentment of the
move.3 Where the clause in Article IV reinforces the American federal
union by protecting incomers, who carry on activities in a neighboring
state without losing their connection to their home state, the Fourteenth
Amendment functions to affirm that Union by also protecting the right
of citizens of one state to sever, partially or wholly, the bonds of its old
citizenship while putting down new roots in another state or, more
exactly-given today's extended living habits-even when the new
roots are put down without wholly or even at all pulling out the older
roots, so that the old form of domiciliary status itself requires rethinking
and the uniqueness of domicile is put into question.
The several rights connected to the privileges and immunities of
citizenship, state and national, taken together, turn out to be exemplified
by the unquestioned American right to pick up and go ad libitum and to
move freely, temporarily or permanently, from one state to another and
back again-occasionally, sporadically, habitually. 0 More, they limn
the possibility of an extended home and an extended self for someone
who can be said, with equal accuracy, to be a domiciliary-to be at
home or close to it-simultaneously under two sovereigns. Just how
valuable and central the unnamed liberty, which our law captures as the
right to travel, is, will be explicated from the opinion of Mr. Justice
Stevens in Saenz v. Roe4 °2 and a quick and sketchy trip through that
liberty's multiple appearances and multiple roles in American
constitutional law. As applied to the case of state taxation, the protection
of the rights to travel and to be at home throughout the Union must,
however, be accommodated with the problem of migration (or the
399.
400.
401.
402.

See id. at 409.
See id.
See id. at 449.
526 U.S. 489 (1999).
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illusion of migration) for the purpose of evading taxes in one state or
another or even to evade state tax altogether. When so accommodated,
taxpayers will have a constitutional right, judicially enforceable, to insist
on reasonable state measures to limit double taxation, properly
understood, and to require state mechanisms to avoid double taxation
arising from multiple state living and working arrangements. It will also
demand the substitution of a more rational approach to income taxation
of trusts as resident than the Founder-State Trust approach. The remedy
if those measures and mechanisms are not put in place is an appeal to the
federal judiciary as a constitutional referee.
Our brief investigation of the introduction, at the opening of the
twentieth century, of national and state income taxation has to be read
against the long procession of tax cases, of all sorts, that have proceeded
through the constitutional testing process both before and after the
introduction of income taxes, that is, the first part of this Article must be
read against the second. What emerges from the reading of the two, I
believe, is a persuasive history of the period, whose underlying theme is
of a political development, which accompanied the growth of
industrialization after the Civil War, saw increased government
expenditures and responsibilities at every level of government, and, with
some difficulty, found the necessary means to permit governments to
meet the burden of such responsibilities and expenditures.
During the period when the political will to introduce income taxes
was growing, but had not yet come to the point where such taxes could
be introduced, there was a long, golden era when income from salaries
and non-real estate investments were substantially under-taxed in
comparison to the burden of real estate subject to ad valorem taxes and
the burden of indirect taxes on goods and services. 43 Although in theory,
ad valorem taxes, administered at the county level, for the benefit of
both state and local government, applied equally to property of all sorts,
including tangible and intangible personalty, the tax on the latter was
seldom effectively collected, as a long line of state commissions and
committees reported.4 Political acceptance of income taxation at
graduated rates brought this era of under-taxation of the most dynamic

403. See SELIGMAN, supranote 65, at 432-34.
404. See id.
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forms of wealth to an end. This is the story told by most historians, 45 and
by reformers 4° who were active during the periods in question.
It is in the context of this fiscal history and development, that one
ought to see the history of constitutional law relating to state taxation
over the same period. The Court was first sensitive to under-taxation
and, later, to the impact of increasing taxation. Writing in 1934, Charles
L.B. Lowndes, said that previously the Court thought that the most
serious problem was that intangibles would escape taxation everywhere,
and so it justified double taxation; but now the tide was running the
other way and the threat of double taxation was viewed by many as
serious so that a new Court turned from the cases encouraging a variety
of state taxes and discounting the risks of double taxation, to a new
concern with preventing double taxation.40 7 For Lowndes, an astute
student of the issue,4°' that new judicial concern had its roots in both "a
rapidly mounting tax burden [and] the writings of students of taxation"
who were reacting to the same impact on individuals.4
The result of this sea change in the attitude of a majority of the
Courts to state taxation and the threat of double taxation, resulted in
what proved to be the brief adventure reflected in the Cases Allocating
Intangibles, whose rise and fall-a twelve year cycle-we have followed
above.4 ° Those cases were an attempt to make an authoritative allocation
of intangibles among the states, and it failed. It failed, among other
reasons, because it was based on the uncertain touchstone of a unique
domicile. The domiciliary allocation was not extended to income taxes;
and a little later the Court first refused and then only hesitantly
undertook to resolve conflicting determinations of domicile contested by
the states themselves in the John Dorrance, 4" Harold Hughes 41 2 and other
double domicile cases. The Cases Allocating Intangibles were overruled
within the decade of their completion.
405. See RATNER, supra note 76, at 210; CLIFTON K. YEARLING, THE MONEY MACHINES: THE
BREAKDOWN AND REFORM OF GOVERNMENTAL AND PARTY FINANCE IN THE NORTH, 1860-1920, at
167 (1970).
406. Mills Committee Report, supra note 95; see SELIGMAN, supra note 65, at 432-34.
407. See Spurious Conceptions, supranote 270, at 631.
408. In a series of articles in the early 1930s leading up to Spurious Conceptions of the
Constitutional Law of Taxation, supra note 270, Lowndes came to provide some of the best
analyses of the issues involved in the Cases Allocating Intangibles. Then a young man, Lowndes
went on to join the Duke law faculty and to become a recognized authority in estate planning until
his death thirty-five years later.
409. Spurious Conceptions, supranote 270, at 638-39.
410. See supra notes 156-206 and accompanying text.
411. See Nash, supranote 298.
412. See Califomia v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601 (1978) (per curiam).
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Finally, in State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich,4 3 Mr. Justice
Douglas allowed Utah to impose an estate tax on the value of shares of a
Utah corporation, where the decedent and other persons involved in the
estate have nothing to do with Utah, and where the Utah corporation has
both its principal place of business and its stock transfer functions
elsewhere. In doing so he dismissed the Cases Allocating Intangibles as
"of recent origin" themselves and reaffirmed Blackstone v. Miller,414
going out of his way to insist that "double taxation" was not
constitutionally prohibited.
Even here, however, there was dissent and demurrer. Justice
Frankfurter concurred in the result in Aldrich, but warned that there were
real Due Process limits on state taxation, however wrongly they had
been expressed in the Cases Allocating Intangibles; but he also supposed
that judges were not well situated to make the judgment as to where that
Due Process line was to be drawn and hoped, with little justification,
that Congress would act to accommodate conflicting state taxes. 415 Mr.
Justice Jackson opposed the Aldrich majority more robustly; he urged
that there were constitutional limits on the invention of taxable events by
the states that should have been applied to bar the taxes in the present
case.41 6 With rhetorical force he argued that the majority might be
construed as saying that, "any [state] tax that is collectible is legitimate,"
41 7
and he forcibly insisted that that was not the case within the Union.
In the sixty years since Aldrich has decided, it is Justice Jackson
rather than Justice Douglas who has been vindicated. The Court has
accorded the states assurances of broad discretion in the formulation of
tax policies, the Cases Allocating Intangibles have not been revisited,
and the Court has attempted to craft its rules, so as to reduce the
possibility that they would enable some taxpayers to avoid taxes
altogether or would trigger undue competition among the states.
Nevertheless, the Court has continued to supervise state taxation with a
view to avoiding double taxation.
With the notable dissent of Justices Scalia and Thomas,4 8 the Court
has developed the test of "internal consistency" in interstate commerce
413. 316 U.S. 174(1942).
414. 188 U.S. 189 (1903).
415. See Aldrich, 316 U.S. at 184 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
416. See id. at 174.
417. Id. at 200 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
418. See Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Wash. State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 254-62 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 303-306 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200-01 (1995) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part).
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cases," 9 in order to avoid the possibility of double taxation. The Court
has also supervised, in addition, two major programs of constitutional
allocation of taxables, with the same view of avoiding double taxation in
mind without permitting participants in the state's economic life to avoid
their fair share of the tax burden.4 0 First, under the rubric of the
Interstate Commerce Clause it has overseen the apportionment of state
income and corporate franchise taxes among the states in reasonable
proportion to the business done as part of a multistate unitary operation
in the taxing jurisdiction and elsewhere. And it has continued the line of
cases through which, under the Due Process Clause, the Court has
continued to insist on allocating rolling stock-railroad cars, trucks,
ships, airplanes-on the basis of "presence" of the stock within the
state.421 In such activity the Court is not only assisting taxpayers, it is
also mediating conflicts between the states. 2 Such conflicts still clearly
continue to arise, as the newspaper treatment of New York's aggressive
local sourcing of income, treated above, shows. The point of the present
argument is to urge on the Court its undertaking another supervisory
burden if the states-and New York among them--do not move
promptly to remove some of those sources of conflict.
We must begin where all discussions of the judicially determined
meanings of the National Privileges or Immunities Clause must begin,
The Slaughterhouse Cases.4 Counsel in that case confronted the Court
with a demand for judicial intervention in a local licensing dispute in
New Orleans, asking for judicial enforcement of a national right against
the state award of monopoly on police power grounds. The majority of
the Court rejected the notion of such an enhanced federal right to pursue
a "common calling" and also rejected the argument that such a right was
included in an indefinite list of privileges or immunities of United States
citizens under the newly enacted Fourteenth Amendment. 4 Mr. Justice
Miller, speaking for the Court, responded to that demand by insisting
that the nation had not entirely replaced the states as a source of and
419. See Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 U.S. 638, 644 (1984); Tyler Pipe Indus., 483 U.S. at 240;
Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 483 U.S. at 284; Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. at 185.
420. See Armco Inc., 467 U.S. at 644.
421. For apportionment of taxes on unitary businesses, see, e.g., ContainerCorp. v. Franchise
Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983) and for apportionment of rolling stock, see, e.g., BraniffAirways v.
Nebraska State Bd. of Equalizationand Assessment, 347 U.S. 590 (1954); Norfolk & Western Ry.
Co. v. Missouri State Tax Commission, 390 U.S. 317 (1968).
422. The original jurisdiction of the courts seems to be open to disputes among the states
concerning conflicting determinations of domicile. See, e.g., California v. Texas, 457 U.S. 164, 164
(1982); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 93 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting).
423. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
424. See id. at 66.
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limit on individual rights by reason of the National Privileges or
Immunities Clause. 42' Having concluded that the plaintiffs in error were
mistaken in seeking federal protection against a state monopoly when
such a right existed, if at all, under the law of that state, Justice Miller, in
dictum, did go on to point to a right that did arise out of national
citizenship." 6 It was the right to free travel beyond the state's boundaries
and within the Union that he had already vindicated in the strongest
terms, speaking for the Court,4 2 7 a few years before in the case of
Crandall v. Nevada.4 There the Court had struck down a poll tax on
persons leaving that state just because it was inconsistent with that right.

Justice Miller's right to travel has been derided as trivial and
trivializing,429 but he did not think so, and reflection and experience has
suggested that the right is neither trivial nor trivializing.

425. The argument for such a right (and others) is given, in different versions, in the dissenting
opinions of Justices Field, Bradley and Swayne, in contemporaneous critical comment after the case
was decided, e.g., William M. Royall, The FourteenthAmendment: The Slaughter-House Cases, 4
S. L. REV. 558, 569, 578 (1879), and notably by Justice Black dissenting in Adamson v. California,
332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947). The various critical voices differ in many respects: certainly, Justice Black
finds the expansive natural rights reasoning of Justices Field and Bradley objectionable. All three
share, however, disagreement with Justice Miller's insistence that the provision protects only the
rights of national citizenship from abridgement by the states and that the states remain both the
source and the protector of "the privileges and immunities which arefimdamental; which belong of
right to the citizens of all free governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by citizens of
the several States which compose this Union." Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 76 (Miller),
quoting Justice Bushrod Washington sitting, on circuit, in Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 551
(C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). Justice Black and Bradley equally agree, for example, that the rights
guaranteed by the amendment from state abridgement, include those rights previously established
against the federal government by the first eight amendments to the constitution, although Justice
Bradley would go further and express confidence that those same and other rights appropriate to
citizenship (including a protection against monopoly) are part of national citizenship. National
citizenship, for them, in a reversal that is accomplished by the first sentence of the Fourteenth
Amendment, is now "primary" while state citizenship rights have become only marginal at best.
426. See SlaughterhouseCases, 83 U.S. at 47.
427. Justice Clifford and Chief Justice Chase were alone in insisting the poll tax in that case
should fall only because it violated federal control over interstate commerce.
428. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35,48-49 (1867).
429.

See CHARLES FAmiMAN, RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 864-88, at 1354 (Vol. VI of

O.W. Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court (Paul A. Freund ed.)) (Miller's opinion
trivialized the National Privileges and Immunities Clause). Justice Miller is widely condemned for
his opinion, but a generation ago he was a hero to Fred Rodell for his rejection of unlimited judicial
power, for the list of rights called for by the plaintiffs in error and the dissenters would have been
judicially defined. Rodell said, "Samuel Miller, of Iowa, humanitarian and unlegalistic realist,
became, despite the fact that history has largely overlooked him, one of the Court's few top-flight
Justices [and in The Slaughterhouse Cases] produced perhaps the finest and certainly the most
important opinion of his admirable ... career on the high bench." FRED RODELL, NINE MEN: A
POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT from 1790 to 1955, at 137, 160 (1955).
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The prime evidence against the charge that the right to travel is a
"trivial" one, begins with the Interstate Commerce Clause and its central
importance in American constitutional structure. From the New
Jerseyites being ferried over to Manhattan in Gibbons v. Ogden430 in the
1820s travelers have come under the protection of the national power
over their interstate journey. That protection also supports federal
prosecution for a conspiracy to interfere violently with such travel. 3'
Finally, in 1964 Congress relied on its power over the conditions of
interstate travel to end customary racial segregation throughout the
country. 432
Straining to see the full importance of Justice Miller's right to
travel, allows one to reject a slight feeling of moral uneasiness that the
end of overt segregation in public places in America had to rest on an
over-extended use of the Interstate Commerce Clause. Although such a
revolutionary change can now better be placed on a straight reading of
the Thirteenth Amendment 3 3 than by invoking Congress' power over
interstate commerce, and although the decisions in Heart of Atlanta and
McClung do not lack precedents, there was and is a sense that turning to
that clause meant relying on a mere jurisdictional hook and the
expectation of a collective judicial wink. The strongest proponents of the
invocation of the commerce power in the context-Charles L. Black and
Laurence Tribe-do not deny that.4M Although he now emphasizes the
renewed congressional interest in the scope of its power under the
Fourteenth Amendment,435 in his second edition Tribe, in justifying these
430. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
431. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 760 (1966).
432. See Civil Rights Act of 1964 P.L. 88-35; Heart of Atlanta Motel Inc. v. United States, 379
U.S. 241, 257 (1964); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-02 (1964). Just as Brown v.
Board of Education and its progeny had spelled the end of state-sponsored racial segregation, so
now Congress, spurred by the political success of the sit-in movement and the waning strength of
massive resistance in the South, purged segregation from all public places in any way affected by
interstate commerce.
433. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968), circumvented both the "state
action" bars raised to such a statute in The Civil Rights Cases (1883) and the unpredictable gaps in
Federal jurisdiction which might follow from a vaguely inadequate invocation of Congressional
power over "commerce" in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The Jones case accepted the reasoning that
exclusion of most forms of racial, religious and ethnic discrimination could be proscribed by
Congressional action to enforce the end of chattel slavery in the United States under section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment. See id. The argument may, with some push of analogy be extended to
gender discrimination; it is not clear that that rationale should go further.
434. See generally TRIBE Third, supra note 51; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988) [hereinafter

TRIBE Second]; CHARLES L. BLACK, JR.,

STRUCrURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).

435. See TRIBE Third, supranote 51, at 811-24, 922,936 where he locates Heart of Atlanta and
McClung in an era of judicial deference to Congress in contrast to the era of heightened scrutiny
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cases under the Interstate Commerce Clause, cautiously alludes to this
feeling of unease by
a436reference to Charles Black's 1968 Edward
S
Douglass White lectures.43

In the printed version of those lectures,437 Black insists that the
Interstate Commerce Clause analysis is justified,43' but goes on to
deplore the "rhetoric" of such a reliance.
"There remains a certain indirection, an inaptness of the logic to
cover the whole result .... [T]he discrepancy between justification and
result remains, requiring constant explanation, and suggesting, though in
my view erroneously, possible disingenuousness [and] there hangs about
its use was licit
all of these uses a feeling that the tool employed, though
4 39
tool.,
adapted
perfectly
the
not
was
job,
the
did
it
and
I think that positioning the Commerce power in the context of the
rights of a citizen of the Union to be at home anywhere in the Union will
help to show the deep grasp of the structure of our polity that the
draftsmen of the 1964 Act displayed, even if that grasp was floated on
what was perceived as a jurisdictional fiction."* The case to look at here
is Edwards v. California.44'
Fred Edwards was a California resident who was convicted of
driving his brother-in-law, Frank Duncan, an out-of-work and indigent
Texan, back to California with him; his brother-in-law went on
(federally funded) relief shortly after arriving in Marysville,
California."2 Edwards appeals from his conviction on the ground that
California cannot punish him for helping his brother come to California
suggested by United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), before reverting to the same blend of
cases to justify Heart of Atlanta as a case of congressional regulation of the "channels of
commerce," while McClung depends on the more tenuous "cumulative effect" analysis. See id. at
827, 815.
436. See TRIBE Second, supranote 434, § 6-39, at 312 n.5. Tribe cites Black's book, ostensibly
as supporting his Commerce Clause analysis, but the passage cited, also, as the text here shows,
evinces a feeling of unease with the constitutional strategy involved.
437. See BLACK, supranote 434, at 55,57-58.
438. It is justified because there is an "unimpeachable chain of reasoning" that goes from
seeing that "it is fact and not fiction that once in a while any restaurant open to the public will
attract traveler' and that "the only way to be sure [the interstate traveler] will not be discriminated
against is to forbid racial discrimination altogether." Id. at 56.
439. Id. at 57-58. His answer is that Congress should forthrightly declare "its power to declare
and give effect to the rights of citizenship as positive rights to full membership in the community,
without segregation and isolation." Id.
440. For more of the confusion that Black alludes to, see generally, Note, The Civil Rights Act
of 1964---Source and Scope of CongressionalPower,60 Nw. U. L. REv. 574 (1965) and Robert R.
Bebermeyer, Comment, PublicAccommodations and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 19 U. MIAMi L.
REv. 456 (1965).
441. 314 U.S. 160 (1941).
442. See id. at 170-71.
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under these circumstances. 3 A majority of the Court' held that the
criminal statute was invalid as a law burdening interstate commerce,
leaving for another day the question whether the "the Elizabethan poor
laws 4 5 [any] longer [fit] the facts."" 6 Edwards is thus one of the true
forerunners of both Shapirov. Thompson and Saenz v. Roe.
In concurring, Justice Jackson conceded that the majority's grounds
were "permissible ones under applicable authorities." 7 He went on to
state:
But the migrations of a human being, of whom it is charged that he
possesses nothing that can be sold and has no wherewithal to buy, do
not fit easily into my notions as to what is commerce. To hold that the
measure of his rights is the commerce clause is likely to result
eventually either in distorting the commercial law or in denaturing
human rights. 4

Both Justice Jackson and Justice Douglas, the former more
cautiously, 9 place the right to travel of, Fred Edward's brother-in-law,
squarely on the privileges or immunities of national citizenship. Justice
Douglas insists that "the right of persons to move freely from state to
state occupies a more protected position in our constitutional system
than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state
lines. 450
Douglas then rehearses the unbroken line of cases which, as Justice
Miller had said in The Slaughterhouse Cases, go back beyond the
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 ' It was recognized, Douglas

443. See id. at 173.
444. James Bymes, newly appointed to the Court, wrote the opinion which Chief Justice Stone
and Justices Roberts, Reed and Frankfurter joined. The decision is in fact unanimous with the other
Justices concurring in the result in opinions by Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and
Murphy, and Mr. Justice Jackson. See id. at 170, 177, 181.
445. See infra note 459.
446. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 173, 174. At the same time, all the Justices, the majority and the
concurring opinions alike, insist that, whatever the right that supported Frank Duncan's moving to
California, mere indigence is not a qualification on it. The majority is careful to repudiate a dictum
in New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) to the effect that the right might be subject to an
exception for "paupers."
447. Edwards, 314 U.S. at 181-82 (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
448. Id. at 182 (Jackson, J., concurring).
449. But Jackson after saying that "instances of valid 'privileges or immunities' must be but
few," says that if citizenship does not mean at least this right of free movement, it is "a promise to
the ear to be broken to the hope, a teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will." Id.
at 183, 186.
450. Id. at 177 (Douglas, J., concurring).
451. See id. at 178-81 (Douglas, J., concurring).
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points out, by Justice Moody in Twining v. New Jersey45 and Justice
Miller in The Slaughterhouse Cases, but also, and more eloquently in
Justice Miller's opinion in Crandall v. Nevadd53 and even more
eloquently, by Chief Justice Roger Taney in the 1849 Passenger
Cases.4 The right is not exhausted by a narrow right to travel to the
national capital, as was suggested in an infamous later case, United
States v. Wheeler.
The importance of the national right to travel freely emerges as a
much broader right. Eighty years apart, both Justice Miller and Justice
Douglas have no better way of making this clear than by repeating the
language of Chief Justice Taney in 1849:

452. 211 U.S. 78 (1908). This case, denying that the Privileges or Immunities Clause made the
Federal rules relating to self-incrimination applicable to the states, will later be heavily criticized by
Justice Black, in his effort, in Adainson v. California,332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting),
to read the Bill of Rights into that clause, but he does not disagree about the right to travel. He joins
Douglas in Edwards.See id.
453. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867). In that case, Nevada had levied a dollar tax on every person
departing the state by train or coach. Crandall, a coachman, had refused to report persons leaving or
collect the tax. Miller distinguishes a tax on the privilege of traveling by coach or train and, as in
this case, a tax on the passenger for the privilege of leaving the state. The "government has a right to
call ... its citizens" throughout the Union, and a state may not interfere with that power, and "the
citizen also has correlative rights" to travel throughout the Union. Id. at 36, 40, 43, 44.
454. The PassengerCases (Smith v. Turner,Norris v. Boston), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 471, 492
(1849), invalidated New York and Massachusetts laws imposing a head tax on immigrants. In
dissent, Taney sharply distinguished between aliens and citizens; the states, in his opinion, ought to
be able to tax the entry of aliens, but not of American citizens. As Justice Miller calculated, writing
in Crandall, 73 U.S. at 48, at least four "and perhaps ... more" of the Justices in The Passenger
Casesassented to a citizen's right to travel that was beyond the control of the states.
455. 254 U.S. 281 (1920). This case upheld, with only one dissent, dismissal of a federal
prosecution, as a conspiracy to deprive others of a "right or privilege secured.., by the Constitution
or laws of the United States," in the Bisbee Deportation case of 1917. Id. at 292. Chief Justice Taft's
opinion was forced to treat Crandall v. Nevada as justified as a violation of the Interstate Commerce
Clause and no more. (It was only later that Helson & Randolph v. Kentucky, 279 U.S. 245 (1929),
did invalidate a similar head tax on entry and exit as a violation of the Interstate Commerce Clause.)
The Bisbee Daportation referred to events that created a national sensation. On April 26, 1917, soon
after the United States entered World War I, the Industrial Workers of the World called a strike of
copper miners in Cochise County, Arizona. On July 12, 1917, the county sheriff led a posse of over
200 that rounded up and herded into box-cars nearly 2000 Wobblies, whom they ultimately
abandoned in the New Mexico desert. Before the Wheeler case, a state prosecution of posse
members for kidnapping had resulted in a not guilty verdict. The state case, State v. Wootton, Crim.
No. 2685 (Cochise County, Ariz. Sept. 13, 1919), is reported in Comment, The Law of Necessity as
Applied in the Bisbee Deportation Case, 3 ARIZ. L. REV. 264 (1961), and is a rare case where a
defense of "necessity" to act (to prevent violence on the part of the Wobblies) was successfully
raised.
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We are all citizens of the United States and as members of the same
community must have the right to pass and repass through
every part
4 6
of it without interruption, as freely as in our own states.

The Edwards case sets the scene for the reemergence of the
National Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
in the guise of the right of free travel throughout the United States for
citizens. In Shapiro v. Thompson,457 the issue was whether the states
could impose a durational residence requirement of one year before
permitting new residents to obtain welfare assistance. This presented
squarely the issue that was present, but avoided, in Edwards v.
California.4 s Elizabethan poor laws, for long the model of state welfare
provisions, essentially imposed a local obligation on local governments
to care for their own residents, and an unintended consequence of this
system was a local determination to prevent the arrival or settlement of
persons likely to become charges on the community.4 59

Justice Brennan wrote an opinion, joined by six Justices, that,
although invoking the right to travel, nevertheless did not rest its holding
on that right directly .4 Instead, it held that imposition of the year's
durational period, as a measure of bona fides in establishing in-state
residence, violated the Equal Protection Clause because it impermissibly
set new residents in a class apart from longer established residents. 6'
Why was the case put on Equal Protection Clause grounds?
Certainly one possible reason for that grounding is that Congress had
apparently permitted the durational residence requirements, and the
welfare laws of the District of Columbia, required just such a year's
wait. A majority of the Court was not prepared to say that the right of

456.
457.
458.
459.
severely

PassengerCases, 48 U.S. at 492.
394 U.S. 618, 622 (1969).
See id. at 630 n.8.
See the treatment of these laws, which, together with other laws and guild restrictions,
discouraged labor mobility in England in ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN

RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF 1787, at 162-213 (1956). See LYNN HOLLEN LEES, THE
SOLIDARITIES OF STRANGERS: THE ENGLISH POOR LAWS AND THE PEOPLE 1700-1948, 56 (1998);
PAUL SLACK, THE ENGLISH POOR LAWS 1531-1782 (1995).

460. See Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 641-42.
461. See id. at 541. Chief Justice Warren's dissent argued that such a requirement,
corresponding to state responsibilities under national welfare aid laws, was an appropriate one, and
not an undue indirect burden on the right to travel. See id. at 649. The dissents of both Chief Justice
Warren and Justice Harlan insisted on the fact that the Court was striking down, not only state laws,
but the Federal laws that accommodated the state laws also. See id. at 650-51, 664-65. Justice
Harlan, who found the right of travel a right that due process subjected to reasonable state and
federal regulation, also agreed with the Chief Justice that the burden on the right to travel was both
indirect and not undue. See id. at 676.
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travel as such was beyond Congressional control. Yet, because the
durational requirement "impinged" on the right to travel, the standard
governing the permissibility of the classification imposed by the Equal
Protection Clause was a compelling state interest, under strict scrutiny.462
The Shapiro case is the stem of a number of cases considering state
imposition of durational residence requirements as a condition of
receiving state benefits.4 3 It is the invocation of that higher standard of

scrutiny, not in respect to a "suspect class," but in defense of an
uncertain group of "fundamental rights, 464 that has been most
controversial about the Shapiro case.
In 1999, three decades after Shapiro, Saenz v. Roe465 reached the
Supreme Court. It tested California's new provision of separate
treatment for new residents applying for welfare before they had been in
California for a year. 466 Such residents were eligible for relief, but only at
the same level they would have received in the state from which they
had come. 67
Speaking for a majority of seven Justices, 4 Justice Stevens
responded with a new analysis and appreciation of the right to travel and
a firm location of that right as one of the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States, that is, a nationally held right. Neither
Congress nor the states can "abridge" that right. Since he concluded that
the California law's separate treatment of new residents from residents
462. See id. at 634.
463. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (registering to vote); Fortson v.
Georgia, 410 U.S. 686 (1973) (same); Mem. Hosp. v. Maricopa, 415 U.S. 250 (1974) (medical
services); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (suit for divorce).
464. Justice Steward added, in a concurrence, additional language about the right to travel as a
"fundamental right." The case presents the strange spectacle of Justice Stewart's quoting from
United States v. Guest that the right to travel was an unmentioned right under the Constitution that
"isquite indepzndent of the Fourteenth Amendment" and refusing to found it, as a Federal right, as
Justice Harlan does, on the Due Process Clause binding on the Federal government in the Fifth
Amendment. See id. at 642-43.
465. 526 U.S. 489 (1999).
466. See id.at 493.
467. See id. The provision was an effort to meet Shapiro's concern that refusal of any aid
meant that the new residents were worse off for having moved. By classifying such residents with
residents in their old state California could make an argument that the new residents were not worse
off for the move. The practical answer may well be that the equivalence with other state benefits
ignored the impact of such things as comparative costs of living in the two states. In any event, the
penalty was obviously less draconian than that in issue in Shapiro. See id. at 499. It was also
expressly approved by a provision of federal welfare reform law, the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 43 U.S.C. § 604(c). See id. at 500.
468. See id. at 491. The Justices joining Justice Stevens included Justices O'Connor, Scalia and
Kennedy as well as Justices Souter, Ginsberg and Breyer. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas dissented. See id.
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of longer duration, for purposes of providing need-based assistance
impermissibly abridged that right, both the provisions of the California
law and of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act must
fall.4 69 The understanding of national citizenship in relation to state
citizenship controls, and the Equal Protection Clause is irrelevant.
Federal law, Justice Stevens says, cannot authorize violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment, but that silently presupposes that Congress, at
least in this case, lacks power to redefine national citizenship in any
470
relevant way.
In focusing on the national right of citizens, newly resident and so
newly citizens of the state to which they have moved, to equal treatment
with all other citizens of that state, Justice Stevens expresses the
protection of the national right to travel as follows:
The 'right to travel' discussed in our cases embraces at least three
different components. It protects the right of a citizen of one State to
enter and to leave another State, the right to be treated as a welcome
visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily present in the
second State, and, for those travelers who elect to become permanent
residents, the right to be treated like other citizens of that State.47
State citizenship back home protects, as a national matter (Article
IV, Section 2), the visitor, and national citizenship (protected from
abridgment by the Fourteenth Amendment) protects the immigrant.472
Although it looms very much in the background, the vigorous
Fourteenth Amendment scholarship of the last two decades is not
actually the focus of the case. That scholarship has elucidated the
structured forcefulness of radical abolitionist legal doctrine before and
during the Civil War and a related agenda that is, it argues, aimed at in
the Fourteenth Amendment.473 Instead, the emphasis is on consensus,
Saenz recognizes that in the right to travel it is dealing with what is
"common ground" between "fundamentally differing views concerning
the coverage of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment., 474 Locating the right to travel as one of the privileges or
469. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 506-07.
470. See id. at 507.
471. Id. at500.

472. See id. 501-04.
473. As exemplified in two wonderful works of lawyers using history: see generally MICHAEL
KENT CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF
RIGHTS (1986); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

(1998), a more prophetic book by CHARLES L. BLACK, A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN
RIGHTS, NAMED AND UNNAMED (1997) and work, both historical and doctrinal, by others.

474.

Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503.
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immunities of national citizenship does, however, open up the issue of
the substance of that citizenship, and its role in American politics and
federal-state relations, but it also opens up the implications of the
American right to travel. Those implications are already as diverse,
deeply rooted and tangled, as the different contexts in which the legal
right has emerged. The right is not a trivial one.
C. The Colgate Case
The right to travel has profound implications for federal relations
within the United States. 475 Since the right to travel arises, not from
particular language of the Constitution, but from the structure of the
Union, commentators have asked what calling the right a privilege or
immunity of national citizenship adds. But the first sentence of the
Fourteenth Amendment makes it clear that each American has a dual
citizenship, national and state, and that state citizenship belongs to each
national citizen at election. 476 But for our federalism that means that a

state has no control whatever over which of the citizens of the United
States are also citizens of the state.477 This clear consequence of the right
to travel and its location as a national privilege is in tension with the

475. As Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival
Portend the Future-OrReveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REv. 110 (1999)
[hereinafter Saenz Sans Prophecy], elegantly shows. The imaginative structure of American
federalism that is revealed is breath-taking. Unfortunately, the grasp of such a vision is lamented,
rather than celebrated, by Professor Tribe. He rejects such a structuralism; it is not complete enough
for him, for he demands allegiance to rights, deeply personal rights, other than those dependent on
our federal structure; and he regrets, and even disdains, the Justices who accept only the structure of
federalism, however carefully that structure is elaborated. With a demeaning reference to a cartoon
in which the Founding Fathers admit "Religious Freedom is my immediate goal, but my long-range
plan is to go into real estate," Tribe concludes:
Rather than a glimpse into a future written in terms of privileges or immunities, the
Saenz decision seems to me to have offered a window into the present and the recent
past. Saenz revealed a Court far more comfortable protecting rights that it can describe in
architectural terms, especially in terms of federalism, than it is protecting rights that
present themselves as spheres of personal autonomy or as dimensions of constitutionally
mandate equality-even by modes of analysis that are in essence structural. Ours is more
than an era of structure over substance. It is an era of largely unexamined preferences for
structure in the service of geography and organization over structure in the service of
human rights as such.
Id. at 198, 198 n.357.
476. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 US 489, 502-504 (1999); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 667
(1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 180 (1941) (Douglas, J.,
concurring), 183 (Jackson, J., concurring); and as cited by Justice Stevens in Saenz, 526 U.S. at 503504, Justice Miller for the majority and Justice Bradley dissenting in The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
477. See Saenz, 526 U.S. at 504.
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other-the non-national and federative-side of the American polity:
states are independent (if ultimately subordinate) centers of policy
making for their own citizenship and insist upon peculiar and, to some
extent, exclusive rights to gather resources from and extend benefits to
those citizens. 47 The Court is deeply involved in accommodating that
tension. Our thesis is that fully portable welfare rights and a wholly free
and individual labor mobility, on the one hand, and limits on the reach of
state taxing statutes, on the other hand, are, from this perspective, all part
of the same governmental adjustment.
It is appropriate then that a fourth aspect of the right to travel,
added to Justice Stevens' three, arises in the context of the invalidation
of a state tax by invocation of the National Privileges or Immunities
Clause and the right to travel and relocate. The fourth aspect of the right
to travel is the right to leave a state, even a state of birth or long
residence, and to take with one elsewhere the benefits won in that state,
without hindrance or penalty.
Colgate v. Harvey begins as a petition in the Vermont courts for
relief from the alleged unconstitutionality of the state's 1931 Income and
Franchise Tax Law. 9 The tax statute imposed separately computed
taxes on "business" (Class A) and "intangible" (Class B) income.80 The
taxpayer had lost money in business, but he stood to pay "a large sum on
account of Class B income, which came very largely from dividends on
foreign corporations doing little or no business in this state." '' He
attacked the tax as violating the federal Constitution, citing the Interstate
Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,
Section 1 and the Fourteenth Amendment.482 The Vermont Supreme
Court rejected the petitioner's claims and sustained the tax, citing the
broad discretion for choosing and classifying items of taxation and
exemption that have been accorded to legislatures by both the highest

478. See Saenz Sans Prophecy, supra note 475, at 110, 111. States are open to the election, by
national citizens, to take or to terminate state residence and thus citizenship: the right of travel for
citizens within the Union is "a virtually unconditional personal right." Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 643
(Stewart, J., concurring). But what is here involved is a right of U.S. citizenship, not a universal
human right. As Justice Stewart says, in contrast, "the 'right' of international travel has been
considered to be no more than an aspect of the 'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment." Id. at 643 n.l. Of course, Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), assures aliens
under federal protection free admission throughout the Union, but on different grounds. See id.
at 39.
479. See Vt. Pub. L. 1931, No. 17 (1931).
480. Colgate v. Harvey, 175 A. 352, 354 (Vt. 1934).
481. Id.
482. See Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 418-419 (1935).
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44
4 3
courts of the states and the United States Supreme Court. , On appeal,
the decision of the state supreme court was generally upheld, 4' but a
majority of the Court4 6 fixed on a single aspect of the case, which had
not been clearly decided below. Under the Vermont statute, Class B
income included corporate dividends and interest, but excluded interest
income from in-state loans at no more than five percent or dividends
from Vermont corporations.
As a result the tax on Class B income was struck down. Justice
Sutherland suggests, without holding, that the tax would fail even under
an Equal Protection attack.488 A greater likelihood of local investment or
the legislature's aiming at "some unnamed public interest" does not
provide a rational basis. In the end, however, he prefers (perhaps
because he is not comfortable with his Equal Protection Clause
argument) to put the case on the National Privileges or Immunities
Clause.8 9 The second sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, completes

the paramount position of national citizenship established by the first
sentence of the Amendment and thus, fills a gap left by the earlier
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, Section 2 by protecting
the national rights of one already a citizen of the offending state.490
Having laid down the major, Justice Sutherland then supplies, as
minor, that the right to travel in any state is a national privilege, and that
right includes the right to do or engage in business in any state. 491 He
concluded that the Vermont tax on interest from out-of-state loans must
483. See Colgate v. Harvey, 175 A. 352, 353-54 (Vt. 1934). The Court insists a tax will not be
disturbed without "a flagrant and palpable inequality between the burden imposed and the benefit
received" and the unquestioned right to tax the income from intangibles owned by a Vermont
resident, even though from out-of-state sources, carefully citing Justice Sutherland in FirstNational
Bank of Boston v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932), expressly in light of the Supreme Court's then
current "zeal to avoid the evils of multiple taxation." Colgate, 175 A. at 353-54, 356. FirstNational
Batik of Boston, of course, had then just recently completed the Cases Allocating Intangibles.
484. See Colgate, 296 U.S. at 436.
485. See id. First, a tax on net income attributable to the state does not burden interstate
commerce. See id. at 422. Second, the classification that distinguishes between dividends from instate and out-of-state corporations (which themselves pay franchise and property taxes) is justified,
as is the varying availability of a personal exemption. See id. at 422-23.
486. Justice Sutherland wrote the opinion, and he was joined by Chief Justice Hughes and
Justices VanDevanter, McReynolds, Butler and Roberts.
487. See Colgate, 296 U.S. at 417-18.
488. Justice Sutherland is clear in his own mind: The interest income classification, he
complains, does not even require the locally lent money to be invested in-state. In the latter case,
perhaps it could be argued that such investments increased "the actual wealth of the state"; but in
the absence of such a provision, there is no rational basis for the distinction. See id. at 424.
489. See id. at 426.
490. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV.
491. See Colgate,296 U.S. at429-30.
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fall, because its being linked to a more favorable rate on loans made instate had "the effect of denying equality of treatment in respect of the
'
exercise of their privileges of national citizenship."492
Justice Stone, joined by Justices Brandeis and Cardozo, dissents
from this last point; he would, as had the Vermont Supreme Court,
uphold the entire tax. 93 He insists that creation of the exemption for in-

state lending has a rational basis under existing Equal Protection Clause
precedents.494 And he thunders against the invocation of the National
Privileges or Immunities Clause. He characterizes the Clause as "almost
forgotten" and otiose.495 He lists, in a single footnote, forty-four
unsuccessful attempts to insist that state statutes have abridged those
privileges or immunities; in all those cases, "[u]ntil today none has held
that state legislation infringed that clause., 49 6 And well that they did.
If its restraint upon state action were extended ... it would enlarge

judicial control of state action and multiply restrictions upon it to an
extent ... sufficient to cause serious apprehension for the rightful

independence of local government. That was the issue fought out in the
497
Slaughter House Cases ....
Justice Stone's dissent in Colgate v. Harvey turned out to have a
substantial impact upon at least the language of the Supreme Court for
the next two generations. His footnote was to reappear, not only in
Madden v. Kentucky, 45 which, four years later, was to overrule Colgate,
492. Id. at431,433.
493. See id. at 436-37 (Stone, J., dissenting).
494. See id. at 437 (Stone, J., dissenting).
495. "It created no new privileges and immunities of United States citizenship, and, as they are
derived exclusively from the Constitution and laws enacted under it, the states were powerless to
abridge them before the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as after." Id. at 443 (Stone,
J., dissenting).
496. Id. at 445 n.2, 446 (Stone, J., dissenting).
497. Id. at 445 (Stone, J., dissenting).
498. 309 U.S. 83, 91 n.14 (1940). Kentucky had confronted, for a long time, continuing
evasion of its property tax on intangibles, and one of the most popular forms of evasion was keeping
money in out-of-state banks. After an enabling Constitutional amendment, a reduction of rates and a
new mode of collection, which imposed on local banks themselves the task of remitting the tax, the
rates on deposits in out-of-state banks were set at five times the in-state rate. Here the decedent had
kept large amounts in New York City banks, where he also was engaged as partner of a national
securities firm headquartered in New York. See id. at 87. On his death those accounts, unreported
through his lifetime, were listed in the probate inventory and triggered assessments for past years.
See id. His estate resisted the tax, relying on Colgate. See id. at 90. Justice Reed, speaking for a
majority of six, built on and referred to Justice Stone's dissent in Colgate. The difference in rates
may well be justified by "the difficulties and expenses of tax collection" where the deposits are not
in Kentucky banks. Id. Justice Reed cites cases to show that the Court has denied enforcement to a
right to carry on the slaughterhouse business, to sell wine as freely as grape growers do, to operate
otherwise free of state regulation, and has permitted a state to limit deductions for estate tax
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but in his refusal to go along with the invocation of the National
Privileges or Immunities Clause in the context of First Amendment
rights in Hague v. Committee For Industrial Organization.99 It is clear
that, to Justice Stone as to Fred Rodell, Justice Miller was a hero in the
struggle to restrain judicial activism.5°
D. Founder-StateTrusts
I do not defend the particular holding of Colgate v. Harvey. Neither

Justice Sutherland's disingenuous refusal to find a rational basis for the
exemption of "money loaned within this State" (while having no trouble

at all in justifying the exemption for dividends from in-state
corporations)"' nor Justice Stone's elaborate deference to the Vermont
legislature, nor his statement that a state was free "[to] favor domestic
interests by granting exemptions in the exercise of its taxing power,"' '
comport with the complexities of the Court's current attitude to taxes
that discriminate between in-state and out-of-state taxables. Despite the
approval of Justice Stone's dissent by the majority in Madden, which
permitted a state tax imposing very different tax rates on a depositor's
deposits in in-state in out-of-state banks, it is not at all clear whether
either tax would survive today under a reinvigorated Equal Protection
Clause" 3 and the increasingly close scrutiny of the argument, under the
purposes to charitable contributions made to local charities. See id. at 92, n.17-20. Colgate is
expressly overruled "as repugnant to the line of reasoning adopted here." Id. at 93.
499. 307 U.S. 496,520-21 n.1 (1939).
500. See supra note 429. When Justice Stone admitted that, for him, there was a continuing
role for judicial intervention, it was to the Due Process Clause he turned in the footnote reservation.
See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938). "There is little doubt that the
Colgate decision and the danger it created for state regulation of business inspired Justice Stone's
narrow interpretation of the privileges or immunities clause even where political liberties were at
stake ....TRIBE Second, supranote 434, at 557 (omitted in parallel passages in TRIBE Third). The
path from there to Justice Black's dissent inAdamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 71 (1947) (arguing
that the National Privileges or Immunities Clause had imposed the first eight Amendments as
binding on the states), and the academic response to that effort, Charles Fairman, Does the
Fourteenth Amendment Incoiporate the Bill of Rights?, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949) and RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977), led in turn to books by Michael Kent Curtis, Charles
L. Black and Akhil Reed Amar and the potential "revival" of the Clause as the intended bearer of
the Bill of Rights as fixed, judicially, on the states.
501. Justice Stone says, "the considerations which have led to upholding the one exemption
would not admit of condemning the other." Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404,437 (1935).
502. Id. at 439. Justice Stone strangely defends state support for local economic activity by a
comparison to national trade barriers, "a Constitution that has known a protective tariff for more
than one hundred years." Id.
503. See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 875 (1985). See generally William
Cohen, Federalism in Equality Clothing:A Comment on Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v.
Ward, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1985).
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Interstate Commerce Clause, that such taxes, although discriminatory on
their face, can be justified only if the can be shown to be
"compensatory" in nature.""
Instead, what I wish to take from Colgate, read in the light of
Shapiro v. Thompson and Saenz v. Roe, is precisely a vision of the
individual's mobility throughout all of the states, while assigning value
to citizenship in that state in which he elects to reside. How that vision
of mobility and loyalty is to be accommodated, is far from having been
worked out in those two cases, which deal only with the narrow issue
of denying states' desires to avoid incentives to indigent immigration.
The "privileges and immunities" of the original Constitution dealt
with the obvious problems that attended the visiting trader, and the
"privileges or immunities" of the Reconstruction Congress perfected
Article Four, Section 2 by including anything that it had failed to
include' 6 It has been argued that both clauses are implicit in the "split
atom"50 7 of American federalism. In any case, the right to travel, without
explicit anchor in the Constitution, has taken on a life and shape. That
shape requires that one is to be protected against one's own state as well
as those one does not claim.5 05 One state's resentment at your relations
with other states, is proscribed and, as with the hospitality of the newly
chosen state, the state that is left is required to provide an even-handed
approval.
One purpose and effect of the privileges and immunities clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment ... was to bridge the gap left by [Article IV,

Section 2] so as also to safeguard citizens of the United States against
any legislation of their own states having the effect of denying equality
504. See Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 331 (1996) (seems to be almost on all-fours
with both Colgate and Madden, and to be inconsistent in result with the latter).
505. We need only to think of Justice Stevens' questionable distinction in respect of state
benefits between those that are "portable" and those that are not as justifying continuing state
barriers to in-state college tuition or state jurisdiction over divorce proceedings.
506. "At this point, the majority's analysis became a bit wobbly, exposing a gap in its
argument." Saenz Sans Prophecy, supranote 475, at 129-34.
507. "The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens
would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the
other." U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Reconstruction was also the era when, after many Americans had been torn between the two
loyalties-to state and to nation--the triumphant national government insisted that the Union was,
as Chief Justice Chase said in Texas v. White, "an indestructible Union, composed of indestructible
States." 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868).
508. This is what Professor Tribe means when he says that, in Saenz, "the right of an individual
to migrate to any state that she chooses and make that state her home fits into [the] overall design
...by providing a measure of political accountability to the citizens of those states." Saenz Sans
Prophecy, supranote 475, at 156.
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of treatment in respect of the exercise of their privileges of national
citizenship in other states .... When [a citizen] trades, buys, or sells,
contracts or negotiates across the state line, when he loans money or
takes out insurance in New Hampshire, whether in doing so he remains
in Vermont or not, he exercises rights of national citizenship which the
law of neither state can abridge....509
This protection is, in the final analysis, not based on the Interstate
Commerce Clause after Saenz, but on national citizenship, the right to
travel and National Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.1 0 Thus the question of whether the requirement of avoiding
discrimination or burdening of those who have moved, personally, from
one state to another, is applicable in such noncommercial contexts, is not
relevant. At least as high a standard of protection is or ought to be
available under the Fourteenth Amendment.
The "nondomiciliary resident" has led a magic life without serious
constitutional interrogation. It is now widely adopted among the states as
a basis for global, as opposed to source-based, taxation.5 1' The statutory
language is designed, precisely, to capture those people whose relation
to the state is marginal, and stubbornly refuses to fall within the old
pigeon-holes. The provision even carries with it a tradition of aggressive
enforcement. 1 2 And yet, when once someone has been identified as a
resident, no consideration is given to the marginal nature of the
residency.513 This is wrong. Surely, some form of apportionment is
appropriate. These are, today, not going to be the Dorrances, Fricks and
Howard Hughes of this world, nor are they primarily tax evaders (and
there is no question in my mind that the nondomiciliary resident was
invented as a proxy for rich, but evasive quarries).,s4 Today the

509. Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404,431,433 (1935).
510. See, e.g., Saenz Sans Prophecy, supra note 475, at 153-58. The current Court "has
become committed to the elaboration of a system with sovereign, self-governing states at its heart."
Id. at 156. On constitutional structure as part of constitutional analysis, see AMAR, supra note 473,
where structure provides an archaeologist's clue to the full meaning of the Bill of Rights; Lawrence
Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993); Steven G. Calabresi, We Are All
Federalists,We Are All Republicans: Holism, Synthesis, and the FourteenthAmendment, 87 GEO.
L.J. 2273 (1999) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION (1998)) (it is structure that provides the source of Amar's most enlightening

arguments).
511. See supranote 152 and accompanying text.
512. For example, in counting the days of presence within the state, only a few minutes'
presence is needed to charge a whole day's presence; leaving later than midnight makes the night at
the theater count for two days.
513. See discussion supraPart ll.D.
514. See supranote 165 and accompanying text.
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nondomiciliary residents are commuters-long and short-range, stay-athome workers in e-commerce, and snowbirds. The decent application of
rules should require greater care than in the past. Perhaps the incidence
of tax should not depend on whether the tax credit mechanisms of the
commuter's non-New York home impose direct double taxation, as in
the case of the Connecticut statute, or express the patient submission in
the New Jersey tax credit provisions." 5 Nor should it depend on the
lucky chance that snowbirds can claim a state that attracts new residents
by refusing to have an income tax, as do Florida and Nevada.1 6
The same response is appropriate in the guerrilla warfare between
51 7
Connecticut and New York that is holding Professor Zelinsky hostage.
His claims, too, demand a more "welcoming"5 8' attention from both
states, to be paid to his unusual and potentially unduly costly situation.51' 9
The bite of the state "double taxation" that is inconsistent with national
citizenship is that it becomes due solely by reason of the several states'
indifference to the taxpayer's reasons for assigning residential and work
places in different states.
What is the apportionment solution? That is much more difficult to
say, and within the self-imposed scope of this Article, perhaps
impossible. 2 ° Perhaps it is time to demand of Daniel Webster that he
deliver on his assurance, so glibly and fruitlessly proposed nearly two
centuries ago, to assure that every state apportion their taxes
appropriately. It is up to the states to suggest ways to limit taxation to
the income that, in light of the contesting claims, can be said to "belong"
to it; certainly, allocation is more likely to be the correct solution than
apportionment. It is a territorial question, because states are territorial
and exclusive; 52' but the commitment of the states of the Union is that
they will make the effort to make sure that neither state makes a demand

515. See supranotes 160-163 and accompanying text.
516. Both Connecticut and New Jersey long accommodated New York's aggressive tax
policies by refusing to enact income tax statutes, until the inadequacy of the local real property tax
to fiscal realities became too clear to ignore. The history of the adoption of the income tax in each
state is an interesting reflection of the forces that shape fiscal policy.
517. See supra notes 167-71 and accompanying text.
518. Justice Stevens speaks of the transient's "right to be treated as a welcome visitor rather
than an unfriendly alien." Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 500 (1999). By transposition, the expatriate
should be welcomed by each state.
519. See supra text accompanying note 165.
520. See generally D.J. Farage, Multiple Domcils and Multiple Inheritance Taxes-A Possible
Solution, 9 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 375 (1941) (efforts, not always persuasive, to find a fair basis for
allocating inheritance taxes to states having different relations to the decedent).
521. See generally Douglas Laycock, Equal Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The
ConstitutionalFoundationsof Choice of Law,92 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1992).
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that the totality of the facts will not sustain. Of course, to adopt one of
the commonplaces of tax law, absolute equality is not to be hoped for.
Different states have different levels of fiscal demand, and there is scope
for legislative choice in deciding who is, as a matter of public policy, to
bear a larger or smaller share of the fiscal burden. Even where there are
roughly similar levels of taxation and roughly similar taxing policies, the
complexities of modem economic life and the fine-meshed net of taxes
that is thrown over that life, make it impossible to assure, in every case,
the same tax experience, or no worse, for every one that is, in some
sense, similarly situated.
And, last of all, the Founder-State Trusts, the puzzling term, and
more puzzling choices to which it refers, that began this exercise and
impelled me to learn more about taxes, our restless federalism and the
dual citizenship we bear so easily. The Founder-State Trust concept is
like a "Pelasgian wall" in an otherwise contemporary edifice; 2 it can be
dismissed as a curiosity, but if we do so, we lose sight of much
understanding. But if we pause long enough, we can see how the original
authors of New York's early income tax perceived the linkage to the
trust, as entity, through the probate courts. What was originally, perhaps,
a useful proxy for in-state presence, however, over time became a
perpetual claim over assets that could outlive every other, more
functional connection to the taxing state.
There is really no justification to the Founder-State Trust model of
taxation: the asserted contact of a potentially available forum in the local
probate court is too tenuous to justify the significant result of full tax
liability (subject to rules relating to trust distribution of income to
beneficiaries). Invocation of this concept in the case of an inter vivos
trust seems totally indefensible.5 3 And the claim that jurisdiction based
on the settlor's death as a resident is a perpetual and unchanging
commitment to that state is insupportable. Yet counsel for the New York
State taxing authorities were not ashamed to insist on the fixedness, the

522. The Pelasgian Wall is a part of the Parthenon structure in Athens, "crudely hewn blocks
of limestone" that form part of the abutment of that famous structure, and are the remains of a
Mycenaean citadel on the Acropolis. The classic Greeks, perceiving the strangeness of these ancient
structures when they found them, called such dressed stone structures "cyclopean" and were content
to dismiss them as useful relics, to be used as foundations or other inconspicuous parts of the works
in which they appeared and not calling for further investigation. For the modem historian, of course,
the ancient stone-work points the way to a whole different culture, and its history. See, e.g.,
FRIEDRICH MATZ, THE ART OF CRETE AND EARLY GREECE 13 (1962).

523.

See Chase Manhattan Bank v. Gavin, 733 A.2d 782, 805-06 (Conn. 1999).
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perpetuity of trust taxability based on the original domicile of the
decedent under whose will the testamentary trust was established.524
I was originally impressed by the baneful symbolism of the
unyielding hold that assertion of a Founder's Trust domicile is intended
to imply. I must admit that all the images of some tyrant of a jealous
native land that is not willing to permit individuals to leave as they wish,
without payment of a forfeit, a Founder's Forfeit, if you will, is difficult
to eradicate. History gives too many examples, from Pharaoh hardening
his heart against the cries of the Jews who wished only to leave, to the
refuseniks and the Berlin Wall of our own history. Nor is it credible that
that motive does not play some role in legislative thinking. It seems very
likely that the probate court contact was fixed on, in part, because the
probate court, with its public records, gave easy access to the creation of
every testamentary trust.5z Probate courts long functioned as sporadic
traps for the unwary in the long, evasion marked history of the property
taxation of intangible property. In any event, this relic deserves to be put
at rest; and taxable events that are more attuned to the current status of
trusts, from time to time should be selected and employed. 526 The
Founder-State Trust is inconsistent with the relations of states of the
American Union and with the reality, and realistic expectations, of the
citizens of each state. Of course, in my home state, New York, the pure
Founder-State Trust doctrine has long been abandoned, and the choices
and problems inherent in the "New York brew" are different."
524. See supranote 136 and accompanying text.
525. See supraPart II.C.2.
526. In the selection of new taxable contacts as more appropriate than the Founder-State Trust
model, states may well consider what they will or can do about tax havens. The very evasion of
evasion that still partly justifies the Founder-State model argues for this. Perhaps more direct steps
could be taken to prevent tax-haven shopping for tax-free trustees. That possibility suggests, as does
a reasonable concern about putting local trustees at a disadvantage, that other, less manipulable
contacts should be given consideration. The domicile of possible or actual beneficiaries, present or
future, offer one area that should be explored; contacts of that nature, if not productive of much
likelihood of multiple taxation, would make sense. But, given the reality that trusts are almost
always taxable only on their undistributed income, the beneficiaries in question may not be
identifiable. In turn, any proxy for such unidentified or even unborn beneficiaries would be
extremely conventional in nature, perhaps once more a retreat the Founder-State Trust or to some
other factor that raises the possibility of multiple state claims and double taxation.
527. See supra Part lI.C.4. Given the New York brew, if New York law has a constitutional
infirmity, it is not so much that it may violate the National Privileges or Immunities Clause, as that
it may offend the Equal Protection Clause. It subjects to full global income tax an arbitrary selection
of New York trusteed trusts. As such, it allows New York trustees to seek out-of-state business on
the representation that trusts established with New York trustees will not be subject to New York
State income tax, while they can tell New York residents that their trusts will be no worse off than
are the settlors themselves. The existing New York State regulations are trustee friendly, but in an
arbitrary way. The rule can easily subject two trusts, which differ only in the state of residence of
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APPENDIX
STATE
Alabama
Arizona

Arkansas

STATUTORY
REFERENCE
ALA. CODE § 40-182(4) (2002)
ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§§ 43-1312, 43-1313
(2001)
ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 26-51-203 (Michie
2002)
ARK. TAX REG.

FOUNDER TRUST
TAXATION
No
No

No

§ 1.26-51-203 (1999)

California

CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE § 17742
(Deering 2002)

No

Colorado

COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 39-22-103 (2002)

No

Connecticut

CONN. GEN. STAT.

Yes

Delaware

DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

§ 12-701 (2001)

Yes

30, § 1601 (2001)

District of Columbia

D.C. CODE ANN.

Yes

§ 47-1809.03 (2002)
Georgia

GA. CODE ANN. § 487-22 (2002)

No

Hawaii

HAW. ADMIN. RuLE

No

§ 18-235-1.17 (1998)

the settlor, to very different New York tax results. The Equal Protection Clause question, of course,
is whether there is a rational basis for this expression of an implicit policy choice to forego some tax
revenue in return for improving the competitiveness of New York trustees. It is clear that the
increasing success of states that are aggressively wooing New Yorkers to establish non-New York
trusts will soon make the New York legislature reconsider the definition of resident and nonresident
trusts for income tax purposes. The legislature will be under pressure to protect local trustees from
their present disadvantages vis-jt-vis states the promise to exempt locally organized trusts from
income tax liability. See Gibbs & Carew, supranote 121 (arguing for tax relief to stem the outflow
of New York trusts); Matter of MargaretHitchcock, (Nassau Sun'. 1999), N.Y.L.J., Sept. 7, 1999, at
34, (Surrogate Radigan sends copy of his opinion permitting the transfer of twelve New York trusts
out-of-state for tax reasons to New York legislature). The legislature should consider its options
carefully.
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Idaho

Illinois
Indiana
Iowa

IDAHO ADMIN. RULE

§ 35.01.01.035 (2002)
35 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/1501 (2001)
IND. CODE § 6-3-1-12
(2002)
IOWA ADMIN. CODE

[Vol. 30:1133

No

Yes
No
Yes

§ 701-89.3(422)
(2001)

Kansas

KAN. STAT. ANN.

No

§ 79-32,109 (2001)

Kentucky

103 KY. ADMIN.

No

REGS. 19:010 (2001)
Louisiana

Maine

LA. REV. STAT. ANN.

§ 47:300.10 (West
2002)
ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 36, § 5102 (West

Yes

Yes

2001)

Maryland

MD. CODE ANN. TAx-

Yes

GEN. § 10-212(2002)

Massachusetts

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
62, § 10(c) (2002)
MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 206.18(1)
(2001)
MINN. STAT.
§ 290.01(7)(b) (2001)

Yes

Mississippi

MISS. CODE ANN.

No

Missouri

§ 27-7-27 (2001)
MO. REV. STAT.

Yes

Michigan

Minnesota

Yes

Yes

§ 143.331 (2001)

Montana

MONT. CODE ANN.

No

Nebraska

§ 15-30-135 (2001)
NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 77-2714.01(6)

Yes

(2002)

New Jersey

N.J. REV. STAT.
§ 54A: 1-2(o) (2002)
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New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon

Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

South Carolina

Utah
Vermont
Virginia

West Virginia
Wisconsin

A THEME FROM SAENZ

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-2(B)(1) (Mitchie
2002)
N.Y. TAX LAW § 605
(Consol. 2002)
N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-160.2 (2002)
N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 57-38-01(10) (2001)
OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 5747.24
(Anderson 2002)
OKLA. STAT. tit. 68,
§ 2353(6) (2002)
OR. REV. STAT.
§ 316.282 (2001)

No

PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

Yes

72, § 7301 (West
1999)
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 4430-5 (2001)
R.I. PIT § 90-13
(1990)
S.C. CODE ANN. § 126-30 (Law Co-op.
2001)

Yes
No
Yes
No

Yes
No

Yes

No

Yes

UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 59-10-103 (2002)
VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
32, § 5811 (2001)
VA. CODE ANN.
§ 58.1-302 (Mitchie
2002)
W. VA. CODE § 1121-7 (2001)
WIs. STAT § 71.14
'(2001)

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2002

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
1

1
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